

ANALYSIS OF LITERARY FAULTS MAHIMABHAṬṬA AS A CRITIC

**Concept of Poetic Blemishes in Sanskrit Poetics with
Special Reference to Mahimabhaṭṭa's Vyaktiviveka**

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Foreword

Mahimabhaṭṭa, the formidable author of Vyaktiviveka, is generally kept aside at a safe distance with some respect just as an inconvenient political colleague is sought to be retired with a show of proper honour. That Mahimabhaṭṭa is a highly talented writer on Sanskrit Aesthetics, with an unmistakable mark of originality, is not denied. Yet it is also not to be denied that his fate is somewhat unenviable.

In a sense he is the architect of his own fate because his genius shines more in destruction than in construction. So it is no wonder that the greatest appreciation of Mahimabhaṭṭa has come from none other than Śrī Harṣa, the most fearful philosopher of Advaita Vedānta. Śrīharṣa's almost superlative appreciation is inspired by the fact that Mahima's genius shows its best in theorising about the faults of poetry, not about the excellence of poetry.

Yet to the general reader Mahima is not so much known for his theory of poetic blemishes as for his bold challenge to the well-established theory of Dhvani. His criticism of Dhvani is the weakest link in his critical genius. Hence his critics have cleverly and judiciously caught him at this weakest link. It is not difficult to understand that Mahima is basically and temperamentally a logician, somehow fallen among the theorists of poetry. He is well-versed in the nuances of Buddhist logic and has not shrunk from upholding Dharmakīrti against Gautama. His meticulous detection of faults is also a deduction from his logical genius. When this genius enters the field of aesthetics it has aspired to turn poetic suggestion into syllogistic inference, for which he has been severely taken to task by Abhinavagupta in his Dhvanyāloka locana.

Unfortunately though Mahima opens his discourse with an elaborate treatment of the faults of poetry, his contribution in

this regard has been ignored by the later authors who, nevertheless were indebted to him with regard to this particular domain of criticism.

Dr. Rabi Sankar Banerjee has quite rightly and successfully shown how later authors like Mammata and others are indebted to him, unfortunately without bothering to acknowledge this debt. Even the great Vyāsa, not to speak of Kālidāsa and Bhāravi has not come unscathed out of Mahima's scrutiny ; sometimes his zeal has gone to an excess saturated with suggestions for corrections of texts which should better have been left uncorrected. Dr. Banerjee has subjected this critic of faults to his own light of criticism by showing what is right and what is wrong with Mahima's scrutiny of poetic blemishes.

I have no doubt that his critical study of a great critic who has been generally by-passed will be a valuable addition to the study of Sanskrit poetics, and will be highly welcomed by discerning students and scholars who are especially interested in judging the right relation between poetry and language.

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PREFACE

In this study of the faults of poetry Mahimabhaṭṭa, the author of Vyaktiviveka, has commanded my special attention. Mahima is more well-known for his challenge to the Dhvani-school of literary criticism. Understandably, the previous studies of Vyaktiviveka have generally revolved round Mahima's central position as an opponent of the dhvani theory. He has dismissed dhvani or suggestion as the tertiary dimension of meaning, and by elaborate argumentative illustrations has sought to include suggestiveness within the domain of syllogistic inference. The suggested meaning does not belong to the power of an expression as such, but to a process of inference of which it figures as the cognitive end-product. In the history of literary criticism the dhvani-theory developed by Ānandavardhana and Abhinavagupta has attained the height of respectability, and so Mahima's challenge to this well-established tradition has earned him well-merited renown. In the rising clamour of this spectacular controversy Mahima's great contributions to the concepts of literary faults have for long remained unstressed, if not totally unnoticed. But it is an undeniable fact that in the field of studies on literary faults Mahima definitely and almost conclusively set the pattern even for those later ālaṃkārikas like Maṃmaṭa and others who were unflinching adherents of the dhvani-school. They rejected Mahima's challenge to dhvani, but zealously retained his ideas of literary blemishes. It is thus both interesting and significant that the most confirmed opponent of the dhvani - school has cut out for himself an undisputable position of authority among the faithful followers of dhvani-tradition. Hence it may be said that though Mahima has not been able to establish any school of continuous tradition with his endeavour to supersede dhvani by inference, yet he has been singularly successful in establishing a school of study on literary faults to which even the later ālaṃkārikas of the dhvani - school have found it reasonable to subscribe. Mahima has expressly declared his intention to exclude the faults of Rasa which he calls antaraṅga anaucitya, or the faults of intrinsic impropriety, from the purview, of his work. He thinks Ānandavardhana has said the last word on intrinsic impropriety. So he has avowedly confined himself to the study of extrinsic faults, the faults belonging to the constructional or compositional aspect of literature, which he terms bahiraṅga anaucitya. He is rightly conscious that faults apparently belonging to even the exterior of poetry finally percolate into the interior and seek to vitiate Rasa, the soul of poetry itself. In his elaborate discussion on these faults in the second chapter of the Vyaktiviveka he has

shown both logical astuteness and critical insight. In the modern studies on Mahima we have not yet found a fairly detailed critical interpretation of Mahima's treatment of poetic faults.

In the present dissertation we have not simply tabulated the poetic faults conceived and illustrated by Mahima. We have interpreted Mahima's conception of each fault and critically analysed it along with chosen illustrations. We have weighed in balance each logically significant observation, subjected it to our own independent critical examination and have supported or rejected Mahima's position in the light of our independent examination. We have tried to focus the attention of the readers whenever Mahima gives unmistakable evidence of originality and sharp critical acumen, but sometimes we have felt that despite incisive insight Mahima has often gone astray with his arguments verging on tricky sophistry. There we have reacted with sharp criticism and drawn the attention of the readers to the fact that Mahima himself is at fault. In short, we have also tried to discriminate between what should be retained and what rejected in Mahima's disertation on poetic faults.

We have begun with Bharata and preceded through Bhāmaha Daṇḍin, Vāmana, Rudraṭa, Anandavardhana and Abhinavagupta before reaching Mahimabhaṭṭa. This survey is not purely historical. It has been made in order to show the development culminating in Mahima in the field of a continuous tradition of study on poetic blemishes. Before Mahima the treatment of poetic faults was more or less of the nature of dry tabulation. The faults were defined principally in the form of assertions without getting the necessary logical confirmation out of any penetrating interpretation of the concepts involved therein. The faults in relation to Rasa have indeed received adequate justice from the pen of Anandavardhana. But Anandavardhana's deeper analysis of Rasadoṣas has proceeded from the requisites of fine poetic sensibility and not from the logical analysis of the ideas of faults expressed in corresponding illustrations. When one deals with Rasadoṣas the scope of logic is extremely limited. There one makes the appeal to the aesthetic experience of the poet and the critic, and not to the intellectual discipline demanded by stern logic. The position is reasonably changed when one comes to the treatment of extrinsic faults which flow from the constructional aspect of a literary composition. Here we have got to scan the logical syntax, the subject predicate relation in the underlying propositions through which the poetic meaning is sought to be expressed. Faulty predication, syntactical dissociation, dispensable repetition, irrelevant statement or non-statement of the relevant — all these faults of construction require

an elaborate logical analysis. Mahima has set for himself this analytical task which he has carried to culmination almost with a vengeance. Often he has taken pains to show how these defects finally invade the field of poetic sensibility that becomes a casualty of faulty construction. That almost a puritan concern for logical accuracy of syntax has not blunted the aesthetic sensibility of Mahima is evident from his occasional treatment of faults in the figures of speech. As for example, Mahima has refused to recognise pure Śleṣa, which is unrelieved by any other supporting poetic figure, as a figure of speech at all. Here Mahima, in our considered opinion, has correctly supported the stand-point of Udbhaṭa to the effect that pure Śleṣa as such has no exclusive scope in poetry. Such well-quoted verses as *Yena dhvasto* — etc. have been rightly condemned by Mahima as a clever contrivance of a skilful versifier. It has no real claim to be a figure of speech, because it does not figure as an adornment of real poetry. He has not spared even Kālidāsa for his sundering of a proper name into a descriptive phrase such as *Daśapūrvaratham* (Raghu VIII, 29) which evidently loses the force of identification inherent in a proper name. Not even the great Vyāsa has been spared for his fault of repetitive prolixity in the famous verse of the Bhagavad, *gītā, yadā yadā hi dharmasya* etc. We have underlined all those examples and observations which bear the mark of critical poetic insight. But when he has gone too far in his zeal for discovering faults we have not spared him our own criticism. Thus Mahima has found fault with the famous verse of the Kumārasambhava - *Dvayaṃ gataṃ samprati śocanīyatāṃ samāgamaprārthanaya kapāliṇaḥ/Kalā ca sā kāntimaṭi kalāvatas tvamasya lokasya ca netrakaumudī*//

Kumāra. V. 71.

It goes to the credit of Kuntaka that he has been able to bring out the deeper poetic significance of the term *Kapālin* which cannot be replaced by any synonym. Here Mahima's contention that another substantive word should have been placed to identify Śiva shows that he has completely missed the fine point made by Kuntaka or has been overwhelmed by his fault-finding fastidiousness. All those examples which gave us occasion for definite disagreement from Mahima have also been underlined by us with necessary arguments. Our assessment of Mahima in relation to his treatment of poetic faults shows his genius in proper perspective and places him in the correct position. He is far above the mediocre without rising to a dizzy height. Mahima is well-versed in logic. He had acquaintance even with such an abstruse and less well-known work as the *Vādanyāya* of Dharmakīrti which he quotes with approval even against Gautama. But it would have been better for the tradi-

tion of literary criticism in Sanskrit if Mahima could keep his enthusiasm for logic within proper limits while going forward to write a treatise on literary criticism. The same enthusiasm for logic which we have found in his endeavour to bring Dhvani within the fold of Syllogistic inference, has been carried forward in his treatment of poetic faults. The result has not been always happy, though at times he has evenly matched his logical insight with poetic insight, and the height of a genius is fairly evident on these occasions. Considering both his strength and weakness we may conclude that on the whole Mahima deserves the encomium conferred on him by no less a philosophical personality than Śrīharṣa in the following verse of the Khaṇḍana :—

Doṣaṃ vyaktiviveke'muṃ kavilokavilocane /

Kāvya-mīmaṃsīṣu prāptamahimā mahimā'dṛta //

(Khaṇḍana with Vidyāsāgarī Commentary

Chow edn. page 1327)

We have deliberately left out Mammaṭa's treatment of literary flaws, first because it has been elaborately studied by other scholars such as Professor Dr. V. Raghvan in his voluminous introduction to Bhoja's Śṛṅgāraprakāśa and Professor Dr. Bechan Jha in his work, Concept of Poetic Blemishes, and secondly because Mammaṭa's treatment is more of the nature of a long schematic tabulation than of an original contribution. His treatment of Rasadoṣas lacks the depth of aesthetic analysis that we find in Dhvanyāloka, and his treatment of extrinsic faults is of the form of a catalogue, the monotony of which is nowhere relieved by the flashes of critical genius and logical insight that we find in Mahimabhaṭṭa. He had borrowed the concepts of Rasadoṣas mainly from Ānandavardhana and those of constructional faults from other predecessors including Mahimabhaṭṭa. All the extrinsic faults shown by Mammaṭa can be easily brought under the five-fold classificatory scheme of Mahima. Mahima's scheme does not suffer from the dullness of elaborate prolixity. Since he is concerned with unfolding the logical foundation of faults, his five-fold classification is based on broad logical generalisation intended to cover the most prominent and significant flaws from which not even the great poets are free. Mahima is thus undoubtedly the most original aesthetic thinker on the nature of extrinsic faults. It is significant that Śrīharṣa's respectful reference to Mahima (which we quoted earlier) has come forth in the context of the concept of anaucitya or impropriety which Mahima has used as the most comprehensive term indicating the most general foundation of all possible faults. In this respect he approves the dictum of Ānandavardhana — Anaucityādrte nānyad rasabhaṅgasya

kāraṇam / Prasiddhaaucitya bandhastu rasasyopaniṣat parā // Dhv. III, page 362. The later ālaṅkārikas thought it impossible to improve upon what Mahima did in respect of bahiraṅga anaucitya. None of them has dared to delve into the logical analysis which Mahima brought to bear upon his concepts on extrinsic faults. They have questioned his challenge to Dhvani, but could not criticise any item of the second chapter of Vyaktiviveka. Perhaps they felt themselves subdued by the logical acumen of Mahima as regards the concepts of constructional faults, and so have elaborately borrowed from him. The author of Ekāvalī has exactly taken the five-fold classification of bahiraṅga faults from Mahima, and the illustrations that he has chosen are also basically borrowed from him. Narendraprabhāsūri, the author of Alaṅkāra mahodadhī, has almost borrowed verbatim his examples of five faults from Mahima. Viśvanātha, Hemachandra and Gaṅgānanda Kavi, the author of Kāvyaḍākinī, have generally followed the scheme and tabulation of Mammaṭa without any trace of mentionable originality. Since Mammaṭa himself could scarcely add anything original to what had already been said and done by his illustrious predecessors, we may safely pronounce Mahima to be the last great giant in ālaṅkāra literature with the sole exception of Jagannātha. It may be safely said in a general way that between Mahimabhaṭṭa and Jagannātha we find no great original thinker in the field of Indian aesthetics. The greatness of both these thinkers lies in an extraordinary combination of powerful logic and aesthetic imagination. Jagannātha had the advantage of belonging to an era of intellectual life illuminated by the Navya-nyāya technique of analysis. Mahima flourished long before the emergence of Navyanyāya. But his deep erudition in both Buddhist and Brahminical logic helped him to emerge as an acutely original thinker in the field of aesthetics. Both Mahima and Jagannātha may be credited with drawing a line of demarcation between aesthetic feeling and aesthetic understanding. It is true that interpretation of poetry is not poetry itself. A great critic must be equipped with the dual faculty of aesthetic sensibility and analytical understanding. But no analytical understanding can be adequate without a logical discipline. Concepts are to be analysed, propositions are to be confirmed or rejected, the syntactical structure is to be dissected and the meanings are to be unfolded for the proper understanding of aesthetic accuracy. Mahima has attempted to do just these things in the whole body of the Vyaktiviveka which seems to suggest that aesthetics, to receive proper justice as a discipline of thought, must take adequate help from logic, the light that illumines all the Śāstras. Even a great thinker blunders into over-enthusiasm, and so we find that

Mahima is often swayed off his balance by his excessive concern for logical analysis even at the cost of aesthetic imagination.

The predecessors of Mahima, have been placed by me in separate appendices, one for each, so that greater attention may be focussed on Mahima the author that I have mainly dealt with. In the appendix on Ānandavardhana I have advanced a long critique of 'Svapadavācayatā' which is generally accepted as a Rasadoṣa. In the appendix on Daṇḍin, in the context of the figure simile, I have made an elaborate analysis of the logical concept of similarity and concluded in favour of accepting similarity as a fundamental category (Padārtha) of reals in conformity to Prabhākara's position, which has been finally accepted by neologicians like the authors of Dinakārī and Rāmarudrī.

I respectfully acknowledge my debt to my teacher guide and supervisor, Sri Hemanta Kumar Ganguly for the ungrudging help and labour that he has bestowed on the dissertation and to Prof. Dr. Ramaranjan Mukherjee, Vice-Chancellor, Burdwan University, for many valuable suggestions that have gone to improve the thesis. To Professor Gopikamohon Bhattacharjee of Kurukṣetra University, Pt. Bidhubhusan Bhattacharya of Jadavpur University, Dr. Sitanath Goswami, the officiating Head of the Department of Sanskrit, Jadavpur University, Dr. Debranjana Mukherjee, Principal Bidhan Chandra College, Assansol, and to my colleagues in the Department of Sanskrit I am indebted for unstinted co-operation and inspiration.

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ABBREVIATIONS

V. V.	—	Vyaktiviveka
V. J.	—	Vakroktijīvita
Māgha	—	Śiśupālavadham of Māgha
Kumāra	—	Kumārasambhava
U. C.	—	Uttararāmacarita
H. C.	—	Harṣacarita
Raghu	—	Raghuvaṃśa
Kirāt	—	Kirātārjunīya
Dhv	—	Dhvanyāloka
N. S.	—	Naṭyaśāstra.

**ANALYSIS OF LITERARY FAULTS
MAHIMABHAṬṬA AS A CRITIC**

MAHIMABHAṬṬA

Chapter I

VIDHEYĀVIMARŚA

Mahima's Vyaktiviveka is a bold specimen of destructive criticism which as such is bound to suffer from all the faults of a negative approach. In the second chapter wherein he elaborately deals with poetic faults he himself records his conscious realisation that he may be justifiably accused of a destructive and negative approach which outrages the taste of cultured critics. Mahima finds special delight in detecting faults in others, especially in poets of acknowledged skill and fame. He apprehends that he may be misunderstood by appreciative critics as a person uncharitably given to fault-finding. He defends himself on the plea that he has taken to this path of fault-finding resorted to by the people of uncultured taste and has shunned the appreciative way of the cultured critics only at the behestful insistence of his students (Mugdhaḥ kiṃ Kimasabhya eṣa bhajate mātsaryamaunaṃ nu' kiṃ Prṣṭo na prativakti yaḥ kila janastatreṭi sambhāvayet /Chātrābhyar-thanayā tato'dya sahasaivotsrjya mārgaṃ satāṃ paurobhāgyamabhāgyabhājanāsevyam mayāṅgikṛtam// V. V. II, 1). He is also conscious that he is eager to show the same faults in others as are found in his own composition, and yet has not taken himself to task for these. He explains his conduct by citing the example of the physician who himself relishes unwholesome diet that he advises others to give up —

Svakṛtiṣvayantritaḥ kathamanuśiṣyādanyamayamiti na
vācyam/

vārayati bhisagapathyaditarān svayamācarannapi tat //

This attitude certainly makes Mahima Vulnerable to the charge of insincerity as a critic, given to the way of boating about trifles which may easily be ignored by a critic inspired with constructive seriousness of purpose. This explains his laborious effort at finding faults where they are really found absent on proper examination. Of course there are a few occasions when we are impressed by flashes of constructive criticism. His treatment of poetic faults lays the foundation for the later writers on rhetoric

like Mammaṭa and others. These later writers very often rest content with dry and boring classification without the redeeming light of penetrating analysis displayed by Mahima at every step. Mahima deliberately omits Rasa doṣas of poetry. All faults may be brought under a superclass of anaucitya or impropriety. This impropriety again may be divided into two types, intrinsic and extrinsic. The intrinsic type belongs to the problem of Rasa, and this has been dealt with fairly well by Mahima's predecessors, especially Ānandavardhana. Mahima feels that he has nothing new to offer on the problem of intrinsic faults and so has thought it wise to omit them. Hence he concerns himself only with the problem of extrinsic impropriety or Vahiraṅga anaucitya which has been broadly divided into following five types :—

Vidheyāvimarśa, Prakramabheda, Kramabheda, Paunaruktya and Vācyāvacana (Vācyāvacana and avācyāvacana compressed into one). These are called extrinsic faults, since these are concerned with the constructional or compositional aspect of poetry, with the exterior vehicle of expression which carries the meaning of poetry.

Mahimabhaṭṭa has to his credit a fairly long discussion on the fault of vidheyāvimarśa in which the meaning of negation in the context of predication receives an elaborate and penetrating treatment from his hand. Vidheyāvimarśa is the fault of involved predication such that the intended predicate, due to defective syntax, cannot be directly related to the subject, but is to be brought out by analysis and its predicability is to be understood by way of implication. This is specially evident in the case where the negative sense is misplaced in predication due to the syntactical defect in a compound form. The position may be clarified by taking into consideration the following two propositions— 'A is not B' and A is 'not-B'. these two propositions do not carry an identical predication. In the first one it is the negation of B that is predicated of A, while in the second what is predicated is not the negation of B, but something positive which is other than B. This shifting of emphasis from a pure negation to a mixed negation charged with a positive sense accounts for the difference between two seemingly identical propositions. Predominance of negation in the predication technically furnishes a case of Prasajya pratiṣedha while the predominance of positive sense through a prefatory negation constitutes a case of Paryudāsa. The term Prasajya-pratiṣedha and Paryudāsa analytically involve their connotations. Even a pure negation is not possible without relating it to its positive counter co-relate (Pratiyogin) which constitutes the definite negatum. In other words negation is understandable

only in relation to something that is negated. Hence the negatable counter co-relate must be dragged into our imaginative memory in order to account for the very possibility of negation.

This fixation of the negatum in imagination is *prasakti*; so it is *prasajya-pratiṣedha*, that is negation of the positive counter co-relate after fixing it in mind. Perhaps for this reason the major section of the *Naiyāyikas* does not admit negation in case of a totally non-existent chimera such as a rabbit horn or a sky flower. Never and nowhere a total fiction can be established as an existent. So it is logically and epistemically impossible to assert non-existence of something that is universally absent as a matter of possible experience —

Alikapratīyoyikābhāvo na svikriyāte.

The *Naiyāyikas* explain the negation rabbit-horn as the negation of 'belonging to a rabbit' in the horn (*śṛṅge śaśīyatvābhāvaḥ*).

The analytical connotation of the term *paryudāsa* has been brought out by *Ruyyaka* in the following observation.

Kimcidvarjayitvā kasyacidupadeśo nirāsaḥ

When we say A is 'not-B' the predication does not stop with negation of B but proceeds to something positive C or D which is other than B. This settling down of negation into a positive content is the meaning of *Paryudāsa*. We reject something in order to attain something; rejection is only a means to reception. In *Paryudāsa* negation is generally submerged in a compound. In *Prasajya-pratiṣedha* negation stands in its own right pre-eminently over the surface, not in subservience to a compound form, but in direct relation to a verb. This distinction of *Prayudāsa* and *prasajya-pratiṣedha* is sharply underlined in the following off-quoted verses.

Pradhānatvaṃ vidhīryatra pratiṣedhe pradhānatā/
Paryudāsāḥ sa vijñeyo yatrottara padena mañ // .
Apradhānyam vidhīryatra pratiṣedha pradhānatā/
Prasajyapratīṣedho'san Kriyayā Saha yatra nañ //

As an instance of *Vidheyāvimarśa* in the context of a faulty application of the negative particle. *Mahimabhaṭṭa* points to the expression '*asamrabdhavān*' in the verse.

Samrambhaḥ karikīṭameghaśakaloddeśena simhasya yaḥ
Sarvasyaiva sa jātimātraniyato hevākaleśaḥ kila/
ityāśādviradakṣayāmbudaghatābandhe pyasamrabdhavān
yo 'asu kutra camatkṛteratiśayaṃ yātvambikākeśarī//

—“That insolent intolerance which is shown by a lion towards an insignificant elephant or to the bits of patchy clouds, is indeed a part of inglorious vanity dictated by the clan character of the common run of lions, but despite this that lion of the Divine mother Ambikā, which did not get provoked even at the elephants of the quarters, or at the massive array of doom's day clouds, indeed rises to the peak of surpassing excellence.”

The intended meaning of the expression is burdened with an emphasis on the sense of negation, —“The lion did not fly into a rage”. But in the compound the meaning of negation has been subordinated to a positive emphasis which makes an unhappy sense such that the lion was ‘not-angered’. So we come to the distinction between ‘not angry’ and ‘not-angry’. The second expression points to a positive disposition other than anger, which is quite different from the intended sense. Thus the sense and expression are at variance, the compound form being a faulty, vehicle of expressing the intention. The fine shade of distinction may be brought out by contrasting the two expressions ‘na gacchati’ and ‘a gacchati’. The latter expression is considered a grammatical fault, since the intended sense is simple absence of going which is more happily expressed by the former expression ‘na gacchati’ with its definite emphasis on negation, a gacchati does not stop with mere negation, but proceeds to a positive sense of staying for which negation serves only as a preface. The grammarians do not recognise the propriety of such a negative compound with a tiñanta verb even for emphasising a positive content. It is quite clear that ‘asamrabdhavān,’ is definitely an unhappy expression, for the context suggests only a negation of anger and not a positive content of quiet ! Mahimabhaṭṭa could have been quite correct if he contented himself with noting this discrepancy between the sense and the expression, since the predicability of negation stands shaded and screened by the compound which by its very syntactical structure finally rests on an unintended positive sense. Hence the predicative sentence which requires a direct predication of negation suffers from the fact that the compound does not allow the subject to have a straight cognitive contact with the predicate which is relegated to a subordinate or submerged position. Unfortunately, Mahimabhaṭṭa enters into a disproportionately lengthy discussion on the very possibility of nañ samāsa in the form ‘asamrabdhavān.’ He concludes that the negative particles can enter into a compound only in the sense of Paryudāsa and that Prasajyapratīṣedha invariably debars a negative compound. To prove his contention he forces a sense of Paryudāsa even on some well-known compounds in which Prasajyapratīṣedhas is too pal-

pable to be denied. Thus Mahima is at pains to argue that such well-known compared-forms as 'asṛāddhabhājī' and asūryampaśyā are cases of paryudāsa and not prasajyapratishedha. His argument may be summarised as follows :—

The expression asṛāddhabhojī means a person who does not participate in a funeral feast. Apparently here the stress is laid on non-participation, but not on a positive participation in any kind of feast other than the funeral one. So one may be easily misled into thinking that the compound conveys an idea of prasajyapratishedha and not of paryudāsa. Mahima counters this 'mis-guided' thought. The negative particle is not syntactically connected with the funeral feast (Śrāddha) or with the simple action of participation (bhjana kriyā), but with the nominative element, that is, the participating person. The kṛt suffix ñini has been added to the verb in the nominative sense, Śrāddhabhojā means śrāddhabhojanakartā and asṛāddhabhojī should therefore mean śrāddhabhojana akartā. But the meaning of akartā does not stop with kartṛtvābhāva. In connection with śrāddhabhojana it would mean a non-participant in funeral feast, which does not rest content with simple absence of participation, but finally implies the person's participation in non-funeral feasts śrāddhetarabhojitvaṃ gamyate). Mahima himself has not analysed the meaning in so many details, yet to bring out any cogent sense; out of his laconic remarks his intention requires such an analytical clarification. Hence Ruyyaka remarks - asṛāddhabhojītyatra tu nanā bhoktussamanvaye śrāddhabhoktṛvyatirikto 'pi vidhasāśyādiḥ prañiyate — V. V. page 194. He applies the same method of analysis to the case of asūryampaśyā (a lady of the harem who cannot come out to see the sun). The false idea of prasajyapratishedha creeps in through a confusion between the compound from (Vṛtti) and its sentential analysis (vighraha vākya). When the compound is analysed into a sentence such as śrāddhaṃ na bhunkte. We undoubtedly fall back upon prasajyapratishedha. In the sentence the negation clearly goes with the verbal form of action (bhajanakriyā) and the stress is unmistakably on the negation of eating. When the sentence is compressed into a compound there is a definite shift of emphasis from Prasajyapratishedha to Paryudāsa. If the shift is unnoticed and the impression of prasajyapratishedha inspired by the sentential form is carried or miscarried forward into the compound, a non-discerning reader is trapped by the illusion that the compound too is charged with the sense of Prasajyapratishedha. Mahima here draws a fine shade of distinction between the sense of siddhatā and

sādhyaṭā. The distinction can be traced to the well-known concept of verb contributed by Bhartṛhari in his Vākyapadīya.

Yāvat Siddhamasiddham vā sādhyatvena vidhīyate /
āśritakramarūpatvāt sā kriyete pratiyate —

Vākyapadīya, 3rd Kāṇḍa, Kriyāsamuddesa.

A verb is not a term but is conceived as a **process** of action. A process is an unsettled stream. All the cases or Kāraḥ combine and co-operate to carry the process to completion. Hence the Kāraḥ are subordinate to the verb in the sense that the verb sets the purpose for which the Kāraḥ have their being and existence. Thus a verb conceived as conveying the sense of a process is sādhyā; this sense does not alter whether we use the verb in the past, further or present. A verb in the past tense speaks of the completion of an action. It is only a process that stands completed for the time being; yet the predominant sense of the verb as such does not lie so much in its completion as in its process that has come to a stop for a while. It is as if a running stream is barricaded ahead at a distance. The barricade cannot alter the running nature of the stream, which seethes with an agitation in protest against its arrested motion. Similarly the past tense does not do away with the unsettled nature of the verb which is always a sādhyā whether it appears as completed or not. So a verb cannot be conceived as a term which has a fixity and rigidity that leans too much on settledness. When a verb is transformed into a verbal noun we can clearly see the difference. A verbal noun makes a term of the verb and cloud its progressional character by an appearance of fixity and immobility. When 'pacati' is replaced 'pākaṁ karoti' the word pāka stands as a term which appears as the fixed terminus of a relation takes of substantive character such as we get in the sentence 'kaṭaṁ karoti'. Whether pāka and kaṭa are completed or not its nature is logically settled as the destination towards which the verbal relation is directed. This shows the divergence between the factual and the logical significance of a word. Thus the verbal noun tends to violate the original nature of a verb by turning the sādhyā into siddhā, the progressive process into a stationary substantive, as if the wanderer has come to rest. Logically speaking 'pacati' cannot be replaced by 'pākaṁ karoti' without alteration of the original logical significance. Analysis of a proposition is no substitute for the proposition itself. This has been forcefully brought out by Bhartṛhari who beautifully anticipates the following subtle observation of Bertrand Russel :

"A proposition, in fact, is essentially a unity and when analysis has destroyed the unity, no enumeration of constituents will restore the proposition. The verb when used as a verb embodies the unity of a proposition, and thus is distinguishable from the verb considered as a term" (The principles of Mathematics – page 50).

This distinction between the concepts of siddha and sādhya has been extended to cover the distinction between a vṛtti and a vākya. Approximately speaking a vṛtti is a compact synthetic structure into which a sentence is compressed wherein its sentential character is too suppressed to be discernible without an analytical interpretation. Thus samāsa is a vṛtti which can be analysed into a sentence. Yet the logical character of the vṛtti and vākya is not the same. The sentence is sādhya, in other words, is expressive of a process. We can see the difference by taking into consideration the distinction between the two expressions such as — 'A person does not move' and 'An immobile person'. The former expression signifies a process and the later expression transforms the process into an attribute at rest. Thus 'does not move' expresses the sādhya character, while 'immobile' is a siddha adjective. Similar is the distinction between śrāddham na bhuñkte and aśrāddhabhojī Prasajyapraṭiṣedha conveyed by a sentence turns into paryudāsa in vṛtti.

A careful scrutiny of Mahima's position raises some pertinent doubts which cannot be easily answered. If it is urged that in aśrāddhabhojī the negative particle is connected with the nini pratyaya which indicates the sense of nominative, there is no reason why asamrabdhavān should not be justified on the same score. In asamrabdhavān the 'Ktavatu pratyaya' also stands for the nominative in general and so the negation, by the very logic of Mahima, may be connected with the nominative sense thus justifying the use of the expression asamrabdhavān. So Mahima's imputation of the fault vidheyāvimarśa to the expression concerned falls through by his self-defeating argument. If Mahima means that in aśrāddhabhojī we feel the prominence of a positive sense while in asamrabdhavān the feeling-content has a pronounced negative leaning, it finally boils down to a matter of feeling which nobody is under command to feel in the way decided by Mahima. Moreover, a doubt may be raised regarding the very fundamentals of Mahima's presupposition. According to the peculiar syntax of Sanskrit, in the sentence 'sa na gagacchati.' The tiñ suffix stands for a nominative in general which is particularised by the concrete pronominal nominative of the sentence. However, in this case it is assumed that the negative goes with

the verb involved in *gacchati*, and not with the *tiñ* suffix signifying the nonimative. But why should it be so? Why should we not here too take the meaning to be *gamana-akartā*? So again it turns out to be a matter of feeling. We feel that in the sentence concerned the emphasis is on the negation of going and not on the non-going person who has other action to his credit. Authoritative convention has confirmed this feeling of negation without proper authentication. We can appreciate the position of the grammarians, according to whom, in any sentence the meaning of the verb is predominant and so negation is attached to the sense of the verb which stands as the negatum. Any way, one cannot be blamed if he feels unlike Mahima that in *āsrāddhaboḥi* also negation goes with the meaning of the verb and not with the nominative sense conveyed by the *Kṛt* suffix. If Mahima's contention to the effect that *āsrāddhabhoḥi* or *asūryampaśyā* is a case of *paryudāsa* is accepted as final we cannot account for the fact the Patañjali himself has initially questioned the validity of such compounds and conceded at last that in such peculiar cases '*asamartha samāsa*' should be allowed. Along with the two examples of *asamartha samāsa* cited above Patañjali has listed such compound forms as

*a-kiñcitkurvāṇam, amāsaṃharamāṇam,
agādhād utsṛṣṭam, apunargeyāḥ ślokaḥ*

M. B. 2. 1. 1. pp 320-21

N. S. edu. Vol. II.

In all these cases Kaiyaṭa clearly shows that negation is related to the verbal sense

*bhujinā nanaḥ sambandho na tu śrāddhena, śrāddhe
bhojananiṣedhāvagamāt.*

Kaiyaṭa here does not state—

*bhojanakartrā nanaḥ sambandhaḥ
śrāddhabhojanakartṛtvanīṣedhāvagamāt*

Similarly Kaiyaṭa explains *akiñcitkurvāṇa* as '*kiñcid akurvaṇam*', *amāsaṃ māṇam* as *māsamaharamāṇam* in which the negative is attached to the verbs and not to the *śānac* suffix which indicates the nominative. We would have had no hesitation to accept Mahima's contention if he could have countered Patañjali and Kaiyaṭa with convincing arguments. But Mahima has only asserted his belief and the logic of his assertion is very weak indeed.

In the verse samprambhaḥ karikīṭa etc. Mahima again finds fault, in the juxtaposition of the two pronouns 'yah' and 'asau' in the fourth foot of the verse. According to the ancient dictum 'yattadornityo'bhisambandhaḥ' the use of the two pronouns yad and tad is always inter-related through natural expectancy. Hence the pronoun 'yad' to complete its referential function requires the word 'tad' and vice versa. But these are exceptional cases where 'tad' may be used without its co-relation with 'yad', if the reference is completed even by its solitary use. Thus 'tad' may be without 'yad' with reference to a well-established object as the case Kalā ca sā kāntimatī kalāvataḥ. Such solitary use of 'tad' is also permissible in reference to a pre-cognised object (anubhū-taviṣaya) as in 'Te locane vidhure kṣipantī etc. Again such use is tolerated when 'tad' as a simple pronoun is charged with a well-understood back reference (prakrānta-viṣaya). But such solitary use of 'yad' unaccompanied by 'tad' is never permissible according to Mahima.

The reason is that 'yad' can never complete a reference by itself, because it always touches the referent only through the intervening referential function of tad.

It may be contended against Mahima that the pronominal form asau has been used here in the sense saḥ (tad), so he is not fair in detecting the fault. There are instances in which the pronouns 'idam' and 'adas' serve the purpose of 'tad'. This is apparent in the verses —

Yo'vikalpamidamarthamaṇḍalaṃ paśyatīśa,

nikhilaṃ bhavadvapuḥ /

svātmapakṣapāripūrite jagatyasya nityasukhinaḥ

kuto bhayaṃ //

Smṛtibhūsmṛtibhūvihito yenāsau

rakṣatāt kṣatād yuṣmān

Against this argument Mahima offers a very weak defence. He says something like this — then let it be accepted as a principle that 'idam' and 'adas' may bear the sense of 'tad' only when they are related to the word yah placed at a fair distance or when the two related pronominal terms are used in different case-endings.

tarhi yathādarsanaṃ vyavahitānāmeva, avyavahitātve vā
bhinnāvibhaktināmeva sā parikalpyatām, itarathā tu teṣāṃ
tatparikalpanam anyayameva. — V. V. page 208.

It is very difficult for us to detect any logic in the queer suggestion of Mahima quite contrary to Mahima's suggestion, when 'idam' and 'adas' are used in juxtaposition with yad and in the same case-ending their relation with yad. Become more pronounced being more easily understandable. That some distance intervening between 'yad' and 'idam' or 'adas' offers a better understanding of relation or a better discernment of the sense of 'ted', is quaint logic. Similarly, use of different case-endings in two inter-related words does not lead to any greater grasp of the relation.

Again Mahima's distinction between prakrānta (an object which has already been spoken about) and prakramsyamāna (an object which will be spoken about) is untenable. In the verse under consideration the pronoun 'yah' refers to ambikākeśarī. In the particular construction yah stands at the beginning of the fourth foot and 'ambikākeśarī' at the end. So Mahima contends that 'yad' cannot refer to ambikākeśarī which in the sequence of construction comes last and so has not been spoken about when 'yah' is used. In a single verse what has been spoken about (prakrānta) and what has not been or will be (prakramsyamāna or aprākṛanta) does not depend on the place a word occupies in syntactical sequence. The point is whether the object figures in our understanding or not, irrespective of the place occupied by the corresponding word in the constructional sequences. A discerning critic just after reading the verse grasps the intended import that the poet here intends to emphasise the excellence of Ambikā's lion over other members of the same clan. So in understanding of both the poet and the reader ambikākeśarī is already Prakrānta and there is no difficulty in relating 'yah' with ambikākeśarī in a syntactical analysis which comes after the emergence of total understanding. Of course, for a child, not yet sufficiently accustomed with the laws of syntax, the process may be reversed. He takes the words one by one, keeps on laboriously groping for understanding the relation of one word with another, and only at last comes to grasp the total meaning. Mahima certainly does not stand here in favour of an ill-equipped beginner. His observations are meant for the discerning critics who, however, do not find any difficulty in relating yah to ambikākeśarī simply because the latter comes late.

Following the logical consequence of Mahima's contention one shall not be permitted to use an adjective before the noun. An adjectival word is always subordinate to the noun. So how can we use the adjective before the noun because the object of which it is an adjective has not yet been spoken about. In that case an adjective is

always to be used as a predicate, because only then the subject (noun) becomes prakrānta.

In the verse under consideration the third fault of Vidheyāvimarśa is spotted in the compound ambikākeśarī. This compound has a concealed predication which is revealed to a discerning critic. The first member of the compound, i. e. Ambikā stands as a mark of demarcation which emphasises the excellence of her lion over the common leonine herd. This particular lion, unlike others of the kind, stands unperturbed even before the most provocative objects. This majestic patience is endowed upon it by its association with the great goddess Ambikā. Hence here the poet likes to put his emphasis not on the lion itself, but on the goddess from whom its superior quality is derived. The poet means to say — this lion is separate from the rest of the clan, because it is Ambikā's. When the poet says — 'the lion is Ambikā's', the force of predication is conferred upon Ambikā whose association makes the lion what it is worth for, and the subject lion stands only as an object of reiterative reference.

The grammatical form of a sentence often does not tally with the form demanded by the intended sense. The statement — it is my pen' may be a reply to two different questions, 'Whose pen is it?' and 'What is this object of yours?' The form of logical reply to the first question, should have been 'this pen is mine', but we often make the same statement, 'it is my pen' to both the questions, though it does not bring out the real predicative character of 'mine' and the emphasis it bears, which are intended by the statement, 'this pen is mine'.

The compound ambikākeśarī may be analysed into the statement-form 'ambikāyāḥkeśarī'. Grammatically Ambikāyāḥ is an instance of vyadhikaraṇa adjective in which case it is not related to the noun in a proposition of identity. It is a case of 'bhedānvayiviśeṣaṇam' unlike nīlamutpalam, in which case the adjective nīlam provides an instance of samānādhikaraṇa or abhendanvayi-viśeṣaṇa, it being the constituent of a proposition of identity. In both these instances a compound is grammatically permitted under the rule 'samarthaḥ padavidhiḥ'. In a saṣṭhitatpuruṣa compound the sense of the last number is predominant and that of the first member is subordinate to it (uttarapadārthapradhānastatpuruṣaḥ). In the saṣṭhitatpuruṣa compound ambikā-keśarī the substantive, character of the second member Keśarī stands in pre-eminence over the adjectival character of the first member 'Ambikā'. In subservience to this grammatical law of meaning governing the sense of a compound the

predicational pre-eminence which the poet wants to bestow upon Ambikā is lost in the compared form Ambikakeśarī. To save this poetically intended predicative preponderance of the adjective.

Over the substantive the poet should have avoided, the compared and kept intact the statement form Ambikāyāḥ-keśarī. This could have somewhat saved the meaning of the predicative statement — this lion is Ambikā's.

It may be argued that both in the compound-form ambikakeśarī and the statement-form ambikāyāḥ-keśarī the word Ambikā equally retains its character of adjectival subordination to the substantive. So where does lie difference of meaning? The consumer of this question lies in the peculiar logical character of the meaning of a compound itself. A compound has ekārthībhāva in which the separate meanings of the members are bound up into one total unitary meaning. Though the separate meanings are not totally lost in the total meaning (ajahatsvārthā vṛttiḥ), yet because of the very fact that the compound has a total meaning preponderating over the separate meanings, the adjective passing into the compound further loses even the limited independence of meaning it could somehow save in the uncompounded statement-form. Moreover, that in a tatpuruṣa compound, within the structure of the total meaning the second member gains further pre-eminence over the first member, and thus the subservience of the adjective (the first member) is further increased. Hence the emphasis on the predicative character of ambikāyāḥ, which is intended by the poet, is lost in the grammatical meaning-structure of the compound. In the statement-form ambikāyāḥ-keśarī there is no contradiction between the grammatical subordination and the poetically intended predicative preponderance of the same adjective ambikāyāḥ. Mahima observes that this contradiction is unreal. The subordination of the adjective is a reality logically demanded by the syntactical structure of the sentence, while the preponderance of the adjective is the demand of poetic sense as a matter of poetic choice. The poetic meaning is an unreal or 'fictive' imposition, while the grammatical meaning in this case has a real factive character that corresponds to our way of understanding the relation of facts. In the way of the world as it is viewed by the realists a property or guṇa for its existence depends on the substantive dravya. This is how we look at things. Hence the grammatical subservience of the adjective to the honer is ordinarily accepted as a reflection of the relational reality existing in the world of facts. A poet may, however, choose to reverse this order of relation in deference to the need of emphasis he feels as a poet. Hence the contradiction between the gramma-

tical meaning and the poetic meaning is unreal. The real contradiction obtains between two reals such as hot and cold, but not between the real and the unreal.

An āhārya jñāna is not liable to contradiction. The poetic meaning is an object of āhārya jñāna or deliberately created fictive knowledge. Mahima thus significantly observes.

Naiṣa doṣaḥ, Virodhasyobhayavastuniṣṭhivāt śītoṣṇādivat
na ceha vastutvamubhayoḥ sambhavati, ekasyaiva vāstava-
tvad, anyasya ca vaivaksikatvena viparyayāt. na ca
vastvavastunorvirodhaḥ. na hi satyahastināḥ kalpanākeśa-
riṁśā kaścidanyo'nyam virodhamaragacchati. Phala-
bhedaṣṭvanayornirvivāda eva ekasya hi sakalajagad-
gamyāḥ śābdikaikaviśayaḥ padārthasambandhamātram.
aparasya punaḥ katipayasaḥṛdayasaṁvedanīyaḥ san
kavīnameva gocaro vākyaṛthacamatkāratīṣaya iti.

V. V. page 230.

To drive his point home Mahima quotes the following verse from Bhavabhūti's *uttararāmcarita*.

re hasta ! dakṣiṇa ! mṛtasya śīṣordvijasya jīvātave visrja
śūdrāmunaḥ kṛpāṇam/

Rāmasya pāṇirasi nīrbharaḡarbhakhinna-sītā vivāsanapaṭoḥ
Karuṇā kutaste //

V. C. Act. II, 10

In this verse the words Rāmasya pāṇiḥ have been deliberately kept uncompounded by the poet. The reason is to stress the overwhelming importance of Rāma, though grammatically it stands as an adjective subordinate to the noun pāṇiḥ in the expression Rāmasya pāṇiḥ. The meaning intended by the poet is the hand is Rāma's; so nobody should expect mercy from it'. This poetic shift of stress from the substantive to the predicatively intended adjective could not have been revealed in the compound Rāmapāṇiḥ. Thus for a poet the rule of Pāṇini, 'Samarthaḥ padavidhiḥ' is not always sufficiently competent to command his construction of compound.

Mahima's over-enthusiasm for finding faults has often led him to suggest an alternative improved version of the original, the version which is more a deterioration than improvement.

Sometimes his suggested replacement verges on an absurd caricature of the original, and in this unenviable performance he

has been faithfully followed by Rāghavabhaṭṭa who finds fault with the verse of Abhijñāna Śūkuntalam almost at every step and suggests improvement which are almost foolish, to say the least. In order to relieve an original verse of the alleged faults which he delightfully discovers, he suggests an alternative reading that does away with the dignity of diction displayed in the original and with poetic significance conveyed by the original words. Thus he finds a series of vidheyāvimarśa faults in the famous verse of Kuntaka's vakroktiṣivita samrambha - etc and suggests an improved reading in which the word samrambhah is replaced by udyogah and the word 'asamrabdhavān' by 'nodyuktavān'. The word 'udyogah' does not convey even a bit of that impatient and insolent intolerance which is significantly conveyed by the word Samrambhah. Asamrabdhavān may be a grammatically unhappy expression, but its grammatically immaculate replacement, by nodyuktavān does not carry the sense of majestic tolerance and unperturbability suggested by the original word. Again Mahima has correctly noted that the emphasis on ambikā which is intended by the poet has been somewhat lost by pressing it into a subordinate position in the compound Ambikā-keśarī. But his replacement of 'ambikā-keśarī' by gauryāh hariḥ violates the dignity of diction. Gaurī may be a synonym of Ambikā but is too soft to convey the proved spirit of the Universal Divine Mother which Ambikā successfully suggests. The same comment may be made about replacing 'keśarī' by 'hari'. The royal majesty associated with the flowing manes of the lion is lacking in the word 'hari'.

Chapter II

PRAKRAMABHEDA

After considering the fault of Vidheyāvimarśa Mahima proceeds to discuss Prakramabheda or the fault of broken symmetry. He divides this class of faults into two types—broken symmetry of word and broken symmetry of meaning. Mahima thinks that this fault of asymmetry, though primarily related to the constructional aspect of a composition, it disfigures the appreciation of Rasa by irritating the mind of the critical reader. The poet is not at liberty to completely transgress the symmetry of syntax that is needed for intelligible communication of meaning. Violation of symmetry in social linguistic behaviour standardised by convention disturbs a critical mind which at once gets deflected from the way of poetic enjoyment. So this fault also finally touches Rasa or the soul of poetry, since the very enjoyment is at least partially inhibited.

Mahima indulges in tiresome details of 'Sabdaprakramabheda doṣa by relating it to prakṛti, pratyaya, paryāya and so on. Out of his monotonous procession of details we, for our purpose, shall select only a few examples which will be sufficient to reveal the working of Mahima's mind.

The poetic fault of breach of symmetry in case of pronoun is instanced in the following verse from Kumārasambhava (VI. 94) to himālayamāmantraya punaḥ prekṣya ca śūlinam.

Siddham cāsmāi nivedyārthaṁ tadviśiṣṭāḥ khamudyayuh //

(in the edition of Griffith there is a different reading 'prāpya' for 'prekṣya')

Here the pronoun 'asmai' (dative masculine of idam) is used in place of Śūlin in the third foot of the verse, while the same śūlin has been referred to by the pronominal form 'tad' in the fourth foot of the verse.

Mahimabhaṭṭa here finds fault of pronominal assymmetry. The two pronouns 'idam' and 'tadi' have completely different meanings just as yajñadatta and Devadatta stand for two different persons 'tad' refers to an object lying beyond the perception of the speaker and 'idam' to an object standing close to him. According to

Mahima (if the pronominal order were changed in the line of the verse the fault might have been avoided 'Sūlin' should have been referred first by the pronoun 'taḍ' and secondly by 'idam') the second reference also should have been made by the same pronoun idam (or by 'etad' or 'adas', which are nearly similar in meaning).

In our opinion the fault noted by Mahima in this context is too trivial to merit serious attention. The correct use of pronoun should be dictated by the consideration — Whether the reference is easily apprehensible or not. In the verse of Kālidāsa under review though two different pronouns 'Idam' and 'taḍ' have been used in sequence we do not feel the least difficulty to understand that both of them bear the same reference. Grammatical or lexicographical fastidiousness should not be played too much against a poet, the understanding of whose expression is not hampered in the least by the so-called wrong choice of pronouns.

Poetic fault of breach of symmetry in case of a suffix is illustrated by Mahima in the following verse :

Rudatā kuta ova sā punarbhavatā nānumṛteravāpyate /

Parolokajuṣāṃ svakarmabhīrgatayo bhinnapathāḥ

śarīrīṇām //

Raghu, VIII, 85.

Mallinātha reads nānumṛtā, so also Hemādri, Vallabha and others read nānumṛtena

"How can you, thus weeping for her, obtain her now ? You will not be able to reclaim her again, even if you die after her. For the ways of those who enjoy the other world lie along different roads according to their respective actions".

Here two ineffective causes for 'not obtaining' are expressed by Satr in 'rudatā' and the fifth case-ending in 'anumṛteḥ' and thus breach of symmetry with regard to suffix is evident. To avoid this fault 'rudatā' should be replaced by 'anurodanāt' according to Mahima. One comment on Mahima's observation is the same as above. Moreover, Mahima's emendation has failed to notice the sweet alliteration artistically applied by Kālidāsa in 'rudatā' and bhavatā'.

Poetic fault of asymmetry in case of suffix is again instanced in the following verse of Bhāravi :—

Yaśo'dhigantum sukhālipsayā vā manuṣyasamkhyāmati-
vartitum vā /

nirutsukānāmabhiyogabhājām samutsukevāṅkamupaiti
siddhiḥ //

Kirāt, III, 40.

Here in the expression 'Sukhalipsayā' the poetic fault of asymmetry is evident, since the use of a noun with a desiderative suffix in lipsayā is unsuited in the midst of two expressions with infinitives 'yaśo'dhigantum' and 'manuṣyasam-khyāmativartitum'.

To keep up uniformity of suffix, 'Sukhalipsayā' should be replaced by 'Sukhamīhitum vā' according to Mahima.

But a true critic with sense of poetry does not find fault in the expression; the reasons are the same as we advanced before. But according to Mahima in the following verse from Rājaśekhara's Bālarāmāyaṇa as well as from the Hanūmannāṭaka of Dāmodara (1, 27) this fault is not present.

Prṥthvi, sthirā bhava bjujaṅgama dhārayainām
tvaṃ kūrmarāja tadidaṃ dvitayaṃ dadhīthaḥ /
dikkuṅgarāḥ, kuruta tattritaye didhīrṣām
devaḥ karoto harakārmukamātatajyam //

O, earth, be firm; O, Serpent, hold her. You, lord of tortoises, hold both the earth and the serpent; O elephants of quarters, have the desire for supporting all the above three; the lord is stringing the bow of Śiva.

Here 'dhāraya' has been used in parasmaipada and dadhīthāḥ in ātmanepada. The suffixes are evidently different. Yet there is no breach of symmetry with regard to suffixes; since the imperative sense of 'lot' remains unimpaired in both the uses. The roots dhr and dhā though meaning the same are not used in different contexts so that the one is not a simple reiteration or reassertion of the other. Hence according to Mahima the fault does not accrue to the expression.

Poetic fault of breach of symmetry in case of synonyms is illustrated by Mahima in the verse from Kumāra (1.27)

Mahībhṛtaḥ putravato'pidṛṣṭistasminnapatyē na jagāma
ṛptim etc.

— Though the Mountain - god had a worthy son (Maināka) yet he was never satiated with gazing at that new-born female child, just as a string of black bees, which makes its appearance in the vernal season, especially attaches itself to the blossomstalk of the mango-tree although there is an abundant variety of flowers at the time.

Apatya is a general term for offspring (male or female) and 'putra' stands for the male child. yet Mahima thinks that the two words are synonymous, since the general and the particular are not totally different. To avoid the fault of asymetry of synonyms Mahima suggests that putravato'pi should be better replaced by apatyavato'pi. Truly speaking, Mahima here fails to note the underlying significance of the word 'putra'-intended by Kālidāsa. Traditionally in Indian Hindu homes a son is more welcome as an issue than a daughter. Yet Umā though a daughter captured the affection of her father far more than her brother so much so that the eyes of Himavat knew no satiety though fixed intently on her. By setting the word 'putra' in contrast reinforced by the word 'api' (though) Kālidāsa wants to mark the exceptional divine beauty of Umā before whom even a good son paled into insignificance.

Ruyyaka has raised this point but contrary to his habit has lent laborious support to Mahima in this case. The verse has the figure *dr̥ṣṭānta* in which the second half as an independent sentence containing the *upamānas*, operates as a poetic illustration in support of the first half. In the *upamāna* portion the general term *puṣpa* is followed by the particular term 'cūta', while in the *upameya* portion the particular term 'putra' is followed by the general term 'apatya'. The real fault of asymmetry, according to Ruyyaka, lies in this reversal of sequence from the first half to the second half of the verse.

Hence Mahima's emendation, 'apatyavato'pi' is justified. The second word 'apatya' in the first half is reduced to a particular in term by the force of the pronominal adjective 'tasmin' which is fixed on Umā. Thus the symmetry of sequence between the two halves of the verse is reclaimed. But all these efforts of Ruyyaka cannot meet the point that we have raised. The contrast intended by the force of the word 'putra' as we have shown, is missing in this emendation.

The following verse from Bhāravi (III, 37) is an instance of the defect of breach of Symmetry in case of case-ending :

Dhairyeṇa viśvāsyalayam ahaṣṣestivrādarātiprabha vācca
masyoḥ /

vīryaṃ ca vidvatsu sute maghonassa teṣu na sthānamavāpa
śokaḥ //

III 37

On account of their firmness of mind, their confidence in the great sage (Vyāsa), the intense anger (or worry) caused by (the

actions of) their enemies, and the prowess they knew to exist in the son of Indra (Arjuna), sorrow did not (long) find a footing in them".

Here the fault noted by Mahim is one of asymmetry of case-endings — In 'Dhairyeṇa' we get the third case-ending, in Manyoḥ the fifth case-ending in the same sense. Then the particle 'ca' is used in a cumulative sense, co-ordinating the two reasons (hetu) in one collection. This is a fault. Again in the expression 'vidvatsu' the particle 'ca' in the same cumulative sense co-ordinates another 'hetu' with dhairya' and 'Manyu' and thus fixes 'Śatṛ' in 'Vidvatsu' in the sense of 'hetu' also.

('lakṣaṇahetvoḥ kriyāyāḥ' Pāṇini 3/2/126)

This constitutes another fault. Hence Mahima suggests an improvement by emending the text of the verse in the following way :

'tivrādarātiprabhavācca manyoḥ should be replaced by

..... tivreṇa vidveṣibhuvāgāsā ca

and 'Vīryaṃ ca vidvatsu sute' by 'vidvatsu vīryaṃ tanaye' (in this way the second 'ca' is removed, removing along with it the suggested sense of 'hetu' in 'śatṛ' in vidvatsu).

In this context Mahima quotes a verse which lays down the principles of using words in cumulative or alternative sense the sense of cumulation or alternation is permissible only when different meanings of different words belong to the same plane of understanding (in the verse under review the same plane is provided by the same sense of 'Hetu' involved in dhairyeṇa, manyoḥ, and vidvatsu). From this simple meaning of the verse Mahima wants to deduce a corollary that in such a case the words must be in the same case-ending. In our opinion this deduction is unwarranted, since no reason has been shown as to how any why 'tulyakakṣatva' or 'belonging to the same plane' necessarily impulse the use of the same case-ending. Pāṇini equally permits the third or the fifth case-ending in the sense of 'hetu'. He also; provides for the use of śatṛ and śānac in this sense (cf. Kāśikā under 3/2/126 — hetau arjayan vasati). Hence it is difficult to see wherefrom Mahima has deduced the additional principle of 'abhinnavibhaktikatva'. Since the same sense of hetu is present in all the three words. 'Tulyakakṣatva' remains unimpaired even without the continuity of the same case-ending. So we do not follow how samuccaya or cumulative sense should not be allowed in this case. When we read the verse the sense of 'hetu' despite different case-endings is easily clearly and instantaneously apprehensible. Our understanding does not falter in the least in

this respect. So where does lie the fault ? Moreover, the emendation suggested by Mahima is more a degradation than elevation. One can easily contrast the two expressions *Tivrādarātīprabhavācca manyoḥ* (original of Bhāravi) and *Tivṛeṇa vidveṣibhuṇagaśa ca* (Mahima's emendation), and feel for oneself that the suggested emendation does away with the dignity of sound effect that we clearly discern in Bhāravi's original the serenity of which has been enhanced by not-too-pronounced alliterations in the right *vaidarbhī* style. Mahima's emendation only succeeds in degrading the diction of Bhāravi, for which the latter is singularly famous.

In this regard Ruyyaka has rightly detected the defect in Mahima's second emendation "*Vidvatsu vīryam tanaye*" (by removing the particle 'ca') Mahima may succeed in eliminating the sense of 'hetu' in *Vidvatsu*, but he has not paused to consider that in such a case the adjective *Vidvatsu* becomes totally irrelevant —

'*Vidvatsu vīryam tanaye*' iti pāthe na dedanam hetutvana vivakṣitam apitu vastusvarūpapratipadanaparātvena iti ayaṃ manyate. Evamca 'vidvatsu' iti viśeṣaṇasya nairartha-kyamāpadyate iti nānena vicāritam — V. V. page. 298

Mahima begins the problem of asymmetry of meaning by choosing for criticism the well-known beautiful verse from Bhavabhūti's *uttararāmacarita* iyaṅgehe etc —

Iyaṃ gehe lakṣmīriyamamṛtavartirṇayanayorasāvyāḥ
sparśo vapuṣi bahulaścandanarasāḥ /
ayaṃ bāhuh kaṇṭhe śīśiramaṣṣṇo mauktikasaṛaḥ kimasyā
na preyo yadi paramasahyastu virahaḥ //

U. C. Act. I, 38.

The specific fault that he finds here is 'vastuprakramabheda', asymmetry of object. The first foot of the verse brings out the charm of the total personality of *Sītā*, but in the rest the poet passes to the partial factors of this personality. This passage from the total object to its partial aspects breaks the symmetry of objective reference. Mahima is conscious that his criticism may be questioned on a very important consideration. It may be contended that the sandal-like soothing touch of *Sītā* and the dewy smoothness of her pearly arms captured the imagination of the poet and the critic not simply as partial aspects, but as so many factors contributing to the over-all charm of the total personality. The import of the verse viewed as such does not show any asymmetry of objective reference. Mahima cannot accept the contention simply

because he feels that the meaning of the total verse does not settle down to the singularity of the charm of a single personality. Description of the partial aspects makes a breach in the integrated singularity and a critical reader is disturbed by the weariness of faltering steps with which he has to move through the description of the partial aspects of the heroine —

nanūbhayaatrāpyarthatastatvarsvarūpaprakarṣapatītiḥ
paryavasyatīti. kathamayam doṣaḥ, satyam, Syadevaṃ
yadyasāvubhatrāpyasañjātapariskhalanakhedavairasye
satyekarasaiva paryavasyet.

V. V. page 317.

But we do not think that the feeling of a critical reader will tally with the feeling of Mahima as regards this beautiful verse of Bhavabhūti. The partial features do not appear at all as so many discrete and disjointed particulars of a single personality. In the first foot of the verse the charming personality of Sitā emerges as the pervasive grace of the household, as the wick of ambrosia to the enchanted eyes of Rāma.

The rest of the verse unfolding the beauty of the partial aspects comes forth as integrated factors accentuating the total charm of Sitā's personality revealed in the first foot. This is what we feel, and so, we find it difficult to agree with Mahima's criticism. We leave it to the judgment of the critical reader of Mahima's suggested improvement —

mukhaṃ pūrṇaścandro vapuramrtavartir nayanayoḥ

is really an improvement upon Bhavabhūti's expression —

iyam gehe lakṣmīriyamamṛtavartir nayanayoḥ

We think it rather to be a ludicrous attempt at improvement.

The next verse that Mahima chooses for criticism (from Rājaśekhara's play Viddhaśālabhañjikā) runs as follows :

Tarangaya dṛṣṭo'ṅgane patatu citramindīvaram

sphuṭikuru radacchadam vrajatu vidrumaḥ śvetatām /

Kṣṇam vapurapāvṛṇu spṛṣatu kāñcanaṃ kālīkā

mudancaya manāṃ mukhaṃ bhavatu ca dvicandraṃ nabhaḥ //

Viddhaśālabhañjikā, Act. III. 27

The first three lines of the verse reveal vyatirekālaṃkara in which the upameyas are shown as excelling the upamānas. But

and not to the word which in only a means towards the communication of meaning. Hence where the breach in the uniformity of words does not involve any breach in the uniformity of meaning it should not be considered as a fault at all, since an impropriety in word does not consist in the word itself but in its relation to the communicable meaning. In reply to the above objection the meaning relation itself should be properly analysed with reference to the fault of broken symmetry. This fault generally belongs to the cases of subject-predicate relation. For the very purpose of successfully communicating the artistic sense intended by the poet it is sometimes necessary to repeat the same word as the predicate as it is given in the form of the subject. Mahima here refers to the usual practice of using the same word as has been used before when there is no difference in meaning. Let us take the following poetic expression — that ambrosia is ambrosia which rests in the petal-like lips of the lady-love. Ruyyaka's interpretation of Mahima's contention with reference to such poetic usages needs some amount of elaboration.

The verbal repetition of the subject in the predicate is here necessary to bring out the unity of meaning on the primary plane. Now if the subject and the predicate have an exact identity of meaning seemingly it becomes a tautologous proposition which on the face of it is an absurdity. If somebody says 'a trade is a tree' without any deeper implication the proposition loses its propositional character. But in our poetic usages we are saved from the seeming absurdity by the fact that the poet has in his mind a particular note of emphasis which he cannot effectively bring out without an apparent tautology. The poet means that ambrosia receives its ambrosial character as an elixir of life only from its association with the lips of the beloved, otherwise ambrosia is not ambrosia. So the poet here creates an artistic effect by playing off a seeming tautology against a suggested meaning which lies deeper and gets its confirmation by its contrast with the tautologous meaning that floats on the surface. In the poetic proposition — ambrosia is ambrosia when it rests in the lips of the lady love'. We may for the sake of experiment replace the predicate by the word nectar and see the effect. Here Ruyyaka says that without the same word as the predicate the identity of meaning is delayed in its emergence. The word conveys the meaning and in course of conveyance the word itself somehow becomes an inseparable associate of the meaning. This has been elaborately shown in Vākyapadiya of Bhartṛhari —

As the conveyer of meaning the word itself must figure in the meaning otherwise the meaning itself loses its relational character. When different synonymous words are associated in the same meaning - cognition, the difference brought forth in this association tends to impose a seeming difference on the meaning itself. Thus the emergence of identity is delayed. It may appear only in faltering steps, but as we have explained before, the tautology is necessary for the sake of emphasis upon the suggested meaning which is revealed by way of contrast with the primary meaning. It is the significance of the locus or adhikaraṇa, which is the rest house of elixir, that imparts artistic excellence to the poetic conception. Thus the emphasis shifts from the predicate to its locus. Hence here the meaning involves a movement from identity to difference which is constituted by the distinctive character of the adhikaraṇa. This shifting process, to get its proper confirmation, requires a primary identity which can be best brought out by repeating the predicate in the same verbal form as in the subject. Ambrosia as a more factual existence does not concern the poet. For the sake of artistic effect and poetic sensibility — it is necessary to lift it from its cold and dry factive character to the plane of aesthetic enjoyment. Hence it is necessary for the poet to find a new habitat for the mythological elixir of life, and this new location is projected in the form of the beloved's lips out of the abundant imagination of the poet. The predicative repetition is a useful instrument for underlining this poetic projection.

In this context an observation of Ruyyaka deserves special attention.

Na ca kāvye śāstrādivadarthapratītyartham

śabdāmātram prayujyate sahitayoḥ

śabdārtthayostatra prayogāt. Sīhityam

tulyakakṣyatvenānyūnātiriktatvam

V. V. page 311.

This observation lends a new dimension to the definition of poetry proposed Bhāmaha, Kuntaka and Mammāṭa in which word and meaning seem to receive equal prominence. In ordinary linguistic usage of matter-of-fact life where conveyance of meaning finds its utility only in pragmatic behaviours, any words may suffice if only the meaning is intelligibly communicated. The same may apply sometimes to cases of higher discipline like philosophy and logic. When this view is pushed to the extreme we get the following well-known caricature of the - Naiyāyikas -

asmākānām naiyāyikeṣām arthani tātparyaṃ śabdani
kaścintā

But literature belongs to a special type of discipline in which word and meaning combine with equal effectiveness to create an artistic effect. In this combination the one does not surrender to the other. Even when a pure primary meaning acceptable to common sense is intended by the poet, he is very careful in selecting the proper word for it. The poet creates an atmosphere, and any and every word is not suitable for it. The word itself is a participating constituent of the atmosphere along with the meaning. This is evident too in political oratory where words are selectively chosen to convey even a matter-of-fact meaning. In poetry creation of an effect is more pronounced and the word gets a special accent therein. Hence in respect of importance word and meaning must belong to an equal height of artistic effect.

Here an objection may be anticipated with regard to the classification of the fault of broken symmetry into śabda and artha. Since the word and its meaning cannot be sundered apart what is the utility of this division except a pre-dilection for fine sophistication. In the example —

Śuci bhūṣayati śrutam vapuḥ praśamas
tasya bhavatyalamkriyā /
praśamābharaṇam parākramaḥ sa
nayāpāditasiddhibhūṣaṇaḥ //

Kirāt, II. 32.

what is sought to be brought out is the relation between the adorning and the adorned. Despite the use of two words bhūṣayati and alamkriyā the appreciation of the above-mentioned relation is no way disturbed. The grasp of meaning, which is clear enough, does not proceed in a halting manner. So there is no lack of propriety in the use of words. Here Mahima's reply is more an emphatic assertion than a convincing argument. He simply says that impropriety in such a case is quite tangible to a critical connoisseur. But he adds a further point which lends some strength to his idea. It is admitted on all hands that a word is not used for its own sake, but for conveying some meaning. When the principal object of apprehension is the direct and unmitigated meaning of a word, the fault of broken symmetry should belong to the word itself. In our case bhūṣyabhūṣaṇabhāva is the principal meaning which is directly conveyed by the words. Hence variation of words is here not only uncalled for, but improper too, because this

may lead to some confusion owing to the fact that the reader may suspect that the variant word may hence some other hidden meaning more than what is directly palpable but in the instance —

samatyā vasuvṛṣṭivisarjanairniyamanāda

- satām ca narādhipaḥ /

anuyayau yamapunyaajaneśvarau savarunavaru

nāgrasaram ruṇā //

Raghu, IX, 6

etc. we are presented with a different problem. Here the king is conceived as imitating Yama, Kubera, and Sūrya and Varuṇa by virtue of distinctive qualities which are shared in common by the upameya and upamānas. But in the statement of upamānas Varuṇa is subordinated in a compound savarunau. So Varuṇa as an object of imitation is apprehended by way of an involved meaning. The connection of imitation with Yama, Kubera and Sūrya is direct, while with Varuṇa it is indirect. Here broken symmetry evidently belongs to the meaning aspect of the situation. Again indirect reference to Varuṇa, for the sake of symmetry of meaning requires an indirect statement of the distinctive virtue by which imitation may be justified. But the expression 'niyamanādasatām' directly expresses the ground of imitation. Thus the indirect conveyance of the imitable object and the direct conveyance of the ground of imitation lead to asymmetry of meaning.

From the foregoing discussion it is apparent that broken symmetry may belong to the variation of words, when the direct meaning remains the same. The emphasis in the case of broken symmetry of word is laid upon the direct conveyance of the meaning by the variant words.

This leads to the surmise that the meaning immediately brought out by a word gains pre-dominance at the cost of indirect meanings. But we know that in the higher forms of literary excellence the suggested meaning which may be a fact, a figure of speech or a poetic sentiment, gains predominance. How can we then reconcile this predominance of the suggested meaning with that of the direct meaning? Very often this predominance of the suggested meaning is attended by broken symmetry of words. Mahima replies that here the question of pre-dominance is to be understood in a relative manner. In inference we can lend predominance to both the middle term and the major term according to the way we understand their functions. If we look at the resultant purpose of inference we pre-eminently take into conside-

ration the sādhyā or the major term the knowledge of which is the goal that we want to reach. But to reach the goal we need an instrument. Hence one is not wrong if the means of ascertaining the probandum is emphasised with a degree of pre-eminence in the actual process of knowledge. Between the end and the means one cannot say that the means is less important. Mahima relegates poetic suggestion to the domain of logical inference. Thus the reason for introducing the problem of inference in order to bring home his point is quite understandable. In the case of suggested meaning the primary meaning of the word must stand as the means to the suggestion. Since there is no attainable end without the means, the predominance of the means is fully justified. As the final purpose the suggested meaning is pre-dominant, while in the process of attaining it the direct meaning of the word as the means of attainment is more pronounced. When the poets have recourse to variation of words to effectively bring out the force of a figure or the depth of a suggestion it may be plausibly argued that broken symmetry of words here does not constitute a fault, since here the intended effect of the meaning receives the note of accent from the poet. In such a case despite śabdaprakramabheda aesthetic relish is not disturbed. Mahima, however, contends that the fault is definitely there, but it is only submerged under an abundant wealth of excellences — eke hi doṣo guṇasanaipāte nimajjatīndoh kiraṇeṣvivaṅkaḥ. The existent fault remains only unnoticed, since the mind of the relisher is monopolised by brilliance of suggestion and imagination. In final analysis the faults of — Śabdaprakramabheda and arthaprakramabheda respectively belong to the direct meaning and the implied meaning.

Chapter III

KRAMABHEDA

After the treatment of Prakramabheda or the fault of broken symmetry Mahima takes up for discussion the fault of Kramabheda or the breach of sequence. It is very difficult to logically define the distinction between these two faults — Prakramabheda and Kramabheda. Indeed, Mahimabhāṭṭa and the later ālaṃkārikas following him on the matter of poetic faults have not cared to show the exact difference between the two. The author of Kāvya prakāśa uses the two expressions 'bhagna-prakrama' and 'akrama' to convey respectively prakramabheda and Kramabheda of Mahima. Govinda, the most learned commentator of the Kāvya prakāśa, sometimes loosely uses the word Kramabhanga to mean bhagnaprakrama. Yet to bring out the meaning of bhagnaprakrama he analyses the compound thus :

bhagnaḥ prakramaḥ prastāvaucityaṃ yatra tat-kāvya-pradīpa,

— page 226. N. S. ed.

The word akramaḥ is analysed by Mammaṭa himself as avidyamānaḥ Kramaḥ yatra. From this difference in analysis we may try to bring out the distinction between the two faults. From the expression prastāvaucityaṃ used by Govinda it seems that prakramabheda or bhagnaprakrama is concerned with the breach of contextual symmetry. Thus for example in the famous verse of Abhijñāna Śākuntalam, 'gāhantām mahistenāḥ' etc. the use of passive voice in the third foot breaks the symmetry in the context of active voice used in the other three feet of the verse. Thus the sense of symmetry demands that the third foot too should be changed into active voice. We shall deal with this verse in our critique on Rāghavabhāṭṭa (in the appendix) when the symmetry of context demands the use of the same verb, prātipadika, suffix, Kāraka, ālaṃkāra etc. in the different sentences constituting a verse, any deviation from this demand constitutes the fault of prakramabheda.

In Kramabheda or the fault of broken sequence we are more concerned with the particular placement of a particular word in a particular position in the syntactical sequence of words in a sentence. This is suggested clearly by Govinda in his following observation :

akramam avidyamānaḥ kramo yaua tat, padānantaram yat
padopādānamucitaṁ tato'nyatra tadupādānaṁ yatra
ityarthaḥ

— ibid p. 230

Thus in the famous verse of Kumārasambhava 'dvayam gatam' etc. the particle 'ca' in the last foot of the verse should have been placed after the word 'tvam' and not after the word 'lokasya'. The co-ordinative meaning (Samuccaya) of the particle 'ca' should refer to tvam i.e. Pārvatī as an object of pity — and not to 'loka' which is not at all a factor to be co-ordinated. Thus akrama or Kramabheda is the fault of broken sequence which shows misplacement of a word in the sequence. The fault does not belong to word itself or its meaning, but to the sequential position in which it is placed. In Prakramabheda, on the other hand, the fault belongs to the word itself or to its meaning or to both, because the particular word or its meaning does not accord with the running symmetry of the context. With these remarks on the distinction between Prakramabheda and Kramabheda let us proceed to Mahima's treatment of Kramabheda.

Mahima's first choice as an example of this fault is unfortunately the following verse from Raghuvamśa (XVI. 33) :

tirthē tādīye gajasetubandhāt
pratīpagāmuttarato'sya gangām /
ayatnabālavyajanībabhūvurhanisā
nabholanghanalolapakṣāḥ //

"On its holy landing steps, while he crossed the Ganges running in a reverse direction on account of the construction of a bridge of elephants, the swans whose wings fluttered to mount on the sky became cāmaras without efforts for him."

We shall show later on how Mahima has misconstrued this verse, but at present we are discussing the point raised by Mahima on the basis of his own construction.

Here the difficulty lies with the pronominal adjective 'tādīye' which refers to the meaning of the nominal word 'Gangām' standing at the end of the first half of the verse. The meaning of a pronoun does not stand in its own right. It is understandable only in reference to the meaning of another word. The final referent of a pronoun is the direct referent of another word which has a meaning independently by itself. Here the reference of 'tādīya' cannot be grasped before we come to the referent directly

conveyed by the noun Gaṅgām. Hence in apprehending the sense of the sentence the reader is bound to falter on the word 'tadiye' which he comes upon first. The proper sequence has been improperly reversed. The noun 'Gaṅgām' should have come first followed by the word 'tadiye' the reference of which would have been clear by that time. This reversal of sequence amounts to the fault of Kramabheda. This is the contention of Mahima.

In this context Mahima raises the point of relation between memory and cognition. Memory has no independent object of its own, for it always refers back to the object of a prior cognition. The meaning of a pronoun is a sort of memory-object, which has already been cognised and conveyed independently by another word beforehand. In conformity to the psychological law of sequence governing cognition and memory it is only proper that the use of a pronoun should come after the use of the noun, the meaning of which is referred back by the pronoun.

Mahima anticipates an objection to his contention. One may argue that this contention holds water only when the words are taken separately i.e., when one makes efforts to understand separately the meanings of separate words one by one.

In short, this contention is pertinent only to the process of analysing a sentential meaning, but not to the proper meaning as a whole. The analysis of meaning is not the meaning. According to the final view-point advocated in the philosophy of language propounded by Bhartṛhari the meaning of a sentence is a monolithic unitary whole, which as such does not permit an analytical division. The meaning of sentence is not a summation of independent meanings of independent words. A sentence is the unit of intelligible language and the sentential meaning is the unit of thought. This unit does not brook an internal division. It is not the case that in some primitive age there were some unrelated words floating at will, and then at a certain period later on someone caught hold of those wondering words and bound them into a sentence. When we grasp the meaning of a sentence it flashes in cognition as an indivisible whole without any internal sequence of parts (akhaṇḍo niṣkramo vākyaṛthaḥ).

The meaning of the part is unreal in the sense that it is an intellectual abstraction brought about by analytical understanding. So the partial meaning is vahirāṅga or external and extrinsic, since it operates from outside through analysis, while the total meaning of the sentence is internal and intrinsic, since it does not depend on any analytical apparatus of understanding. Mahima accepts this basic stand of Bhartṛhari. But how then does the question of

Kramabheda arise at all ? Since the total meaning does not suffer any division the very question of sequence does not arise.

Mahima still upholds his contention on the following consideration. Linguistic behaviour is based on the need of communication of a common meaning from the speaker to the hearer. If the hearer fails to participate in this common fund of meaning intended by the speaker communication is disrupted and the purpose of language is lost. To the speaker the meaning of a particular sentence that he utters is clear no doubt. Yet his sequence of articulated words may present the hearer with a difficulty of understanding. In the mind of the speaker the sentence and its meaning come together inextricably interwoven as an indivisible unit of linguistic thought. But his utterance of the sentence must come in sequential articulation which reach the ears of hearer - in the same sequence. Now if the hearer is not accustomed to this particular sequence he may fail to grasp the meaning intended by the speaker, or may grasp it only after some laborious analysis. From this consideration the reversal of proper sequence in the uses of pronoun and the noun is a fault.

Mahima's position in this respect is only conditionally correct, i.e., correct only if the hearer, properly equipped with the knowledge of the pattern of a particular language, fails to grasp the intended meaning. If the meaning is within the easy grasp of such an equipped reader or hearer we do not know how the fault does arise. In the particular verse under consideration the gap between the noun and the pronoun is not so long as to hamper the understanding when the reader finishes the sentence. The total expression is so transparent that the pronoun coming before the noun does not disturb our understanding.

Hence Mahima's suggested reconstruction of the reading as 'pratīpagāmuttarato'sya gaṅgām tīrthe tadīye gajasetubandhām' is uncalled for. In the suggested reversal of the first two feet of the verse 'gajasetubandhāt' is sought to be replaced by gajasetubandhām, otherwise the *hetu* denoted by the fifth case-ending becomes widely separated from the effect 'pratīpagām', thus making it difficult to grasp the *hetu* *hetumadbhāva*. The change into gajasetubandhām makes it a *hetugarbhaviśeṣaṇa* of gaṅgām. Ruyyaka explains that a long interval between the statement of the effect and that of the *hetu* caught in a *hetugarbhaviśeṣaṇa* does not do any harm, because in understanding the syntax the purpose of an adjective is fulfilled by describing the noun (gaṅgām). The sense of *hetu* is brought out of the *hetugarbhaviśeṣaṇa* by *paryālocana samarthya* or the force of critical deliberation. We

fail to appreciate this point made by Ruyyaka. If the verse begins with *pratīpagām* the reader is at once intrigued by the question, why should the Ganges flow in the reverse direction? He finds the reason only at the end of the first half, and that too, by way of critical judgement. Since the reason lies hidden in a *hetugarbha-viśeṣaṇa*, so how can we avoid *pratitiviprakarṣa* or gap in understanding the relation between the cause and the effect.

It should be noted in this connection that the whole criticism of Mahima becomes irrelevant and wide of the mark if the pronomial adjective '*tadiye*' is taken as referring not to the Ganges, but to the Vindhya mountain, which is mentioned by name in the previous verse (*Raghu XVI, 32*). Indeed it refers to the *vindhya-tīrtha* on the Ganges (the modern *Vindhyācala*) and *Mallinātha* clearly explains as '*tadiye vindhye tīrthe avatāre*'. This means that *Kuśu* crossed the Ganges at *Vindhya-tīrtha*, which is apparent from the context provided by the previous verse. It is unfortunate that such a talented critic as Mahima has missed the meaning, imposed a wrong meaning after his own thought and then proceeded to criticise the great *Kālidāsa*.

Another fault of *Kramabheda* is discovered by Mahima in the famous verse of *Kālidāsa's Vikramorvaśīya* :

Navajaladharah saṁnaddho'yam, na dṛptaniśācaraḥ
 Suradhanuridaṁ dūrākṛṣṭaṁ, na nāma śarāsanam /
 ayamapi paṭurdhārāsāro, na bānaparamparā
 Kananikaśasniḡdhā vidyut, priyā na mamorvaśī //

Act. IV,7.

Here Mahima contends that the pronoun '*ayam*' should go with *navajaladharah* and not with its adjective *Sannaddbh*. This verse provides a case of *niścayalamkāra* in which an illusion is corrected by the emergence of a valid certain knowledge which negates the illusory object. An array of new clouds was mistaken for an arrogant demon. The statement concerned is a statement registering the correction of this illusion. The first part of the statement '*navajaladharah sannaddho'yam*' asserts, the reality with certitude and the second part *na dṛptaniśācaraḥ* negates the illusory object with equal emphasis. In the affirmative part the pronoun '*ayam*' should go with *navajaladharah* which is correctly affirmed and not with its adjective *sannaddhaḥ* which is not the object of affirmation. But the point is whether '*ayam*' coming after *sannaddhaḥ* misses its reference in our understanding. Definitely we do not miss the reference and so the affirmation do

not suffer in the least. Moreover no critic should try to impose a logically impeccable language on a poet. In logical language also no such fastidiousness as is shown by Mahima is cherished by the logicians themselves. No logician would find fault with such an expression as Suktikā ujjvaleyam, na rajatam — this is a shining piece of nacre, not a piece of silver, because what is affirmed is clear enough.

While finding fault with a poet what should concerns us most is to see if a construction commits violence against our understanding. If the understanding is not violated any demand for a studious observation of symmetry in sequence is poetically irrelevant. We like to make the same comment in relation to the placing of the particle 'iva' in an upamāṇakāra. Thus in the verse —

Utkhātadrumam iva śailam himahata-
kamalākaramiva lakṣmivimuktam/
pītamadīramiva caṣakaṁ bahulapradoṣamiva
mugdhacandravirahitam //

V. V. page 329.

on one occasion only the particle 'iva' has been placed before the upamāṇa in 'utkhātadrumamiva śailam.'

According to Mahima this is a fault since 'iva' has been connected with the Sādhāraṇa dharma utkhātadruma and not with the upamāṇa śaila. But the poet must be given some elbow-room for his freedom of construction. If Mahima's prescription is earnestly followed and the poet zealously makes it a point to place 'iva' always after the upamāṇa, then where a series of similes runs without break the verse may suffer from a tone of monotony and a poet becomes more a versifier than a poet. In our opinion the word 'iva' coming at least once before the upamāṇa relieves the verse of this monotony and saves its charm for us.

Again Mahima takes to task a poet for misplacing the word 'evam' in the verse —

Stamberamḥ pariṇīnaṁsurasāvupaiti
śiḍgairagadyata sasambhramamevamekā

V. V. page 330.

— 'this young elephant comes down with a mind to ram at you' a lady was spoken to thus by the viṣas. Here Mahima suggests that the word 'evam' (thus) should come just after the statement referred to by it, that is, the second part of the sentence should be as follows :

"Thus (evam) a lady was spoken to by the Viṭas." Here 'evam' meaning 'thus' stands in the sense of 'iti' and should come just after the statement which constitutes its referent, and nothing should intervene between the referent and the referential word. Mahima himself appears to be conscious of the hollowness of his contention, so he raises the point that if there is no disturbing gap in our understanding of the meaning the immediacy between the referent and the referential word, 'evam' or 'iti', should not be pressed for. In a statement such a gap is tolerated if the relation is well understood, for in the total structure of the meaning the relation between the reference and the referential word stands unimpaired despite the distance allowed in the statement. Immediacy in meaning does not always depend upon immediacy in a statement. Mahima refers to this aspect of ānantarya niyama (law of immediacy), which has been quoted by Ruyyaka as follows :

Yasya yenābhisambandho

dūrasthasyāpi tena saḥ /

arthato hyasamānānāmānantaryama

kāraṇam //

V. V. page 332.

Mahima refers to this law in the following words :

Yathānantaryaniyamasteṣāmarthaucitivaśāt

Sl. 37a, V. V. page 331.

(immediacy is to be sought in the proper understanding of the meaning and not in the statement of meaning as such). Mahima simply dismisses the point with the self-righteous observation that this law of immediacy of meaning does not operate in cases of words like iti etc.

At the end of the second chapter Mahima discovers a long series of faults in the famous verse of the Dhvanyāloka 'Kāvya-syātmā dhvanihriti' etc. The first fault that he notices is one of Kramabheda in relation to the placing of the word 'iti' after the word 'dhvani'. When somebody says 'Sa Rama ityāha', the word 'iti' fixes the word Rama in itself without any reference to the meaning, i.e., here the word Rāma, does not stand for the famous divine hero, but simply for itself, since one can utter only a word and not the meaning meant by it. So the word 'iti' excludes the meaning content of the word Rāma and limits it to the word itself (Śabdasvarūpaparatva). Similarly the sentence 'Kāvya-syātmā

dhvaniḥ', connected with iti coming after it appears to mean — the soul of poetry is called dhvani which as such has been declared before by the learned. Here the word 'dhvani' stands for the name itself and not for its meaning. The self-referential function of the word is underlined by the connective particle 'Iti'. At once an anomalous position crops up in the context of what has been said afterwards - tasyābhāvaṃ jagadurapare - etc. If the pronoun 'yaḥ' refers to the word 'dhvani' (and it must refer so, since the word 'dhvani' here stands for itself). We cannot connect it with 'tasyābhāvaṃ jagaduḥ' because the disputants do not deny the existence of the word dhvani, but deny the existence of the meaning-referent sought to be conveyed by the word. Yet all this mischief has been done by the misplacement of 'iti' after 'dhvaniḥ'. Neither can it be said that the pronoun yaḥ refers to kāvyasyātmā because the disputants do not dispute the existence of the soul of poetry, but they dispute about what constitutes the soul. Hence Mahima suggests that iti should go with Kāvyaśyātmā and the subject-predicate relation should be reversed in such a way as Dhvani stands for the subject and Kāvyaśyātmā for the predicate. Then the meaning-full construction should be something like this, Yo dhvaniḥ Kāvyaśyātmā iti budhaiḥ samāmnātapūrvah. Moreover, the word dhvaniḥ is not the soul of poetry. So we cannot say Kāvyaśyātmā dhvaniḥ wherein the word dhvaniḥ refers only to the word itself.

The great Abhinavagupta has himself noted this anomaly which has been heightened by the explanation offered in the vṛttibudhaiḥ kāvyatattvavidbhiḥ kāvyāśyātmā dhvaniḥ etc. In this explanation dhvaniḥ appears as the saṃjñā or technical name for the soul of poetry which is saṃjñitah or named as such. In this case the pronoun 'yaḥ' (as is patient in the explanation paramparayayaḥ-saṃgya āmnātapūrvath) goes with kāvyāśyātmā, the existence of which the disputants do not deny. So the anomaly is made worse. The explanatory vṛtti continues in the same breath — Tasya Sahridayamanaḥ prakāśamānasyāpi abhāvamanye jagaduḥ. Here Tasya is related to yaḥ which refers to kāvyāśyātmā. Yet what is meant here is not the denial of Kāvyaśyātmā, but of dhvani. Thus there is clumsiness in Vṛttikāra's construction. Abhinavagupta seeks to correct the construction, and rightly so, in the following way :

itiśabdah bhinnakramah vakarthaparamarśakah, dhvani-laksano' rthah kāvyāśyātmā iti yay yaḥ samāmnāta iti śabdapadarthakatve hi dhvanisaṃjñito'rtha iti kā samgatiḥ. evam hi dhvaniśabdah kāvyāśyātmā ityukam bhaved, gavityayamāha yathā

In this interpretation too Mahima seems to find fault with itisabdo vākyaṛthaparamarśakah. Let us quote Mahima in full in this context

atha kāvyātmānuvādena vihitasya dhvaneḥ samāmnānu-kriyākanmabhavavacchedana samudāyadayamiti. Sabdaḥ prayukta ityarthapradhāna evāyaṁ dhvaniśabdo na svarūpa-pradhāna iti tasya sarvanāmaparamarśayogyasya bhāvādi-sambandho ghaṭaṭe eva ityucyate tadayuktamevam hi vākya-ṛthāvacchedaḥ pratīyeta, tataśca tatparāmarśinaḥ sarvanāmapadādernapuṁsa-kaliṁgaparāmarśa prasamga iti.

V. V. page 459.

Mahima does not here find fault with the construction Yo dhanilaksanorthaḥ kāvyasyātmā iti budhaḥ samamnatapūrvah (upalocana on Locana p. 30). Indeed Abhinava himself means this when he says —

dhvanilaksano'rthaḥ kāvyasyātmēti yah samāmnātaḥ

Dhv. page 10.

Mahima too suggests such a reconstruction in the first line of the verse —

Kavasyatmetyamala-matibhiryo dhvanir nāma gītaḥ

V. V. page 461.

But what he contends against in this construction is that iti here refers to the total sentential meaning of the statement dhvaniḥ kāvyāsyātmā. In other words, the construction actually suggested both by Abhinava and Mahima is not —

dhvaniḥ kāvyasyātmā iti yah samāmnātapūrvah, but yo dhvanilaksano'rthah Kāvyaśyātmeti samamnatāḥ.

Abhinava too really means this. But vākyaṛthaparamarśa requires the former structure of the sentence and not the latter. In the former structure the total sentential meaning of the statement — 'dhvaniḥ kāvyasyātmā' is referred to by iti. Then the pronominal word yah bearing the same reference should have been replaced by 'yat' in neuter gender and accordingly samāmnātapūrvah should have been changed into samāmnātapūrvam. A total sentence or its meaning has no gender. So a pronominal reference to it should be in neuter (sāmānye napuṁsakam). This is the contention of Mahima even against Abhinava's interpretation. Abhinava has suggested the correct construction, but then why does he assert that 'iti' is vākyaṛthaparamarśaka — this is the question that has intrigued Mahima.

To understand the implication of Mahima's contention let us compare and contrast the following two sentences :

1. Daśarathanayo Rāmaḥ iti yat kathyate
2. yo Daśarathanayo Rāmaḥ iti kathyate

Vākyārthaparāmarśa belongs to the first case in which 'iti' refers to the total sentence or its meaning — Daśarathanayo Rāmaḥ, while in the second case there is no vākyārthaparāmarśa, since iti refers to the word Rāma itself. The same distinction applies, mutatis mutandis, to the following pair of sentences —

1. Dhvaniḥ kāvyasyātmā iti yat samāmnātapūrvam
2. yo dhvaniḥ kāvyasyātmeti samāmnātapūrvah

This is what Mahima has in his mind. On the face of it Mahima's position seems correct. But on a fair examination of the problem it cannot be said that in the second statement iti bears no reference to any sentential meaning. In the second sentence dhvaniḥ stands as the direct object governed by the verbal form samāmnāta, and kāvyasyātmā figures as the complementary object connected with dhvaniḥ. Now Dhvaniḥ standing as the direct object and kāvyasyātmā standing as its complement together form a subordinate sentence. Here, just as the verbal form samāmnāta directly governs dhvaniḥ and indirectly kāvyasyātmā as its complement, so in a converse way the word 'iti' directly refers to kāvyasyātmā and indirectly to dhvaniḥ. Let us see the effect by omitting the portion 'yo dhvaniḥ' in the sentence and retaining only the portion kāvyasyātmeti samāmnataḥ. Does here the word iti bear any intelligible reference to Kāvyaśyātmā ? Evidently not. We require to know and state that which is called kāvyasyātmā. The named must be known and stated along with the name that names it. When we want to give a name to something or call something by a name in a sentence, both the name and the named (nāman and nāmin) must figure together in the same breath. Hence to complete its reference iti requires the expression 'yo dhvaniḥ' as a complement to kāvyasyātmā. Otherwise the very reference is unintelligible. On this consideration both dhvaniḥ and kāvyasyātmā stand as reference of 'iti', the latter being the principal referent and the former figuring as its complementary referent. In the total sentence — yo dhvanilakṣaṇo'rthaḥ kāvyasyātmeti samāmnataḥ, dhvaniḥ and kāvyasyātmā together stand as a subordinate proposition of identity in which the subject and the predicate are identified, though in final consideration they stand with their difference as nāman and nāmin. Now 'iti' refers to this proposition of identify or to the propositional meaning, since we

have already shown that 'iti' cannot bear any independent and intelligible reference to *kavyasyatma* alone without bringing in *dhvani* as its complementary referent which is inseparably wrapped up with *kavyasyatma* in a relation of syntactical identity (*abhedanvaya*). In this sense, in *Abhinava's* construction also, 'iti' is *vakyarthaparamarśaka*. *Bharṭṛhari* followed by *Nageśa* has elaborately shown how 'tadatmyadhyasa or superimposition of identity between the *naman* and the *namin* between the word and the meaning, operates in a subject-predicate statement in our everyday use.

A boy seeing a thing before him asks — What is it ? The elder replies - it is a tree. It is a proposition of identity. But the subject 'it' stands for the visualised object and 'tree' stands for the name. The object itself is an object of visual perception both to the boy and his elder. The boy knows the object as such standing before him. Then what new information is gathered by the boy from the elder's reply 'this is a tree'. Evidently the new thing that he learns is only the name tree. But we know that the name is not the same as the named; yet in our propositional or linguistic behaviour we very often use such statement of identity — such as *syam vrksah*. The difference is ignored and an identify is superimposed. Without the superimposed identity most of our subject-predicate statements would have sounded absurd and non-sensical. If we follow this analysis of meaning offered in *Bharṭṛhari's* philosophy of language and appreciate the point made therein, most of the controversy raised in relation to '*kavyasyatma dhvaniriti budhaiḥ*' *yah samamnata-purvaḥ* is evenly resolved. The fact stands that *kavyasyatma dhvaniḥ* is a proposition of identity. Whether the particle *iti* confers '*śabdasvarupaparātva* on the expression *dhvaniḥ* or *kāvyasyatma*, the superimposed identity between the subject and the predicate, between the name and the named, operates in our syntactical understanding and the pronominal adjective '*yah*' may refer to any such identified object. Thus the referential identification sought to be established by 'iti' presents no formidable problem. But *Mahima* is not satisfied. It is doubtful if he is a follower of *Bharṭṛhari*. He senses the danger in asserting that *iti* confers '*śabdasvarupaparātva* on *dhvani* or *kāvyasyatma*. If we ignore the theory of *tadatmyadhyasa* and assert *śabdasvarupaparātva* effected by 'iti', the subject-predicate relation between *dhvaniḥ* and *kavyasyatma* becomes absurd. When the subject and the predicate stand in a relation of identity, and yet the one refers to the name and the other to the named, the identity is violated and the sentence stoops to absurdity. *Mahima* is intelligent enough to sense this predicament.

Hence he suggests almost a fantastic way of escape. He suggests that *iti* should go with *kāvyaśyātmā* no doubt, but it does not confer *śabdavarūpa-paratva* on the expression *kāvyaśyātmā* *iti* is here used in the sense of *hetu* —

*tasmādātmaśabdānantarameva ayamiti śabdaḥ prayoktavyaḥ,
sa ca hetvarthavṛttiḥ tenāyamarthaḥ-yataḥ kavya-
śyātmā ivitabhūtaḥ tato budhairyo dhvanirnāma samāmnātā-
purvaḥ*

(because the soul of poetry is its life-breath, so *dhvani* which has been proclaimed before by the learned, but however, is denied by some others, and so on) What *Mahima* exactly means is this — because the soul of poetry is its life-breath, so the learned have proclaimed *dhvani* as the soul of poetry. Yet some others, deny the existence of this *dhvani*. He wants to fit this meaning somehow into the complex construction of the verse and the result is obviously clumsy. This clumsiness finally ensues from his overfastidiousness which degenerates into a punctiliousness bordering almost on an intellectual disease of finding faults.

Chapter IV

PAUNARUKTYA (Repetition)

In examining the fault of repetition Mahima at the very outset takes care to dispel the possible wrong notion that simple repetition of a word constitutes the fault. The fault primarily belongs to the repetition of meaning and not to that of a word. Hence in poetry paunaruktya should not be divided into two types such as sense-repetition and word-repetition, rather it should be restricted to only one type, that is sense-repetition. When the sense is different repetition of a word does not constitute a fault, on the contrary, it often points to a special charm of the figure of lātā-nuprāsa. When the same sense is repeated in two different words the fault is very much there despite the verbal difference. Mahima has to stress the point in face of the Nyāyasūtra on Nigrahassthaha (5214 - Śabdārthayoḥ punarvacanam punaruktamanyatrānuvādāt - Vātsāyana comments - Śabda-punaruktamarthāpunaktam vā nityaḥ śabdaḥ nityaḥ Śabdaḥ iti śabdapunaruktam. Arthapunaruktam anityaḥ sabdah, nirodha-dharmako iti. Mahima seems to be well acquainted with the logical texts of Buddhist philosopher Dharmakīrti. Mahima must be credited with the boldness of independent judgement and when it appeals to his reason he is not afraid of accepting the stand-point of Dharmakīrti even against the authority of Gautama and Vātsāyana. So he approvingly quotes the following text from Dharmakīrti Vādanyāya (page 111 - Rahul's edn.)

Ātra na Śabdapunaruktam pṛthag vācyam

arthapunamktavacanenaiva gatatvāt.

na hi arthabhede śabdasāmye kasciddoṣaḥ - yathā hasati

hasati svāminyucairudatyabhiroditi — page 111. Rāhul's edn.

Mahima's quotation shows only some very minor and immaterial difference from the text of Dharmakīrti presented by Rāhula. Mahima presents the first and the last feet (with slight modifications) of the complete verse quoted in Vādanyāya text. In countering the view of Gautama and Vātsāyāna Dharmakīrti contends that Śabdapaunaruktya should not be stated as a separate type of paunaruktya nigrahassthāna, since its purpose is already served by arthapaunaruktya. If the senses are different sameness of the work does not constitute any fault. In the verse

**Hasati hasati Svāminyuccai rudatyapi roditi /
draviṇakaṇikākṛtaṃ yantraṃ pranṭyati nṛtyati //**

V. V. page 333.

The first instance of *hasati* is a tinanta word and the second instance is a present participial adjective ending with the seventh case-ending in singular. It is a fine example of *laṭānuprāsa* and the apparent repetition of the word with different intended meanings adds to the charm of the verse, far from constituting a fault. Even the sameness of the connotation and devotion does not constitute a fault if the difference in some additional meanings is intended by the poet through contextual difference. This point has been powerfully brought forth in the instance

**Vastrayante nadinām sitakusumadharāḥ śakrasamkaśa !
Kāśaḥ Kāśābhā bhānti tasam navapulinagatāḥ śrīnadi-
haṃsa! haṃsāḥ /**

**haṃsābho'mbhodamuktasphuradamalavapurmedinīcandra !
Candraś candrābhāḥ śārādaste jayakṛdupagato vidviṣāṃ
kāla ! kālaḥ //**

V. V. page 333.

In this verse the words *Kāśāḥ* etc. are repeated along with the repetition of the primary meanings too. Yet it is not a case of *paunuruktya doṣa*, since there is a difference in the contextual meaning intended by the poet — the first word *kāśa* stands as the *upameya* in relation to the *upamāna* *vastra*, while the second word *kāśa* stands as the *upamāna* in relation to the *upameya* *haṃsa*. This verse offers a beautiful instance of *rasonopamā* or similes forming a girdle in which the preceding *upameyas* appear as the *upamānas* in the succeeding stages. Hence the repetition of the same word in the same primary sense becomes necessary for the continuous shift from the sense of *upameya* to the sense of *upamāna*. This shifting relation between the *upameya* and the *upamāna* is the additional sense intended by the poet and emphasised in different contexts. Thus there is *Tātparyabheda* or difference in the intended contextual meanings and so the fault of repetition does not arise.

As an instance of the fault "*Jakṣurbisāndhṛtavikāśibisa-prasūnā - Māgha, V. 28* is quoted by Mahima." Here in this verse the word '*bisa*' is repeated without any variation of meaning. One cannot find in it a case of *Tātparyabheda* *Tātparya* has been nicely defined by Mahima as

**Svārthamabhidadhata eva hi śabdasyārthānta rapratiti-
prāvaṇyam tatparyamucyate — V. V. page 335.**

Ruyyaka explains —

**na svarthābhidhānameva tātparyaṃ apitu satyeva
svārthabhidhane'dhikamartharthantaron-
mukhatvaṃ tātparyaṃ yathā kāśaśabdayoḥ.**

V. V. page 335.

We get tātparya or the intended contextual meaning when a word conveying its primary meaning has a disposition to slip into an additional meaning dictated by the context. The word 'bisa' in its repetition, however, unlike kāśa, does not go beyond its primary meaning. Hence it suffers from the fault of repetition. The second instance of 'bisa' should have been better replaced by a pronoun.

For the sake of brevity we shall have to skip over some minor details in relation to Paunaruktya and concentrate only on those instances which offer the scope of showing Mahima's depth of critical insight. It is a wellknown dictum that very often only the adjective is used to convey the noun which is left out — viśeṣaṇā-mātrād viśeṣyapratipattiḥ. V. V. P. p. 345. In such a case the use of both the noun and the adjective constitutes the fault of repetition. The use of both is permitted only when a special significance is attached to the one by the poet. In that case the fault does not arise, otherwise the fault is very much there. To point out the fault Mahima quotes the following from Māgha's Canto I.

Nisargacitroj्ज्वालāsūkṣmapakṣaṇā lasadbisaccheda-

Sitāṃgasamīnā /

**Cakāsaṭaṃ cārucamūrucarmanā kutthena nāgendra-
vim endravāhanam //**

S. V. Canto I, 8.

Here it is correctly pointed out that between nāgendra and indravāhana only one word is sufficient and the other is a needless repetition. This verse is then very ably contrasted with the following verse from Kumārasambhava —

**Tava prasādāt kusumāyudho'pi sahāyamekaṃ
madhumeva labdhvā /**

**Kuryāṃ harasyāpi pinākapāṇerdhairacyutiṃ ke mama
dhnvino'nye //**

Kumār, Canto. III.

To a superficial reader pinākapāṇi may seem to be a mere synonym needlessly repeated in relation to Hara. But a critical reader cannot miss the contrast set forth between Kusumāyudha and pinākapāṇi. The god Cupid is here bragging of his volume — my weapon consists of soft flowers, but Lord Śiva wilds the temble piṇāka; yet I promise to defeat Śiva by throwing him off his mental calm and serene patience. Understood in this light pinākapāṇi does not serve as a mere synonym of Hara, but as a purposeful adjective bearing a significance which underlines the very spirit of the verse. But no such defence is possible in the case of Māgha's expression nāgendramivendravāhanam which involves a mere verbose repetition of a needless synonym. Mahima's critical insight has indeed unmistakably captured the difference between a great poet and a lesser poet.

The fault of repetition is also found in the repetition of the word 'iva' as a mark of simile. Thus we find in Kirātārjuniya —

Niryāya vidyātha dināramyādbimbādivārkasya
mukhānmaharṣeḥ /

Pārthānanam vahnikaṇāvadātā diptiḥ
sphuratpadmamivabhipeḍe //

Kirāt, III, 25

Here between the two instances of the same word 'iva' one is quite sufficient to mark the similarity between a series of upameyas and a series of upamānas. Mahima rightly comments —

tathā hi maharṣimukhād vidyā niryāya
pārthānanambhipede arkabimbādiva diptiḥ
padmamiti. evaṃ padārthasamanvaye sati
sarveṣāṃupamānopameyobhāvo'bhimataḥ
siddhatyeva

V. V. p. 386.

Otherwise, why do we leave out even a third 'ivi' such as — Vidya diptiriva.

The same type of fault is pointed out in the beautiful verse of Kumārasambhava —

Dine dine sā parivardhamānā labdhodayā cāndramasīva rekhā /
Pupoṣa lāvaṇyamayān viśeṣān jyotsnāntarāṇīva kalāntarāṇī //

Kumār, I

Here too one 'iva' is sufficient and the second is a needless repetition. The most easy going construction of the verse should be thus —

labdhodayā sā pārvatī dine dine

parivardhamānā lāvaṇyamayān viśeṣān .

pupoṣa cāndramasī rekhā iva jyotsnāntarāṇi kalāntarāṇi

Thus one 'iva' is sufficient to mark the series of similes. Yet the total effect of the verse is so overwhelmingly charming that we may ignore the fault which has not missed the unsparing eyes of Mahima. But we cannot ignore the same fault in this verse of Māgha —

Yaṃ sametya ca lalāṭalekhayā yuñjataḥ

sapadi śambhu vibhramam /

Caṇḍamārutamiva pradīpavaccedipasya

niravād vilocanam //

S. V. XIV, 85.

The expression candamārutamiva pradīpavat involves the repetition of the sense of similarity by the use of two synonymous words 'iva' and 'vat' of which one may easily be dispensed with. This verse lacks the easy charm of Kālidāsa's simile and the verbosity of diction is itself disturbing. So here we cannot ignore the fault which, however, in case of Kālidāsa has been overshadowed by an unequalled grace.

Kuntaka in his vakroktiṇīva observes that a poet may choose to reveal the beauty of expression in manifold ways. Sometimes one figure is employed to decorate another figure just as a gold necklace which is itself an adornment is further adorned by inseting of gems. The poet thinks that one figure is not enough for expressing the beauty that wells up in his mind and so another figure is introduced to prop up the beauty of the first figure. Thus we get a two-tier expression of figures as a beauty of beauty.

Alaṃkārasya kavayo yatrā laṃkaraṇāntaram /

asantuṣṭā nibadhnanti hārādormaṇibandhavat //

V. J page 57.

Mahima questions the wisdom of this remark because in his criticism of the fault of repetition he seems to be much obsessed with economy of figurative expressions. So he finds fault with the following description of the celestial ganges Mandākinī in Bāṇa's Harṣacarita.

**nirmokamuktimiva gaganoragasya lilālālāṭikāmiva
triviṣṭapaviṣṭasya**

H. C. page 8.

The white Mandākinī appears as the cast-off slough of the sky-serpent. The expression sky-serpent has the figure rūpaka in which the sky has been identified with a blue serpent, and this forms the basis of white Mandākinī being compared with the cast-off white slough of the serpent. Mahima contends that the word 'iva' after nirmokamuktimiva suggesting the figure simile should have been better dropped. In that case nirmokamukti would have stood as an adjective of identity in relation to the upameya Mandākinī thus turning the second figure too into a rūpaka. In this way 'iva' being dropped in subsequent upamānas of Mandākinī Bāṇa might have more economically expressed his poetic mind with only one type of alaṅkāra, namely rūpaka, without taking recourse to a second type, that is, upamā, Ruyyaka observes that the expression nirmokamuktimiva does not really point to upamā, but to utprekṣā. To make it anupamā the poet should have used muktanirmokamiva. This tallies better with Mandākinī to justify the sense of upamā since a thing is to be compared with a thing and not with an action conveyed by the verbal noun mukti. But here 'iva' connected with mukti meaning an action (kriyā) should be better taken in the sense of kriyotprekṣā. Iva, here does not imply similarity or Sādrśya, but adhyvasāya or super-imposition. Mandākinī moves down the heaven as if the blue sky-serpent is casting off its white slough. To justify the idea of shedding a slough the blue sky has come to be identified with a blue serpent in a metaphorical expression. We think that Ruyyaka is justified in his comment.

Again in the verse —

**amgulībhiriva keśasaṁcayam sannigrhya timiraṁ marīcibhiḥ /
kuḍmalīkṛtasarojalocanam cumbatīva rajanīmukhaṁ śaśī //**

V. V. page. 352

Mahima questions the propriety of utprekṣā conveyed by 'iva' after the verbal form cumbati Mahima thinks that by dropping 'iva' we may replace utprekṣā by simple lakṣaṇā and the needless use of a figure may be dispensed with for the sake of economy. Here Ruyyaka subjects Mahima to sharp criticism for his obsession with economy of expression, and rightly so. The different figures of speech are only different ways of expressing a beautiful idea. In poetry the meaning and expression are inextricably intermingled and so the manifold ways of expression themselves in their turn add to

the beauty of meaning, otherwise the different figures of speech employed by the poets and recognised by the authorities on rhetoric would have been simply meaningless. The science of rhetoric should not have developed beyond the age of Bharata who has recognised only four figures. It is a developing literature that develops the figures. Since upamā and Atiśoyokti constitute the basis of almost all the arthālaṅkāras Mahima, following his own logic, should have insisted that a poet should confine himself only to two of these figures and thus a grand economy would have been achieved. Mahima forgets that poetry is not a technical science in which mathematical precision of definitions requires utmost economy of expression. One cannot write poetry with formula. This extraordinary urge for economy has corrupted and cramped the mind of Mahima in his eagerness to find fault with others

evaṃvidhe ca pradeśe granthakāro

hevākitayaiva dūṣaṇamadāt

— V. V. page 352

Ruyyaka rightly observes further —

Tatrāpi samyojanakrameṇa navaṃ

Vicchittivaicitrayāmanubhūyamānaśṛitaṃ ca

mahākavibhiḥ katham saṃkṣepatvenopoddruyate

V. V. page 352.

Here in this verse discerning critic cannot but feel how the beautiful use of utprekṣā has added to the charm of poetry. But in the particular context we want to add a word in favour of Mahima. We do not proceed from the obsessive need of economy, but from the need of poetic effect. We often use the expression 'abhramliha prāsāda' (cloud-kissing palace literally cloud licking). If we add an 'iva' after 'abhramliha' we get utprekṣā, but at the cost of poetic effect. From the stand-point of poetic effect "the palace kisses the clouds" is a definitely better expression than "the palace kisses the clouds, as if". The second expression waters down the poetic effect brought forth by emphasis on kissing. The same comment holds true in our choice between 'cumbati' and 'cumbatiṇi' in this particular verse. Mahima might have better brought out his point and blunted the criticism of Ruyyaka if in this particular context he would have proceeded from the need of poetic effect, and not from the need of economy of expression.

Mahima then correctly spots the defect in a verse from Māgha's Śiśupālavadha (11.31).

Tṛptiyogaḥ parenāpī na mahimnāmahīyasām /
pūṃścandrodayūkāṃkṣī dṛṣṭanto'tra mahām̐vaḥ //

S. V. 11.31.

The very word dṛṣṭānta used here murders the beauty of Dṛṣṭānta alaṃkāra in which the similarity should be suggested and not expressly stated. Mallinātha rightly comments that it is a case of upamālaṃkāra and that the verse suffers from the fault of Paunaruktya. If the word dṛṣṭānta were omitted it would have been a fine instance of Dṛṣṭānta alaṃkāra with the underlying simile being suggested. Even as a case of upamā the use of the word dṛṣṭānta makes it too crude for appreciation. Mahima observes —

Vācyo hyartho na tathā savadate yathā sa eva prafīyamānaḥ

V. V. page. 354

The express meaning does not taste so fine as the suggested one. In a pleasant contrast against this dull and crude simile of Māgha Mahima sets forth the well-known verse from Raghuvamśa —

Samcāraputāni digantarāpi kṛtvā dinānte

nilayāya gantum //

Pracakrame pallavarāgatāmṛā prabhā pataṅgasya

muneśca dhenuḥ //

Raghu II, 15.

It is a fine specimen of Dipakālāṃkāra which Kālidāsa has chosen in preference to Upamā. The upamālaṃkāra here lies submerged waiting to be noticed only through the power of suggestion, thus forming the silent foundation of the eloquent dipaka. Thus the real beauty of the verse flows from the suggested upamā which is clearly conveyed through an external decoration in the form of, dipaka. Among the ālaṃkārikas Udbhaṭa is the first to notice that the nicety of the dipaka does not consist in a simple syntactical manoeuvre, but in the clever manipulation of attaching the common property, stated only once, to two objects in such a way as to suggest similarity between the two without any statement of similarity.

..... antargatopamā dharmā yatra taddīpakam viduḥ

K. S. S. 1. 14

Hence Udbhaṭa has been appreciatingly quoted by Kuntaka against the elders like Daṇḍin and Bhāmaba who did not see the necessity of upamā in Dipaka and tveyoyogitā.

Prastutāprastutavidhyasāmarthya samprāpti

..... adhiyuktataraiḥ pratipāditam

V. J. page 179.

While appreciating Kālidāsa's use of the figure in the verse examined above Mahima does not spare him the sting of criticism regarding two other verses from the Raghuvamśa. In the verse —

Umāvṛṣāmkau śarajanmanā yathā

Yathā jayantena śacīpurāṇḍaran /

tathā nṛpaḥ sā ca sutena māgadhī

nanandatustatsadṛśena tatsaman //

Raghu III, 23.

the first simile is sufficient to bring out a favourable comparison between Dilīpa and Sudakṣiṇā on the one hand, and the pair of Śiva and Pārvatī and that of Saśi and Indra on the other. Yet the poet has introduced a second simile in the expression 'tatsadṛśena tatsamau' to emphasise the same comparison between the two upameyas and the two upamānas. This is a needless repetition which should have been avoided by a poet like Kālidāsa who possesses the finest sense of figure among the classical Sanskrit poets. Ruyyaka here proposes a weak and halting defence of the poet. According to him the first case of upamānopameyabhāva rests on the common factor of getting an equally brilliant son, while the second upamānopameyabhāva rests on the common height and dignity. Thus the determining factors of comparison being different in two similes, the fault of repetition does not arise. But in the very next breath Ruyyaka recognises the merit of Mahima's criticism. The very fact that the upamānas are high divine dignitaries suggest the extraordinary status of the upameyas, the king and the queen. So a second simile is not necessary to emphasise the status and, we think, Mahima's contention is quite valid. Moreover, 'tatsadṛśena tatsamau' is a crude unpoetic expression unexpected from the pen of Kālidāsa. It remains one of the injudicious application of the word dṛṣṭānta in the verse of Māgha that we discussed above.

Similarly in the verse —

'nidrāvaśena bhavatāpyanavekṣamāṇā

paryusukatvamabalā niśikhaṇḍiteva /

lakṣmīrvinodayati yena digantalambī so'pi

tuadānanaruciṃ vijahāti candraḥ //

Raghu V. 67.

the simile conveyed by the expression abalā khaṇḍiteva should better have remained unsaid. In that case the idea of the offended heroine would have been suggested more beautifully by Samāsokti alaṃkāra. The charm of Samāsokti is definitely lost if the suggested sense is sought to be openly conveyed by a second figure. The appreciation of Kālidāsa for the fine use of figure in saṃcārapūtāni etc., followed by a contrasting depreciation in two other verses of the same Raghuvaṃśa, does credit to Mahima as a discerning critic of great ability.

The same power of discernment is evident in his criticism of the famous verse of Bhāravi —

Sahasā vidadhīta na kriyānavivekaḥ

paramāpadāṃ padam /

Vṛṇute hi vimṛṣyakāriṇaṃ guṇalubdhāḥ

svayameva saṃpadaḥ //

Kirāt, II. 30.

The second half of the verse is a reiteration of the meaning which is already covered in the first half. The first half clearly states that a rash and indiscreet action is the source of misfortune. The second half means discretion, is the source of fortune. Here one statement is enough, since it clearly implies the meaning of other statement. Now if one statement is to be dropped we should choose to retain that one which is more poetically charming between the two. Mahima rightly chooses the second half because it is graced by Samāsokti alaṃkāra that incidentally suggests a superimposed nāyaka nāyiklā bhava between a man of discretion and the goddess of fortune.

Mahima is bold enough not to spare even the great Vyāsa for his fault of repetition and his shaft of criticism is openly directed against the famous verse of the Bhagavadgītā

Yadā yadā hi dharmasya glānirbhavati bhārata /

abhyutthānamadharmasya tadātmānaṃ sṛjāmyaham //

Gītā, IV, 7.

Here 'dharmasya' glāniḥ and adharmasya abhyutthānam — both need not be stated. The one clearly implies the other. Thus the fault of repetition is transparent enough.

Chapter V

VĀCYĀVACANA

After dealing in details with the fault of repetition Mahima examines another fault in contrast, namely, Vācyāvacana or non-statement of that what should be stated. Among many other instances of this fault Mahima also selects the following famous verse from the Kumārasambhava.

Dvayaṃ gataṃ samprati śocanīyatām

Samāgamapārthanayā kapālinah /

Kalā ca sā kāntimatī kalāvata —

Stvamasya lokasya ca netrakaumudī //

Kumāra, V, 71

This verse has drawn high appreciation from Kuntaka for the significant choice of 'Kapālin' as a synonym of Lord Śiva (V. J. page 17). Śiva as a husband is a very unfortunate choice for Pārvatī, since he is a loathsome personality roving with a human skull in hand. The sense of repugnance which is required by the context could not be conveyed by any other name of the god, and the least by Śiva which means the good. Hence the suggestiveness of the word Kapālin has prompted the poet to use it in preference to any other name. Mahima thinks that if Kapālin is chosen for a sense of repugnance another word standing as a substantive should have been used simply as a name to identify the person who causes repugnance. The one and the same word should not be used to convey the property of repugnance and the propertied person causing repugnance. We simply fail to see the justice behind Mahima's objection. Kapālin is a well - known synonym of the lord Śiva, it is a yogarūḍha word which is an adjective by derivation and a specific personal noun by convention. The significance of Kālidāsa's choice of the particular word rests on the fact that, though apparently it is a simple name — it brings out the idea of disgust by power of suggestion through the derivative meaning. Kuntaka calls it the force of Vakratā for striking expression. Mahima seems to miss or ignore this point completely. There is nothing wrong if the conventional meaning of the word identifies the person and the suggested meaning gives us the idea of disgust.

Moreover, the identity of the person is quite evident from the context and a separate noun to fix the person may be dismissed as needless. Mahima himself has accepted the well-known principle

Viśeṣaṇantātraprayogo viśeṣyapratipattau

in the context of Punarukti doṣa.

In the context of Vācyāvacana Mahima examines some instances wherein he offers some interesting comments about misuse of figures. Thus when a figure proper for a particular context is subordinated to another figure, we also get the fault of Vācyāvacana because the proper figure is not allowed to have its full play. We may also call it avācyāvacana because an improper figure is lent prominence. Take for instance the following :

baṃhīyāṃso garīyāṃsaḥ sthavīyāṃso guṇāstava /

guṇā iva nibdhnanti kasya nāma na mānasam //

In this verse the statement of the upamāna in *guṇā iva* produces the effect of pun (Śleṣa) in the connected verbal form *nibadhnanti*. In the context of the subject-matter *nibadhnanti mānasam* means captivates the mind but in the context of the upamāna in '*guṇā iva*' it means 'binds'. Of the two instances of the word *guṇāḥ*—one means good quality and the other means 'rope', hence the play on the means word *nibdhnanti*. The express statement of the upamāna *guṇā iva* is responsible for raising the figure of pun to its position of predominance which inhibits the *samāsokti alaṃkāra* from coming into full play. In '*guṇā iva*' were dropped it would have been a case of *samāsokti* with the pun playing only a subordinate rule. In *samāsokti* the binding rope would have been suggested by *guṇā nibadhnanti* taken together even without the expression *guṇā iva*. The pun then would have come as a matter of context leading the way to the suggested meaning. But the unwanted expression *guṇā iva* completely negates the scope of suggestion. The charm of *samāsokti* lies in its suggestion of non-contextual matter which is subservient to the primary meaning covering the contextual matter. Mahima's insight into the niceties of figures should be appreciated.

But we regret that we are unable to show the same appreciation when he finds fault in the following from *Harṣacarita*.

**Bhairavācāryastu durādeva dṛṣṭvā rājānaṃ śaśinamiva
jalanidhiś cacāla**

and also in the following form the Raghuvamśam

**Tadanvaye suddhimati prasutaḥ suddhimattarah /
dilīpa iti rajendurinduh kṣīranidhavaiva //**

Raghu, I, 12.

In the first case Mahima thinks that the separate upamana word 'sasinam' turns the figure redundantly into an upama. If the word were omitted retaining rajanam alone the purpose of upama would have been served by Śleṣa, since the word rājan means both a king and the moon. Yet it should be remembered that the word rājan meaning the moon, though recognised by lexicographers, is relatively rare in use. So the pun may not immediately flash into the mind of the reader. Thus the poet is not much at fault if he has preferred upama to śleṣa in this particular case.

In the verse from the Raghuvamśam the poet is alleged to be doubly at fault. He ignores the double meaning of the word rājan and proceeds to the figure rūpaka in the expression rājenduh. He is still unsatisfied and proceeds further to upamā in the expression 'induh iva'. Mahima comments that Kālidāsa has here failed to tailor the figures to proper form on account of his extreme fondness for upamā. Otherwise he might have made a pause with rūpaka and stop just short of upamā, though even the rupaka might have been dispensed with in favour of the simple pun on the word rājan. In creation of charming poetic effects upamā can never complete with Śleṣa and rūpaka

na cāsau tābhyāṃ spardhitumutsahate

V. V. page 393

The simple pun on the word rājan would have had a slight touch of suggestion and we know that a touch of suggestion is better appreciated by the appreciative critics. We think that the possible pun has been ignored by the poet due to the relative rarity of the use of the word rājan in the sense of the moon. The second word induh has been deliberately used by the poet to create the effect of a sweet and measured alliterative diction. One cannot command that a poet is bound to always ignore the sweetness of alliteration in favour of economy of expression. Moreover, no great poet in world literature has considered play on words as a high mark of literary beauty. At least a poet of the order of Kālidāsa does not look upon Śleṣa as a fine vehicle of poetic expression. It is also doubtful if rūpaka as a figure is superior to upamā. In this particular verse if the upamā were omitted, Śleṣa or rūpaka would have been clever contrivances smacking off pedantic skill but lack-

ing in the simple grace and charm for which Kālidāsa has earned a singular fame.

But the fault of Vācyāvacana does not arise when one figure is intended to reveal and support another figure. This is especially marked in the combination of Śleṣa and upamā wherein Śleṣa for its revelation depends on an upamā constituting its foundation. As an instance Mahima examines the following verse from Māgha.

anirākṛtatāpasam̐padam̐ phalahinām̐ sumanobhirujjhītām̐ /

Khalatām̐ khalatāmivāsatīm̐ pratipadyeta katham̐

budho janaḥ //

Māgha, XVI, 24

If Śiśupāla is honest how could he resort to knavery ? Of the two uses of the word Khalatā the one is the contextual meaning i.e. knavery and the other is the non-contextual upamāna i.e. a skycreeper (kha-latā). On the strength of the simile in Khalatāmiva the paronomasia is played upon all the adjectivial words. The unfolding of Śleṣa here depends on the expressly stated upamā. Upamā is here subordinate to Śleṣa in the sense that it does not exist here for its own sake, but for the sake of unfolding the Śleṣa. By the dictum 'prādhānyena vyapadeśaḥ' the name of the figure should follow the figure that is predominant. This seems to be an echo of Udbhaṭa's view to the effect that Śleṣa supersedes all other figures coming jointly with it. Udbhaṭa thinks that Śleṣa has no exclusive scope (viviktaviṣayatvābhāva); it always comes along with other figures. So if the superseding power of Śleṣa is not admitted in these cases it cannot be identified as a separate alaṃkāra in the science of rhetoric. Though Ruyyaka in his Alaṃkārasarvasva has rejected this view of Udbhaṭa here in his commentary of Vyaktiviveka he impartially explains the intention of Mahima in this way

Khalatāmityādāvupamothhāpīte śleṣe nopamā śleṣam̐ vādhate.

tasya viviktaviṣayatvābhāvāt śleṣastu tām̐ vādhate iti yuktam

V. V. page 396.

Upamā does not supersede Śleṣa, for in that case śleṣa as a separate alaṃkāra loses its scope, since it has no independent and exclusive scope. So Śleṣa predominates as a figure in accordance with the paribhāṣā

Sāvakāśaniravakāśayorniravakāśo valiyān

But despite Ruyyaka's valuable support of Mahima in this context we fail to understand why Mahima should not find fault in

Kiṁca saundaryātirekanispattaye'tharsya
 kāvyakriyārambhaḥ kavyeḥ, na tvalamkaranispattaye,
 teṣūm nāntariyakatayiva nispatṭisiddheḥ bhamgibhaniti-
 bhedānāmevālāṁkāratvopagamāt

V. V. page 397.

Mahima poses his principle of economy of figures as a corollary to this fundamental principle of poetic composition enunciated by Dhvanikāra. So if Samāsokti is enough to bring out the charm of meaning appropriate to the relish of Rasa what is the need of attempting a Śleṣa again? If Śleṣa is enough for the purpose what is the need of upamā again? Mahima thinks that as an alāṁkāra Samāsokti is superior Śleṣa, and Śleṣa again is superior to upamā. But the theory of the spontaneous emergence of alāṁkāra is hardly consistent with this dogmatic assertion of Mahima. Kālidāsa's upamās display an unequalled charm of spontaneity which is absent in the complex alāṁkaras and even in upamā contrived by lesser poets. The point is whether the alāṁkāra, to an appreciative critic, appears as an integral part of the meaning, or as a clever contrivance laboriously imposed upon the meaning. Viewed from this angle Śleṣa, in comparison with upamā, has a greater and more frequent chance of appearing as a contrivance. So we cannot accept it as a principle that upamā is necessarily inferior to Śleṣa.

To show the proper relation between two alāṁkāras, especially between Śleṣa and Samāsokti, Mahima proceeds to examine a famous passage from Harsacarita —

atrāntare kusumasamayamupasaṁharannjṛmbhata
 grīṣmābhidhānaḥ phullamallikadhavalāṭṭahāso
 mahākālaḥ

Harṣacarita II, P. 21

Dhv. II, page 259.

This passage appears in Dhvānyaloka as a well-known example of Śabdaśaktimūladvani. Abhinavagupta in his Locana elaborates the controversial nature of this passage relating to the question whether it is an illustration of alāṁkāra or of śabdaśaktimūladvani. Mahima takes it to be an illustration of Śleṣa (dharmyārtha śleṣa)—dependent on Samāsokti. If the word grīṣmābhidhāno mahākālaḥ simply were replaced by grīṣmakāla even then the adjectives involving 'attahāsa' and 'yugamupasaṁharan' and the verbal form ajṛmbhata would have sugges-

ted a non-contextual meaning relating to Lord Siva, thus transforming the figure into a pure samāsokti. Hence the paronomastic character of the word Mahākāla appears to come forth only incidentally on the strength of the adjectives, and not as the result of independent efforts. So Ruyyaka remarks :

nacātra mahākālaśabde prayukte prayāsaḥ kaścit

V. V. page 401.

Had it been so we could have said that. Samāsokti being sufficient to suggest a second meaning, a further Śleṣa is redundant and faulty. But the fact that a play on the word Mahākāla comes to the mind of the reader only as an afterthought depending on Samāsokti absolves the poet of the fault of a needless Śleṣa. The beauty of this Śleṣa thus rests on aprthagyatnanirvartyatā (not created with a special and deliberate effort) Mahima here appears to be astute observer of poetic imagery. But the point is if the pun on Mahākāla emerges only incidentally why should we not call the figure involved in this case Samāsokti instead of Śleṣa ? If the poet does not here deliberately mean a pun on Mahākāla it is better to take it as Samāsokti. We think there is something deeper to be said in favour of Mahima. The question is not whether the poet himself deliberately means the pun or not. The question is whether the reader feels it deliberate or not if there is a feeling of effortless spontaneity in the mind of the reader the poet is successful. In short, the success of a great poet depends on his ability to make what is really deliberate appear as indeliberate to the reader. So the figure should be called here primarily by the name Śleṣa on account of the appearance of an unintended effortless pun.

As a contrast to the effortless Śleṣa of Bāṇa Mahima presents the following laborious Śleṣa of Māgha

ācchāditayatadigambaramuccakaīrgāmākramyaca

Sthitamudagraviśālaśṛṅga m /

mūrdhni skhalattuhinadīdhitikoṭimenamudvīkṣyako

bhuvi na vismayate girīśam //

Māgha IV, 19

Here the poet intends a pun on the word girīśa (the mountain raivataka and Lord Śiva). There is no doubt that the compounded adjectives may be analysed in such a way as to fit in with both the contextual subject Raivataka (prastuta) and the non-contextual subject Śiva (aprastuta). But this analysis of the compounds in order to bring out the double entendre is so laborious that it can be

undertaken only if the reader somehow realises the pun in the word *girīśa* beforehand independently of the adjectives.

Thus the realisation of *Śleṣa* in *girīśa* is left to the mercy of an accidental flash of intelligence in the reader who is in no way under any poetic compulsion to realise this double meaning. Provided the double meaning of *girīśa* flashes first in the intelligence of the reader, he then undertakes as a studious enquiry as to if the adjectives can be made to fit in with the meanings of *girīśa*. Thus the first dawn of the sense of *Śleṣa* in the word *girīśa* becomes *nirñibandhana* i.e. without any determinant which is poetically necessary. This makes the whole verse artificial, it lacks in contrast the charm of effortless *paronomasia* that we feel in the passage of *Bāṇa* —

atrāntare kusumasamayam — etc.

where the adjectives themselves have been so beautifully spun out that they go to suggest a second *aprasuta* meaning in the word *Mahākāla*. Here *samāsokti* stands as an easy determinant factor of *Śleṣa*. The position is entirely reversed in the case of *Māgha*'s verse wherein the sense of *Śleṣa* in the substantive word *girīśa*, first flashing somehow in the mind of the reader, prompts him to search for the *Śleṣas* in adjectives.

In the context of *Vācyāvacana* *doṣa* *Mahima*'s observations on the nature of *paronomasia* (*Śleṣa*) as a figure of speech are both important and interesting. A *Śleṣa* suffering from too much artificiality, when there is no sufficient clue to the possible grasp of double meaning, constitutes a fault, and not an adornment of poetry. *Mahima* has tested the truth of this remark by contrasting a passage from *Bāṇa* against a verse from *Māgha*. Thus truth is now further tested by putting under contrast another passage of *Bāṇa* himself —

anavaratanayanajalasicyamānastaruriva

vipallavo'pi sahasradhā prarohati

H. C. page 6.

In this passage the expression '*vipallava*' is an instance of faulty pun, since a word to bear a double *entendre* should not be used both as a *dharmin* and a *dharma* (that is both as a substantive and an adjective) respectively in its relation to two meanings. Primarily, as it is demanded by the context, *vipallava* stands as the *upameya* which should be analysed into '*vipadaḥ lavaḥ*' meaning 'a little bit of danger'. In the sense *upameya* the word figures as a substantive, but some critics think that the word having an

adjectival meaning may also be attached to the upamanā taru as a qualificatory expression thus — vigatāḥ pallavāḥ yasya saḥ that of which the leaves and twigs have withered away. In this way the word vipallavaḥ is claimed to have a double entendre. Mahima finds fault with this interpretation. The word meaning the upameya, standing as a substantive, should at the same time stand as an adjective if it is to qualify the upamāna 'taru'. This is impermissible. A substantive and an adjective belong to two different strata (kākṣā) of meaning, the higher and the lower. The substantive, being predominant, is placed on the higher plane of the hierarchy of meaning, while the adjective, being subordinate, is to be placed on the lower plane, so it is not fair that the same word, used only once, should belong to both the planes at the same time.

The difference in strata crops up also from a different standpoint. It is indispensable that the word should stand as upameya. When you make it stand as an adjective, it is attached to the upamāna. A qualification of upamāna becomes a part of it. Thus the same word partakes in the nature of both upameya and upamāna. This double participation with a double role to play is a cumbrous contrivance which distorts the poetic beauty. To escape from this logico-epistemic difficulty one may take recourse to an imagined repetition of the word vipallava. But that too is unfair, since it is uncalled for, except for satisfying the caprice of a critic who is much given to the love for word-play. Hence Mahima thinks that one should not search for a pun in the word vipallava and so 'dharmidharmobhayarthakatva' is not permissible. these arguments of Mahima have been beautifully elucidated by Ruyyaka in the following words —

atra sthitamapi dharmārthatvaṃ nopamānaviśeṣaṇatvāyalaṃ
viśeṣaṇatvasya kaksyāntarabhavitvāt. na cāvṛttimamtarena
kaksyāntaraparigṛāho nyāyyaḥ na catrāvṛttiḥ kār्या. pra-
māṇābhāvāt. anāvṛttau tu tasyameva kaksyāyāṃ viśeṣaṇatve
upameyasvarūpāpahāraprasaṅgaḥ iti padārthaḥ.

V. V. page 407

While we appreciate the logical acuteness of Mahima's thought expressed in this fine criticism of a mistaken critic we wish to add one point which Mahima has unfortunately omitted. If you drop out the pun in 'vipallava' you may also easily dispense with the upamāna expression taruriva, then the whole sentence should stand thus—anavaratanayanasalilasicyamāno vipallavo-

'pi sahasradhā prarohati. It will be then a case of Samāsokti which by the force of the adjective anavarata etc. will be sufficient to suggest a simile through the imposition of the character of upamāna (upamāna vyavahāra samārapa) on the upameya vipallava. Moreover, this will be in accordance with Mahima's logic that we have been following so long. We remember that according to Mahima Samāsokti as a figure is superior to upamā; and so when Samāsokti is sufficient to suggest a simile, a direct statement of the simile over and above Samāsokti is redundant. Mahima correctly states that the sentence of Bāṇa as it stands is neither a case of Śleṣa nor that of Samāsokti. It is not Samāsokti because the upamāna is directly stated, but not suggested. Thus says Mahima —

atha samasoktivaśaduktanayena tayoh sambandhāvagatiriti
tadayuktaṃ tasyā upamānabhutadharmimātrapratiti - sāmār-
thyopagamāt. iha tu taruriveti tadupattameveti vyartha
evāyamanekārthapadopādānaprayāsaḥ kaveḥ tasmāt salilasiy-
yamānatvasahasradhāprorohādisamānadharmāpekṣyaivātra
taruvipallavayorupamanopameyabhavo'vagantavyaḥ na, tu
śleṣaḥ, Sa hi bhrāntimātrakṛtāḥ

V. V. page 410

But what we want to point out is that Mahima, following his own logic, should have further observed that here even the upamā is faulty, since Samāsokti would have been sufficient by dropping out the upamāna expression 'taruriva'. Yet going against his own logic —

Mahima suggests that this fault of Śleṣa might have been removed by really stating twice the word Vipallava thus 'vipallavastaruriva vipallavaḥ.' Then the one would have figured as the upameya and the other as an adjective to upamāna 'taru'. Absence of restatement of the word vipallava constitutes the fault of vācyāvacana.

Mahima now enters into an interesting debate with Anandavardhana as to the nature of alamkāra in the following wellknown passage from Bāṇa's Haṣacarita.

Yatra ca mātāṅgagāmiṅgaḥ śilavatyaśca, gauryo vibhavaratāśca,
śyamāḥ padmarāgiṇyaśca, dhavaladvijaśucivadanā madirāmo-
diśvasanāśca pramadāḥ

H. C. page 44.

Anandavardhana takes it to be an instance of Śabdaśaktimūladhvani in which the figure of virodha or contradiction is sugges-

ted through the force of Śleṣa. The poetic charm lies in this suggestion. The contradiction is not openly stated, unlike in the case of 'Sannihitavālāndhakārāpi bhāsvanmūrṭiḥ' —

H. C. page 12.

where the particle 'api' brings contradiction into the open. Hence it is not so much a case of pure alaṃkāra as of śabdaśaktimūla alaṃkāradhvani.

Mahima challenges this contention of Ānandavardhana. According to him even here the sense of contradiction is directly conveyed by use of the particle 'ca', such as mataṅgagāminyaḥ śīlavatyasca gauryaḥ. The particle 'ca' has as much capacity to convey contradiction as the particle 'api' —

atra caśabdāvedito virodhaḥ tasyāpyapiśabdasyava
tadarthābhīdhānasāmarthyopagamāt.

V. V. page 420

But we think that Ānandavardhana here stands, on a more sure footing. The particle 'api' (even though) conveys the sense of contradiction more directly than the particle 'ca'. To understand the point we may contrast the two sentences —

'Sannihitavālāndhakārāpi bhāsvanmūrṭiḥ and
sannihitavalāndhakāra bhāsvanmūrṭiśca'

The difference between the forces of 'api' and 'ca' becomes easily evident. Api forcefully brings contradiction to the surface, while 'ca' has the force of suggestion and not of direct communication of the contradiction. Yet one cannot dictate a feeling. It may be that to an experienced reader the particle 'ca' in a proper context at once communicates a sense of open contradiction. In such a case it is difficult to command that he will wait for suggestion. Perhaps this consideration has prompted Mahima to remark that the particle 'ca' has as much power of open communication of contradiction as the particle 'api' !

However, Mahima is silent on the identification of alaṃkāra in the passage concerned. If he concurs with Udbhaṭa as to the nature of Śleṣa he should take it as an instance of Śleṣaṅkāra which serves as the ground of a seeming contradiction (virodhapratibhotpattihetu). Ruyyaka in his Alaṃkāra-sarvasva remarks —

Viviktaviṣayatvena cāsyā drṣṭeḥ śleṣagarbhatve
virodhapratibhotpattihetuḥ śleṣa audbhaṭānām

**darśanāntare tu saṁkarālamkāraḥ yathā —
sannihitavāḷāndhakarā bhasvanmurtiśca ityādaḥ**

Sarvasva, page 123.

Here 'darśanāntare' refers to Ānandavardhana's view which Abhinava in his Locana interprets in favour of saṁkāralamkāra. According to Jayaratha, the commentator of Sarvasva, this is also the view of Ruyyaka himself. Jayaratha however, takes it as an instance of virodha or virodhābhāsa because here the beauty lies in the contradiction or seeming contradiction which the poet clearly intends to bring to our notice. Moreover, Śleṣa is the ground (hetu) on which the virodha stands. There should not be any saṁkara or admixture between the ground and the consequence Jayaratha observes —

**Yo yasya hetutvaṁ bhajate tena saha tasya saṁkaro na
yuktaḥ** — ibid. p. 123.

He then quotes from Sarvasva itself —

**na ca virodhotpattihetau śleṣasya virodhena saha aṅgāṅgi-
gisamkaraḥ** — ibid. p. 123.

He has remarked before —

**alamkāraśabdena cātra virodhābhāsa evābhidhīyate,
tasyaiveha prastutatvāt atra hi śleṣo virodhotpattau hetutvaṁ
bhajate tena vinā tasyānutthānāt** — ibid. p. 123.

The figure of contradiction has an exclusive scope even without the touch of Śleṣa or any other alamkāra. Thus Jayaratha gives an instance —

'Jaḍayati ca tāpaṁ ca kurute' ityatra asya viviktaviṣayatvaṁ
— ibid. p. 123.

It is interesting to note that in this instance the particle 'ca' is used to directly emphasise the contradiction clearly it is a case of virodhālamkāra and not of virodhadhvani despite the use of 'ca'. This reinforces Mahima's contention that the particle 'ca' can express contradiction as much directly as the particle 'api'.

In the concept of Śleṣālamkāra Mahima seems to be an adherent of Udbhaṭa. Pure and unalloyed Śleṣa without the support of any other alamkāra is not possible. This view of udbhaṭa which has come to be known as the theory of 'aviviktavisayatva' has gained powerful support from Mahima. It is well-known that the opposite theory of viviktaviṣayatva of Śleṣa (that is śleṣa having an independent and exclusive scope) has been presented by Ānandavardhana in the context of differentia-

ting Śleṣa from śabdaśakti mūladhvani. As an example of pure and unmixed śleṣa Anandavardhana presents the well-known verse—

yena dhastamanobhavana balijitkāyaḥ purāsvikṛto
 yaścoddhṛtahāravalayo gaṅgāṃ ca yo'dhārayat
 yasyāhuḥ śaśimacchiro hara iti stutyam ca nāmāmarāḥ
 pāyātsa svayamandhakakṣayakarastvām sarvadamādhavaḥ //

Dhv. II, Under Kārikā 21

This verse sings the glory of both Śiva and Viṣṇu. The two gods appearing as substantives are themselves to be unearthed through the śleṣa in the expression 'sarvado mādhabaḥ' (sarvadā umāhavaḥ and sarvado mādhabaḥ). The adjectives too are accordingly analysed as to befit both the gods. The poet seeks benediction of both the gods, and so both of them are prastutas. Both are again directly meant and neither comes up through suggestion or dhvani. These considerations go to make it a case of pure śleṣa. Anandavardhana has been faithfully followed by Mammaṭa and Ruyyaka (sarvasva, page 121-129).

Mahima challenges this view of Anandavardhana and his followers and boldly asserts that such verses as 'yena dhastamanobhavana' etc. are instances of mere laborious versification without a grain of poetic charm, and as such do not contain any alaṃkāra worth its name. They are clever and pedantic contrivances which do not go to make poet. In cases of composition wherein there is śleṣa both in the substantive and the adjectives both the two meanings are equally prastuta and thus is no clue or any other supporting alaṃkāra to point to the śleṣa, the labour of the versifying poet goes in vain, because the composition becomes too artificial to possess any grace, and śleṣa as such loses its character as a real alaṃkāra. Mahima justifiably remarks —

yatra tu avṛttinibandhanagandho'pi na sambhavati

na tatrā arthantarāvagatiriti vṛthaiva tatra kavīnamu-

bhayārthapadanibandhaprayāsaḥ, vācyaāvacanadoṣaduṣṭatvāt

V. V. page 423.

Mahima means that to lend poetic charm to such charmless composition some other alaṃkāra (or some contextual clue at least) should have been introduced to make an easy sense out of the laboured sense or seeming non-sense. Since the way to a painlessly intelligible meaning has been blocked such verses suffer from the fault of vācyaāvacana. Thus pure śleṣa is no poetry. It must go to

the credit of Mahima that he has precisely understood the real implication of Udbhata's view on śleṣa and has boldly brought it to a legitimate logical conclusion.

As to the particular verse of Māgha —

acchāditāyatadigambaramuccakairgāmākramya
saṁsthitamudagraviśālaśṛṅgam
mūrdhni skhalattuhinadīdhitikoṭimenamu dīkṣya
ko bhuvi na vismayate nageśam

Māgha, IV, 19

which has come under the fire of criticism, Mallinātha in adherence to the view of Ānandavardhana and his followers has interpreted it as an instance of śabdaśaktimūlādhvani. This brings us directly to the question whether śabdaśaktimūlādhvani can be justifiably accepted as a case of dhvani at all. The Dhvani tradition seeks to distinguish between pure Śleṣa and śabdaśaktimūlādhvani in the following way :—

In pure Śleṣa both the substantive and the adjectives have double entendre and both the meanings simultaneously come out as the direct referents (vācyārtha) of the words. The two meanings have no deeper material relation except the pure formal relation of being conveyed by seemingly same words. In Śabdaśaktimūlādhvani on the other hand, though both the substantive and the adjectives had double entendre the two meanings do not appear as direct referents. The direct reference is limited to the proper subject-matter (prastuta) by the contextual link (Prākaraṇika). The second meaning comes up by way of suggestion; it is external to the subject-matter (aprastuta), is not necessarily brought in by the context, but yet is suggested by the force of double entendre. But the suggested meaning cannot emerge without a link with the direct meaning and so, in order to establish a relation between the contextual meaning — (Prākaraṇika Vācyārtha) and the non-contextual meanings — aprākaraṇika vyaṅgrārtha a figure of speech like upamā etc. is conjured up to effect the link. This is called — Śabdaśaktimūla alamkāradhvani. The author of Kāvya prakāśa has also recognised śabdaśaktimūlavas-tudhvani (Ch. IV, 38-39 and Vṛtti theorem).

But Dhvanikāra himself has given no instance of śabdaśaktimūlavastudhvani and Jayaratha in his commentary on Sarvasva (p. 130) informs us that Ruyyaka in his Saṁketa commentary on Kāvya prakāśa has questioned the separate status of śabdaśaktimūlavastudhvani, though in Sarvasva he seems to have recognised it. Since the status of śabdaśaktimūlādhvani is

not a problem that particularly concerns us here we need not go into that discussion. We shall confine ourselves only to the problem whether śabdaśaktimūlādhvani itself can be recognised as an independent type of dhvani. To become a dhvani the suggested meaning in śabdaśaktimūlādhvani must predominate over the direct meaning, while in Śleṣa both the meanings being direct are equally prominent.

Jagannātha in Rasagaṅgādhara has questioned the independent status of śabdaśaktimūlādhvani on two counts. First distinction between samāsokti and śabdaśaktimūlādhvani cannot be logically maintained. It is said that in Samāsokti the suggested meaning, being non-contextual is subordinate to the contextual direct meaning, while in śabdaśaktimūlādhvani the suggested meaning is the predominant factor. But what is the logic of this supposition ?

In śabdaśaktimūlādhvani too the suggested meaning is non-contextual. In non-contextuality is accepted as the measure of subordination the suggested meaning is equally subordinate in samāsokti and śabdaśaktimūlādhvani because it is non-contextual in both the cases. If it is said that the beauty of śabdaśaktimūlādhvani finally rests in the suggested meaning, though it is non-contextual, it may be equally argued that the beauty of samāsokti as an alamkāra also equally lies in the suggested meaning, otherwise the very character of samāsokti as an alamkāra will be lost. Hence why should we not transfer samāsokti to the domain of śabdaśaktimūlādhvani ? Dhvanikāra himself has stated "cārutvotkarṣanibandhanā hi vacya-vyaṅgyaḥ prādhānyavivakṣā" — Dhv. p. 114. If that is so samāsokti too should be considered as an instance of dhvani, since it is the suggested meaning that holds the final charm of alamkāra and Samāsokti may be easily dispensed with as a separate figure of speech. Again if you are keen on keeping in tact that independent status of samāsokti as an alamkāra, let śabdaśaktimūlādhvani too come under samāsokti. Thus between samāsokti and śabdaśaktimūlādhvani one or the other should sacrifice its independent status.

Again in pure śleṣa both the meanings are said to be direct, but if the two meanings are entirely unrelated what is the utility of referring to the two meanings and what special charm one does gather thereby ? Mahimabhaṭṭa has dismissed authenticity of pure śleṣa as an alamkāra on the ground that mere double reference is a mere trick of the composer without having any charm in itself.

Jagannātha seems to have raised the same question in a different manner. He says that to protect the charm of pure śleṣa as an alaṃkāra there must be some sort of superimposed identity adhedādhyavasāna between the two meanings. Śleṣa hi śleṣābhittikamabhedādhyavasānaṃ dvayorarthoriti Sakalālaṃkārika - nibaddham anubhavasiddhaṃ ca tatra mūtānveṣaṇe Vidhīyamāne ekapadopāttatvāna śakyate mūlamanyan-hirvaktum. ekapadopātto hyeneko'phartha'bhinnaṭayaiva bhā-sate — Rasagaṅgādhara, II, page 159. In that case pure śleṣa is turned into a case of rūpakālaṃkāradhvani. Hence Mahima's arguments against pure śleṣa as an alaṃkāra and also against śabdaśaktimūladhvani have gained powerful support from Jagannātha.

Chapter VI

AVACYAVACANA

The fault of Avācyavacana literally means 'statement of something which need not be stated'. In this broad sense all faults fall under the class of avācyavacana because all of them involve saying something which need not have been said. Apart from this common universal character of all the faults covered by the general sense of the term. Mahima has applied the expression avācyavacana also in a special sense. In this special sense he defines avācyavacana as follows :

Yat svarūpānuvāddikaphalaṃ phalgu viśeṣaṇanam /

Apratyakṣāyamānārthaṃ smṛtamapṛatibhodbham /

Tadavācyamiti jñeyaṃ vacanam tasya dūṣaṇam /

Tad vṛttapūraṇāyaiva na kavivāya kalpate //

An irrelevant descriptive adjective, which merely reiterates the factual essence of a thing, which does not tend to perceptualise an object and which does not impress us as being born of poetic intuition, is something that should not be stated. The statement of such a not-to-be stated object is the fault of avācyavacana. Such a futile statement is meant only for completing a verse (that is, only for versification), but does not express the genius of a poet.

As an instance of avācyavacana Mahima cites the following verse —

Kakubhāṃ mukhāni sahasojjvalayan

dadadākulatvamadhikaṃ rataye /

Adidīpadinduraparo dahanāḥ

kusumeṣumatinayanaprabhavaḥ //

V. V. page 451

Here Mahima considers the expression Atrinayanaprabhavaḥ as an irrelevant epithet of Indu (moon). This expression is only a dry factual description about the genesis of the moon and serves no particular poetic purpose.

The reference to the mythological anecdote about the birth of the moon from the eyes of Atri does not carry any special sense that is relevant to unfolding of poetic significance. It is a needless des-

cription of the thing as it is in fact. So it can be easily dispensed with without running the risk of losing poetic beauty. But one may take the expression as a case of Nañ tatpuruṣa compound which means 'not born of the three-eyed god 'Śiva' and so, standing as an adjective to dahana (fire) it suggests the beauty of vyatirek-ālaṃkāra. The fire generated by the eyes of Śiva burnt cupid to ashes, yet for a lover the moon plays the role of another kind of fire which is not born of Śiva's eyes and which does not consume cupid, but aggravates his power all the more.- In this way 'Atrinayanaprabhavaḥ taken as a Tatpuruṣa compound suggests some special excellence pertaining to the moon in relation to a lover. So it is not a mere factual description of the moon since it bears a powerful suggestion.

Mahima counters this contention by the remark that in that case the adjective 'aparaḥ' is useless, because the vyatirek-ālaṃkāra is sufficiently suggested by the man Tatpuruṣa compared. It is clear that here Mahima shifts his ground and recognises some poetic force of suggestion in the seemingly factual description 'Atrinayanaprabhavaḥ'. He now moves on to find fault in the pronominal adjective 'aparaḥ'. Truly speaking, the word (aparaḥ), has not been used here simply as a useless adjective. It bears a note of emphasis which helps us in finding the clue to the suggested meaning. It helps us to realise that the compound 'atrinayanaprabhavaḥ' should be better taken as a trinayanaprabhavaḥ in order to suggest the vyatirek-ālaṃkāra. Hence we think contrary to Mahima's contention, that paraḥ need not be replaced by 'Uditaḥ', — as it has been suggested by him.

In this context Mahima raises a pertinent problem in relation to the essence of svabhāvokti alāṃkāra. If a factual description is considered to be a fault the very scope of svabhāvokti alāṃkāra is lost. This particular alāṃkāra consists of describing things as they are. If such a description does not add to the charm of a poetic composition it should not be considered an alāṃkāra at all, for it is not an adornment but a dispensable burden. Mahima here enters into a discourse on the distinction between the ordinary meaning and the poetic meaning of an expression. Every word has a communicable meaning universally recognised by the common people in their matter-of-fact social communication. This universal meaning (Samānya) is a conceptual construction (Vikalpa). We may call it 'pravṛttinimitta' of the connotative conceptual content of the meaning. Bharṭṛhāri in his Vākyapadīya ('sambandha samuddeśa', of the Third Book) has used the technical term 'abhidheya-sattā,' or meaning existence to underline the universal character of this meaning. It is the most pervasive existence in the

sense that people understand some meaning even by such words as ākāśakusuma (sky flower) which does not correspond to any reality in the world of facts (Sā Sattāvyabhicāriṇī). The meaning existence as a conceptual construction does not depend on any corresponding reality. The Buddhists claim that all meanings are intellectual abstractions (Vikalpa). Bhartṛhari falls in line with them in this respect and Mahima records his approval in the following verse —

Ucyate vastunastāvaddvairūpyamiha vidyate /
tatraikamatra sāmānyaṃ yadvikalpaikagocaraḥ //

V. V. page 452.

This universal meaning of a word communicable to the common man in his common social behaviour is different from the Nyāyavaiśeṣika category of 'universal' belonging to the realm of reals. But the peculiar poetic distinction between Sāmānya and Viśeṣa, brought forth by Mahima in this context, appears to suggest that here he is not concerned too much with the logical character of meaning though he has introduced the word Vikalpa that seems to be flavoured with ideas inducted from Bhartṛhari and the Buddhists. Despite the use of the word Vikalpa Mahima by Sāmānya, points to the common meaning of a word accepted by the common men. Whether the character of this meaning is an intellectual construction or not is not a contention with which he is concerned. Our point is apparent from the fact that Mahima's characterisation of Viśeṣa as the poetic meaning has nothing to do with the Buddhist theory of viśeṣa. According to the Buddhists viśeṣa is 'svalakṣaṇa' or the discrete pure particular of the moment which is the only possible object of primary perception, or better say, sensation which grasps just the sensible alone without any intermixture of the name and the class concept. This viśeṣa can never be the meaning of the word. Dharmakīrti observes in Pramāṇavārtika (Pratyakṣapariccheda, sl. 127).

tasmādviśeṣaviśayāḥ sarvaiveindriyajā matiḥ /
na viśeṣeṣu śabdānāṃ pravṛterasti sambhavaḥ //

— all sense-knowledge has for its object the unmixed pure particular of the moment. It is not possible for words to find application to these viśeṣas as their are meaning referents. But Mahima wants to bring viśeṣa into the fold of meaning. Thus Mahima's distinction between Sāmānya and viśeṣa has nothing to do here with the Buddhist's distinction between the two. It is rightly so because Mahima is here concerned not so much with the logic of meaning as

with the meaning of poetry. Indeed it is one of the few occasions where he has evinced an adequate sense of poetry. When Mahima says — 'Viśiṣṭamasya yadrūpaṃ tat pratyakṣasya gocaraḥ' the similarity with the Buddhist position is purely verbal, since in the very next line he remarks — 'Sa eva satkavigirāṃ gocaraḥ, pratibhābhuvām'. Clearly enough by Prutyakṣa Māhima here does not mean the most powerful means of knowledge familiar in logic and epistemology ; but what he means is the poetic intention which grasps the promising features of a fact or thing and convey them in adequate words that make them as much vivid as in preception. Great poets equipped with intuitive insight and corresponding command of words can lend to the meaning the vividness of a sensible percept. Poetic words charged with this power of perceptualisation constitute the essence of Svabhāvokti alarṃkāra. Viśeṣa is this percetualised meaning in the apprehension of which poetic intuition almost plays the role of perception. As a fine example of Svabhāvokti alarṃkāra Mahima cites the famous verse of Abhijñānaśākuntalam Grīvā bhaṅgābhirāmam etc. This is not a matter-of-fact description of a bald and dry fact. The most characteristic features of a deer is flight, relentlessly pursued by a hunter, are here presented before imagination which almost is almost transformed into perception due to the vividness lent to the object. It is far from avācyavacana which means the application of an irrelevant descriptive phrase without any poetic purpose. So a successful instance of svabhāvokti alarṃkāra is free from the fault of avācyavacana.

It is significant that Namisādhu in his commentary on Rudraṭa's Kāvyaṭarṃkāra (page 12 N. S. edn.) has used the term 'apuṣṭārtha' in the sense of what Mahima defines as the fault of avācyavacana. The term 'apuṣṭārtha' is itself significant. Apuṣṭārtha is an unnourished rickety meaning in which dry bones are visible just under the skin. Namisādhu shows that a bleak and barren description of a bald fact sometimes issues from useless circumlocution, thus - Pātu vo girijāmātā dvādaśārdhār-dhalocanaḥ. Here the expression dvādaśārdhārdhalocanaḥ (half of half of twelve) in place of trilocana is fantastic to the point of absurdity.

Mahima finds the fault of avācyavacana where the upamāna and the upameya happen to be synonymous, the difference between the two there being only in the structure of the words, but not in the meaning. As an instance he cites the following verse from the 14th canto of the Raghuvaṃśa (XIV. 8) —

Saritsamudrān sarasīmśca gatvā
 rakṣaḥkapīndrairupāpādītāni /
 tasyūpatan mūrdhni jatāni jīṣṇorvindhyasya
 meghaprabhavāivāpaḥ //

— water of the rivers, oceans and lakes fell in showers on the head of Rāma like the cloud-born water of the Vindhya.

Here the upamāna and the upameya are the same in meaning, though they have verbal difference (āpan and jalāni. We find it difficult to accept the objection of Mahima. The connotative meaning of jala and ap is no doubt the same, since they are synonymous. But the comparison really obtains between two types of water, the water of the Vindhya and the water of the rest. From the standpoint of denotative meaning the two waters are not the same. The comparison is between the two particulars of the same class. That distinguishes this case from ananvaya alaṅkāra (sāgaraḥ sāgaropamaḥ etc.) where the upamāna and the upameya cover the same area of meaning. Suppose we say - the face of this girl looks as pure and beautiful as the face of a goddess. There is no fault here because the comparison obtains between two distinctly different faces. In the same way this verse of Kālidāsa does not bear the fault that has been found by Mahima. When a class name settles down to two distinctive particulars and the relation of similarity obtains between these two, even the sameness of the class name itself does not detract from the merit of the simile. The reading suggested by Mahima as an improvement upon Kālidāsa is simply amusing.

In place of 'vindhyasya meghaprabhavā ivāpaḥ' Mahima suggests the reading vindhyasya meghaprabhavāni yadvat'. In this way he avoids the use of the word āpaḥ which is a synonym of jalāni. But what do we gain by that ? The adjective 'meghaprabhavāni' clearly points to the noun 'jalāni' which at once enters into our understanding despite its omission in practice. Thus to all practical purposes we get more than a synonym, we get the same word. Moreover, yadvat is an unhappy unpoetic expression.

Mahima again finds fault with the following famous verse of Bhavabhūti's Uttararāmacarita (I, 38)

iyam gehe lakṣmīriyamṛtavartirnayanayo
 rsāvasyāḥsparśo vapuṣi bahalaścandanarasaḥ /
 ayam kaṇṭhe bāhuḥ śīśīramasṛṇo maukṭikasaraḥ
 kimasyā no preyo yadi paramasahyastu virahaḥ //

Mahima draws our attention to the last foot of the verse which states that everything relating to Sītā is sweet and pleasant except separation from her which is unbearable. In conformity with this the second and the third feet also directly state the qualities related to sītā with charming application of Rūpakālaṅkāra, but do not directly refer to the heroine herself by making her the immediate subject of whom the upamāna is predicated in a proposition of identity. Yet in the first foot the heroine herself is pointed as the subject (upameya) with the help of the pronoun 'iyam' and the upamānas (lakṣmīḥ and Amṛtavartīḥ) are directly predicated of the heroine. This variation in the subject of predication between the first foot and the rest constitutes the fault.

In the three other feet the upamāna predicables are predicated of the qualities related to Sītā, while in the first foot the upamānas are predicated of Sītā herself. In short this is the fault attributed to Bhavabhūti in this verse. The first foot chooses the qualified object as the subject of predication, whereas here too the subject of predication should have been the qualities and not the qualified object. To remove this discrepancy Mahima suggests the replacement of the first foot by the following reading — mukhaṃ pūrṇaścandro vapuraṃ mṛtavartir nayanayoḥ. It is for the critics to judge if the beauty of the expression iyaṃ geḥ lakṣmīḥ (she is the grace of my house) can be retained in the stale common-place expression of identity 'mukhaṃ pūrṇaścandraḥ.' Certainly we cannot allow the poetic charm to be sacrificed in reference to the demand for a forced conformity of subject-predicate relation. Again when the poet says — 'iyam amṛtavartir nayanayayāḥ' (she is the cream of ambrosia to my eyes), he does not speak of Sītā's person, but of her entire personality. Mahima's suggested reading directly refers to Sītā's physical appearance, and this is definitely crude in comparison with the original expression of Bhavabhūti himself.

Mahima then proceeds to consider a fault that is often found in the improper statement of a proper name which is wrongly stated in the analytical form. Thus Māgha, instead of using the proper name Hiraṇyakaśipu, states 'Hiraṇyapūrvam kaśipum' pracakṣate which is a circumlocutory statement intended to refer to the proper name itself. This is improper since Hiraṇyakaśipu as a proper name is not the same as Hiraṇyapūrvaka Kaśipu. The people call the demon by the name Hiraṇyakaśipu, and not by Hiraṇyapūrvaka Kaśipu. Mahima comments

Hiraṇyakaśipuriti tasyākhyānam na hiraṇyapūrvakaḥ
Kaśipuḥ ityataḥ tasyāvācyaśya vacanaṃ doṣaḥ

We think that Mahima is quite right in his criticism. A proper name is meant for identifying an individual. So as a mark of identification the name should be used as it is. The analysis of the name is not the name. Even Kālidāsa is not free from this fault. Instead of saying Daśaratha in a straight way he has used Daśapūrvah rathaḥ — in Raghu Canto VIII, 29.

Daśaraśmiśatopamadyutiṃ yaśasā dikṣu daśasvapi śrutam /
Daśapūrvatham yamākhyayā
daśakaṇṭhārigurum vidurbudhāḥ //

Mahima's next discovery of the fault is not however convincing. The beauty of the following verse lies in an effective play on contradiction.

Yā gharmabhāśastanayāpi śītalaiḥ
Svasā yamasyāpi janasya jīvanaiḥ /
Kṛṣṇāpi śuddheradhikaṃ vidhātṛbhīr
Vihantumamhāṃsi jalaiḥ paṭīyaśī //

V. V. page 442.

— The river Yamunā is the daughter of the hot rayed Sun, yet her water is cool. She is the sister of the god of death, yet her water gives life. She is dark, yet her water is abundantly pure. In discovering the fault in this case Mahima wants to impose the notion of logical contradiction on a poetic composition. In the logical concept of contradiction two contradictory properties are predicated of the same subject, such as —

'A is hot' and 'A is cold'. So logically, contradiction requires the uncontradicted sameness of the subject-substratum related to the contradictory predications. In this verse, however, the poet appears to place the pairs of contradictory propositions in the following way —

- i) She is the daughter of the hot rayed Sun
- ii) Her water is cold
- i) She is the sister of death god
- ii) Her water is life-giving
- i) She is dark
- ii) Her water is abundantly pure

In every pair of contradictories the subjects appear as different, and so these are not proper statements of contradiction. This is Mahima's contention. Mahima does not feel deterred by the fact that the Yamunā and her water are really the same, and so from

factual standpoint the subjects of contradictory predication are not really different. In that case, Mahima thinks, the statements should have been corrected as thus —She is the daughter of the hot rayed sun and she is cool. In other words contradiction should be brought forth through logically impeccable forms of statement. Mahima forgets that a poet while writing poetry is not charged with the responsibility of writing a treatise on logic. For unfolding the charm of a seeming contradiction a poet need not be bound by the discipline of formal logic. The charm of poetry and the rigour of logic hardly go hand in hand.

After considering these instances of avācyavacana, Mahima goes on to cite some other instances in which the same fault flows from injudicious use of figures of speech. In the figure Aprastutaprasaṁsā a description of the non-contextual (aprastuta) is sufficient to suggest the contextual subject-matter (prastuta) which, therefore, should not be expressed by further introduction of a simile. The non-contextual here serves as a reflected image of the original subject-matter and the similarity between the original and its non-contextual counterpart is also suggested without any express mention of the same. If a simile is introduced over and above the figure Aprastutaprasaṁsā it does not serve any poetic purpose; on the contrary, it weakens the charm of Aprastutaprasaṁsā. Let us take the following instance —

Āhūteṣu vihaṁgameṣu maśako nāyān purāvāryate madhye-
vāridhi

vā vasmstrṇamanirdhatte maṇināṁ padam /

Khadyoto'pi na kampato pracalitum madhye'pi tejasvināṁ
dhik sāmānyamacetanāṁ prabhumivānāmṛṣṭa-

vattvāntaram //

V. V. page 444.

when birds are invited a mosquito coming along with them may not be prohibited. In the mid-sea even the shining phosphorus may assume the status of a jewel. Even a glow-worm may not hesitate to consider itself as one among the luminous objects of the sky. Fie upon these insignificant beings which are oblivious of their position like the trifle of a master who has no sense of proportion.

Here the statement of similarity with the trivial master in quite uncalled for. The case of the master without the sense of proportion is already suggestively covered by the general denunciation of the insignificant beings who cannot measure up their own position. So such a master forms a part of the contextual subject-matter (Prastuta) to which the poet wants to point, and as

such the master should not have been introduced as an upamāna which is 'aprastuta'. Thus the introduction of the simile in addition to Aprastutaprasāṁsā which is sufficient for the poetic purpose constitutes the fault of Avācya vacana in relation to figures of speech. Mahima is abundantly justified in his criticism.

Mahima again finds fault with the following verse in Kālidāsa's Raghuvamśa, IX, 41.

Alibhirañjanabindumonoharaiḥ kusumapañkti
nīpātibhirañkitāḥ /
Na khalu śobhayati sma vanasthalīm na tilakas-
tilakaḥ pramadāmiva //

— Verily it is not that the tilaka tree did not decorate the sylvan site, - the tree marked as it was with bees alighting on rows of flowers and hence looking beautiful like spots of collyrium, as decorates a young woman the mark of musk painting.

Mahima's contention is that in this verse the Samāsokti alaṁkāra itself suggests the upamāna, and so the express mention of the upamāna is needless, because it vitiates the charm of Samāsokti which consists in suggesting the unexpressed aprastuta by the expressed 'prastuta' — The tilaka tree swarming with bees, beautiful as spots of collyrium, enhances the beauty of the forest. Here the introduction of collyrium spots suggests the behaviour of a heroine who displays here charm by applying a beauty spot on her forehead. Thus the behaviour of a heroine is superimposed on the woodland. This superimposition through suggestion constitutes the charm of Samāsokti alaṁkāra here. Hence the express mention of upamāna again (Tilakaḥ pramadāmiva) is not only needless, but also tells against the telling effect of Samāsokti. Mahima seems quite correct in his contention. But we have one word to say on his comment that follows forthwith.

Atra tilakapramadayorekatarasmin vācye
Yadubhayorvacauḥ tadavācya vacanaṁ doṣa

V. V. page 447.

Mahima means that the poet should have said either, Tilaka iva or pramadāmiva, but not both. We fail to understand the logic. Why should one upamāna be stated when we can profitably do away with the both? The suggestion is quite clear without either Tilaka or pramadā. Moreover, the word 'Tilaka' meaning the tree is itself suggestive of the simile, since the beauty mark on a lady's forehead is also called by the same name. Mahima next quotes the following verse to show another instance of avācya vacana —

Jaṅghākāṇḍorunālo nakhakīranalasatkesarālīkarālaḥ
Pratyagrālaktakābhāprasarakisalayo mañjumañjīrabhṛṅgaḥ/

Bhrtuṇṛtānukāre jayati nijatanussvacchalāvaṇyabāpi-
Sambhūtāmbhojaśobhāṃ vidadhadabhinavo daṇ-
ḍapādo bhavānayaḥ //

V. V. page 447.

Here the rūpakālaṃkāra involved in jaṅghākāṇḍa uruṇāla etc. suggests the similarity between a lotus and the daṇḍapāda pose of the dance. So the express mention of the upamāna lotus and the similarity therewith is uncalled for. Since the samāsokti alaṃkāra is enough for the suggestion of the aprastuta, the further use of the upamā alaṃkāra detracts from the beauty of Samāsokti. Upto this Mahima seems quite reasonable. But his obsession with economy of expression makes him rush to the extreme. With the further comment that the very mention of daṇḍapāda as the prastutat itself is also irrelevant. Bhavānī is imitating here the tāṇḍa dance of Śiva, and the adjectives involved in rūpakālaṃkāra are quite sufficient to suggest that this particular pose of the dance is daṇḍapāda. Hence daṇḍapāda should better be replaced simply by 'pādapadma'. It is not expected that even a critical reader is well-versed in the sophisticated art of dancing. To him the adjectives may not suggest the particular dancing pose. For him the mention of daṇḍapāda is necessary to identify the pose. If economy of expression is pushed to such an extreme one may find fault even with this fine verse of Kālidāsa, Mandaḥkaviya-śaḥprārthī etc. One may argue that 'Gamiṣyāmi Upahāsyatām' is a needless expression because its sense is already suggested by the upamānas constituting the second half of the verse.

The fault of Avācyavacana may also be found in an additional use of utprekṣā. Where one utprekṣā in the main aspect is enough, an additional utprekṣā in a secondary aspect is useless. A lady has just come out of a dipping bath. The clusters of her hair are hanging low and loose behind with drops of water trickling down. The poet surmises that the tresses of hair are weeping with trickling tear-drops, as if, in fear of being caught by the raised hindpart of the lady. Here the most pronounced surmise or imagination belongs to the weeping of the drooping clusters of hair. The secondary surmise expressed in 'as if in fear of being caught' need not be mentioned with the help of 'iva' after 'bandhanasya'. 'Iva' bearing the force of surmise should better go with the principal aspect, that is, rudanti. In other words we should say 'rudanti iva'. For the sake of metre the reading should be 'jalabindubhī roditiva cikuracayo bandhanabhayena.' Mahima's point is plausible no doubt. Thus there are many excellent reducing points at which the highly talented critic of poetry has got better of the misdirected logician.

Appendix 1

BHARATA'S CRITIQUE ON DOṢAS

Bharata's Nāṭyaśāstra, the earliest extant treatise on Indian literary criticism, is mainly concerned with dramaturgy and Rasa. Vācikābhīnaya, according to Bharata, is the most important factor for awakening Rasa, the pivotal element in Sanskrit plays. Alamkāras, Guṇas and Doṣas which are treated in detail in the Nāṭyaśāstra, chapter XVI, are shown by Bharata as ancillary elements of Vācikābhīnaya. Bharata is first to show that doṣas relating to a Kāvya (Kāvya-doṣaḥ) are ten in number :

Gūḍhārtha, Arthāntara, Arthahīna, Bhinnārtha, Ekārtha, Abhiplutārtha, Nyāyādapeta, Viṣama, Viśandhi and Śabdahīna. Bharata is the first writer to give expressly the doṣas a positive value besides their inherent negative capacity. But he has not formulated any general definition of Doṣa, not has he given any illustration of any of the ten doṣas. His commentator Abhinavagupta in the commentary called Abhinavabhāratī has successfully explained most of these doṣas with suitable examples and occasionally with parallel citations from Daṇḍin and Vāmana.

(1) Bharata's Gūḍhārtha is 'paryāya-śabdābhīhita' or stating something by means of a manufactured circumlocutory synonym. Abhinava interprets it with the example 'ekādhikanavavimāna' for Daśaratha. He further adds that a proper name cannot be replaced by a synonym and forcibly analysed into a sentence (na hi yadrcchāśabdāḥ paryāyabhāṇaḥ daśaratha iti vaktavye balāt parikalpitena vastunaḥ paryāyaśabdenābhīdhānam ekādhikanavavimāna iti.

(N. S. page 331)

A proper name is a mark of identification. When the name is analysed it turns into a description and as such loses the character of an identifying mark. The name Daśaratha is associated in our mind with a particular individual. The word as it is has the power of individuation. But if we say - here comes the king called 'whose chariot covers quarters numbering nine exceeded by one' the force of individuation is no longer there. Hence neither an etymological analysis nor a connotative analysis can replace a proper name.

Nahima is the first ālaṃkārika after Bharata who has realised the logical significance of this fault when he shows that Hiranyakaśipu cannot be replaced by Hiranyapūrvaka Kaśipu or Himagiri by Himapūrvakagiri.

In this context we are pleasantly surprised to find how Bharata and Mahima anticipated some important elements of Russell's theory of proper names. While dwelling on the epistemic content of a proper name Russell shows the difficulty of substituting a description for a proper name.

(B. Russell - Human knowledge, pages 89-94.)

Compare Bhoṭṭoji's Vṛtti - Vākyaena sāmjñānāvagamānitya-samāso' yam

— on the sūtra Saṃjñāyām (2. 1. 44)

(2) Arthāntara (Superfluous expression) is "avarṇyaṃ varṇyate yatra", i. e., what which need not be stated is stated. Abhinava explains it with the example "cintāmoham anaṅgam aṅga tanute viprekṣitaṃ subhruvaḥ" — the beautiful lady's look spreads indeed love as well as anxiety and insensibility. Here attributes like anxiety and insensibility are not required to be mentioned, since they are easily deducible as two mental conditions of a love-lorn heart.

This poetic fault as defined by Bharata anticipates the fault 'tadvān' in the work of Rudraṭa.

(3) Arthahīna (incoherence) is divided into two types, (a) asambaddha (incompatibility) and Śāvaśeṣa (incomplete). Abhinava illustrates the first as "adyāpi smarati rasālāsaṃ mono me mugdhāyaḥ smaracaturāṇi" — my love-lorn mind still recalls the clever amorous sportings of the little unsophisticated damsel. A mugdhānāyikā or a coy heroine in Sanskrit poetics is never described as clever in the art of love and amorous tactics. The above illustration describing the 'mugdhā nāyikā' as such suffers from the defect of incompatibility. This poetic defect shown by Bharata reminds us of 'apārtha' in the works of Bhāmaha, Daṇḍin and others.

The second type of Arthahīna is illustrated by Abhinava as — "Sa mahātmā bhāgyavaśāt mahāpathamupagataḥ." The expression "mahātmā bhāgyavaśāt" involves two possibilities. It may be really 'mahatmā abhāgyavaśāt' which by sandhi turns into 'mahātmā bhāgyavaśāt'. Or it may be 'mahatmā' standing separate from 'bhāgyavaśāt'.

From the reading the meaning is not clear. Hence we are to depend on the context to complete the sense by removing the doubt about construction (atra hi savaśeṣaḥ prakāraṇāpekṣo vastuniścayaḥ abhāgyavaśadityapi saṁbhāvyatvāt.

ibid. p. 332.

(4) Bhinnārtha :

The fault of bhinnārtha or distorted meaning has been classified by Bharata into three types : the first one is termed 'abhivijñeyam' (to be understood with great labour). When the syntactical relation in a sentence is distorted in such a way that the relation between words is to be understood with great difficulty and rearrangement of the words is felt necessary for proper understanding, Bharata calls it the first type of distorted meaning. Abhinava illustrates this fault by a verse which on its face appears non-sensical, because the words requiring direct relation between them are placed at a great distance with intervention of other words in between them and thus one cannot easily make out the syntactical meaning. This is evident in the following illustration of Abhinava :

**Jvaraṁ bhuñjīta saṁjātamaḥ paṇāśaḥ cirasthitam /
ajādugdhaudanaṁ hanyāt tridoṣotkopasambhavaṁ //**

To make any sense the relation among the words is to be made straight by the following rearrangement : — (yadi) ajādugdhau-
danaṁ bhuñjīta, (tadā tat) cirasthitam saṁjātamaḥ paṇāśaḥ
tridoṣotkopasambhavaṁ jvaraṁ hanyāt — If one takes rice mixed
with goat-milk it will root out chronic fever resulting from
fermentation-of bowels and disequilibrium of three elements.

The second type of 'bhinnārtha' is 'grāmya' (vulgar or which is not refined). Abhinava illustrates it as, "Bhadre bhajasva mām,
idante dāsyāmi" — O, lady, love me and I shall give you this.
This sentence is bad in import and offensive to good taste and
decorum.

The contradiction of the principally intended meaning by an
additional clause is the third type of bhinnārtha (Vivaksito' nya
evārtho yatrānyārthena bhidyate — ibid page. 332).

Abhinava illustrates it as follows :

**'Syāccheda na rāvaṇaḥ' ityuktvā 'kva nu punaḥ sarvatra sarve
guṇāḥ' iti.**

— O, if this person were not Rāvaṇa ! Where does one find the
combination of all qualities ?

From the context it appears that the principal intention of the speaker is to demounce Rāvaṇa, but in the additional clause Rāvaṇa is surprisingly applauded as the repository of all qualities. This contradicts the main intention of the speaker.

(uddiṣṭaṃ hyatra rāvaṇasyānupādeyatvaṃ kva nu punarityanenānyārtha Karaṇād bheditam, page ibid)

(5) Ekārtham (repetition) is the fault where the same purpose is sought to be served by repetition of the same idea in different words (aviśeṣābhidhānaṃ yattadekārthamiti smṛtaṃ — page ibid). In the example given by Abhinava, Kundenduḥāraharahā-sasitaṃ, any one of three (lily, moon or laughter of Śiva) standing as upamānas could have served the purpose of emphasising excellence of the upameya.

(6) 'Abhiplutārtha' is the fault of floating meaning (abhiplutārthaṃ vijñeyaṃ yat padena samāpyate - ibid). Abhinava illustrates it as follows :

Sa rājā nṛikuśalaḥ saraḥ kumudaśobhitaṃ /
sarvapriyā vasantaśrirgrṣme mālaticāgamaḥ //

— that king is proficient in the principles of polity. The lake is adorned with lilies. The beauty of spring is loved by all. Jasmines bloom in summer.

This verse does not give us a totality of intra-connected meaning. Each foot is a complete sentence with a complete meaning having no relation with others. Thus the complete meaning of each foot keeps floating independently without being submerged in a totality (atra pratipādaṃ arthasya parisamāptatvād abhiplutatvaṃ, ekavākyatvena nimajjanābhāvāt - ibid)

(7) Nyāyādapeta - (logical lapse) is noted by Bharata as 'pramāṇaparivarjitaṃ'

i.e. an expression devoid of reasoning.

Abhinava's classification and example of the defect betray Bhāmaha's and Daṇḍin's influence. He divides it into two:

a) deśakālaviruddha — defying the limitation of place and time;

b) Kalāśāstrādiviruddha — contradicting the established notions of art and science etc.

(8) Viṣama — fault of metrical confusion (Vṛttabhedo bhaved yatra viṣamam nāma tat — ibid p. 333).

This fault arises when characteristics of different metres mark the different feet of a single stanza. One is then confused as to the nature of the metre belonging to the total verse.

(9) Visandhi is noted by Bharata as anupaśliṣṭa śabda i.e. the improper absence of euphonic combination which is necessary in a verse.

(10) Śabdacyuta as noted by Bharata is the fault of grammatical inaccuracy.

Our purpose of dealing with the faults noticed by Bharata is to show how the great ancient master had produced and tabulated a scheme which exercised a good deal of influence upon the later authorities like Bhāmaha, Daṇḍin and Vāmana.

BHĀMAHA'S SPECULATION ON DOṢA

Bhāmaha, unlike Bharata, has dealt with Poetics as an independent subject. In the work *Kāvya-lamkāra* he has treated the topic of doṣa in great detail. He has not only accepted some of the poetic faults of Bharata in name and substance but also in his elaborate treatment of doṣa which is certainly ahead of his predecessor he has introduced for the first time in Sanskrit Poetics two sets of poetic faults relating to logic and simile, Bhāmaha's diction is not as agreeable as that of Daṇḍin, but he has sense of proportion and logical erudition which is apparent from his treatment of logical faults.

Bhāmaha has discussed four sets of doṣas. In the first and fourth chapters of his work he has discussed two sets each consisting of ten doṣas. In the second chapter he deals with seven upamā doṣas (defects of simile) and lastly he discusses the logical faults in relation to literature in the fifth chapter.

In the first chapter the set of doṣas consists of the poetic flaws :

Neyārtha, kliṣṭa, Anyārtha, Avācaka, Gūḍaśabdābhidhāna, Ayuktimat, śrutiduṣṭa, Arthadūṣṭa and Kalpanāduṣṭa.

These ten doṣas are mentioned by Bhāmaha while he has been dealing with the general characteristic features of poetry. The statement which immediately precedes the enumeration of these doṣas is *Vakrābhidheyaśabdoktiritā vācāmalamkṛtiḥ* 1. 36 — striking presentation of meaning and words is desirable as constituting embellishment of language. Then Bhāmaha proceeds to enumerate the above set of doṣas only to underlike the fact that defects detract from the essence of ornamental poetry. Expression too far-fetched or the fault of neyārtha should be scrupulously avoided in order to make the statement essentially poetic or tinged with vakrokti.

The fault of Neyārtha is a fault when the proper meaning does not follow from the logical order of words, but a word or words are to be supplied in order to complete the sense of the sentence. The sentence 'māyeva bhadṛā' 'auspicious as deceit' conveys an improper and incomplete sense ; but if we supply the word *Veṇudareḥ* (of *Veṇudari* son of *Bāṇāsura*) the sense is complete and

proper, because deceit on the part of a demon is useful as being conducive to the good of the demons.

This fault of Neyārtha is mentioned by Daṇḍin also in connection with the poetic excellence Arthavyakti (arthavyakti-raneyatvamarthasya — Kāv. Chap. I).

The law of syntax demands that three conditions — competence (yogyatā), proximity (āsatti) and expectancy (ākāṅkṣā), should be fulfilled in order to convey a definite sense by a sentence. When the words constituting the sentence are not sufficient to complete the sense and the total sense is to be inferred by supplying a word or words the sentence suffers from the fault of inferability and in such a case the law expectancy is violated.

Ayuktimat

This fault refers to the employment of clouds, winds etc. as messengers. Objects like clouds, wind and creatures like cakravāka, parrot etc. with indistinct speech or without speech cannot be entrusted with the act of a messenger. Hence pieces of literature like Pavanadūta. Bhṛṅgadūta are specimens of this poetic defect. Judged by this standard Kālidāsa's Meghadūta which is a perfect piece of literature is open to this fault of ayuktimat. Hence Bhāmaha modifies his statement and observes that if these messages are addressed by one suffering from an excess of yearning it is not a fault. (Yadi cotkaṇṭhayā yattadunmatta iva bhāṣate / tathā bhavatu bhūmnedam sumedhobhiḥ prayujyate // 1.44).

Thus we find that this peculiar poetic device is often successfully adopted by many good and talented poets. From this we can infer what Bhāmaha really means by his general condemnation of this device. He means that a genius like Kālidāsa should not be an object of imitation by poets of far inferior merit. A great genius can turn into good account even a trifling theme which though unacceptable as possible fact, nevertheless becomes, acceptable as an artistic creation of extraordinary merit.

Avācaka — (Inexpressiveness)

This is an expression which is not universally accepted as connected with the intended meaning. It is a fault because it is unintelligible to the reader. Bhāmaha illustrates this fault as —

himāpahāmitradharaiḥ vyāptam vyoma — I, 41.

— the sky is covered with clouds.

Here the word 'himāpahāmitra' is made to evolve the meaning 'cloud'. Hima is snow, its 'apahā' is fire, its amitra (foe) is water

and that carries it (water) is cloud. This roundabout expression is certainly a defect and it is called *avācaka* by Bhāmaha.

The replacement of a directly meaningful word by a roundabout and far-fetched descriptive expression fails to easily identify the meaning and the reader's intelligence is quite irrelevantly taxed in order to bring out the meaning by a good deal of exercise in inference.

This defect as shown by Bhāmaha corresponds to Bharata's *Gūḍhārtha* or mention of a thing by means of a manufactured synonym as in *Ekādhikanavavimāna* for Daśaratha.

Gūḍhaśabdābhidhāna — (Hidden meaning)

Use of difficult expression with a hidden meaning is a defect. Poetry with such an expression fails to appeal to even to the taste of a learned reader who finds it difficult to appreciate the beauty on account of this fault.

Bhāmaha illustrates this as —

asitartituk

the word 'asita' means 'black', 'ṛti' means 'path' (from the root ṛ to go) — so 'asitarti' means whose path is black i.e. fire. The word 'tuk' means son. The whole word means 'son of fire'.

The word *asitarti* as a synonym of fire is not well-known ; such a synonym is manufactured with a good deal of useless labour on the part of the composer. This reminds us of the word '*Valakṣagu*' as a synonym of the moon, which is analysed as *valakṣāḥ śvetāḥ gāvaḥ Kiraṇāḥ yasya saḥ* i.e. the moon.

From Bhāmaha's examples it is difficult to determine the very slender line of difference between *avācaka* and *gūḍhaśabdābhidhāna*. So we can only suggest some line of demarcation. An *avācaka* expression is faulty on account of the fact that it does not stand as a synonym which is capable of directly indicating the meaning. The components of the expression such as *himāpahā amitra* and *dhara* are not unintelligible taken separately by themselves. But when they are combined in a descriptive compound they lack the power of direct communication and the finally intended meaning which is sought to be brought out by the compound can be apprehended only by laborious trace of calculating imagination.

In *Gūḍhaśabdābhidhāna* the very components of the devious expression are quite unfamiliar and as such they do not easily convey their own meanings though theoretically, according to lexicon, they are treated as synonyms for more familiar expres-

sions. Thus in the expression 'asitartituk' the word 'ṛti' in the sense of path and 'tuk' in the sense of son are quite unfamiliar even standing by themselves. The unintelligibility of the total meaning here follows from the unintelligibility of the component parts themselves, while in the former case the parts taken separately in themselves are quite intelligible, yet the total effect is unintelligible.

The other four poetic defects of this first set śrutiduṣṭa, arthaduṣṭa, kalpanāduṣṭa and śrutikaṣṭa are referred to by Dhvanikāra by the word 'śrutiduṣṭādayaḥ' in the Kārikā śrutiduṣṭādayo doṣā anityā ye ca darśitāḥ— II. 11a. All these faults are too easy to need any analysis.

The second set of poetic defects discussed by Bhāmaha in the fourth chapter of Kāvya-lamkāra consists of ten doṣas :

Apārtha (absence of collective meaning)

Vyārtha (with conflicting statement)

Ekārtha (tautology)

Sasamśaya (ambiguity)

Apakrama (reversal of order of statement)

Sabdahīna (ungrammatical)

Yatibhraṣṭa (deviation from the rules of metrical pause)

Bhinnavṛtta (metrical defect)

Visandhi (disjunction of euphonic combination)

Deśa-kāla-kalā-loka-nyāyāgama - virodhi

(inconsistency with regard to place, etc.)

The last five poetic flaws together with Ekārtha are taken from Bharata in name and substance. Bhāmaha's sasamśaya is the second type of arthahīna of Bharata. Bhāmaha's vyārtha is the first type of Arthahīna of Bharata.

Apakrama — (Reversal of the order of statements)

When two sets of words are arranged in such a way that one refers back to the other it is sometimes necessary that there should be one-to-one correspondence between the components of one set and those of the other. The possibility of this correct correspondence requires that the arrangements of the words in both the sets should be in such a sequence that words (and meanings) of the one set should respectively correspond to the words (and meanings) of the other set. When the sequence is broken there is danger of reverse

reference or cross reference and the sense of correspondence is lost. Bhāmaha illustrates this thus :—

rathāṅgaśūle bibhrāṇau pātām vaḥ śambhuśārngiṇau — IV. 21.

Here is a referential relation between two sets, rathāṅgaśūle and śambhuśārngiṇau. Correct one-to-one correspondence should be between rathāṅga and śārngi and between śūla and śambhu, but the order is reversed in the second set resulting in a reversed correspondence. Hence it is a defect according to Bhāmaha.

This poetic defect apakrama has been developed by Mahimabhaṭṭa at a later period into two distinct poetic flaws Prakramabheda (breach of symmetry) and Kamabheda (breach of sequence).

Apārtha — (absence of a total collective meaning)

In a mere conglomeration of sentences without having any link of meaning among one another we do not get an integrated system of meaning. In other words, the meanings are disorganised. This lack of a meaningful system constitutes the fault of apārtha—according to Bhāmaha. We have derived this interpretation from Bhāmaha's example ten pomegranates - six cakes etc. The two sentences have no link and so there is no integral organisation of a total meaning structure.

Bhāmaha mentions seven faults of simile in the second chapter of his work. We do not know how far Bhāmaha attached importance to the figure upamā (simile) in the scheme of alarṅkāras: but he selects the figure upamā for pointing out the poetic defects that may be associated with this figure. Bhāmaha tells us at the outset that these faults of upamā were suggested to him by his predecessor Madhāvin whose work on Poetics has not come down to us (ta eta upamādoṣāḥ sapta medhāvinoditāḥ / II. 40a). The seven faults of simile are — Hīnatā (deficiency), Asambhava (impossibility), Liṅgabhedha (Disparity of gender), Vacobhedha (Diversity of number), Viparyaya (Dissimilarity), Upamānādhikatva (Redundancy in upamāna) and Asādrśya (Dissimilarity). Bhāmaha observes at the beginning that no two objects can be similar in every respect (Sarvaṃ sarveṇa sārūpyaṃ nāsti bhāvasya kasyacit II. 43). We shall discuss in detail the question of admitting similarity as a distinct category and the flaws that may be connected with it in our forthcoming chapter on Daṇḍin.

Of the seven faults of simile the last one of asādrśya (dissimilarity) needs some sort of elaboration, since none of Bhāmaha's successors paid any greater need to this flaw of simile.

Asādrśya or dissimilarity is a defect when there is no resemblance between upameya and upamāna. Bhāmaha illustrates it with the following verse —

Vane'tha tasmin vanitānuyāyinaḥ

Pravṛttadānādrakaṭā mataṅgaḥ /

Vicitrabarhābharaṇāśca barhiṇo

babhurdivīva'malavigrahā grahāḥ //

II. 63.

Here the infatuated elephants and peacocks with variegated plumes are compared with shining planets. Bhāmaha points out that this is the example of defect asādrśya as there is no conceivable resemblance between elephants and peacocks on one hand and planets on the other.

The last set of poetic defects relating to logic and logical fallacies are not treated by us for two reasons. Firstly, they are elaborately dealt with by Professor Dr. Bechan Jha in his work 'Concept of Poetic Blemishes in Sanskrit Poetics' and secondly, we share the same view with Daṇḍin that these defects are difficult to judge and unprofitable to discuss, specially because their bearing on literature is extremely remote.

Vicāraḥ karkaśaprāyastenālīḍhena kiṃ phalam — III. 127

Bhāmaha is the first ālaṅkārika to maintain that a fault is sometimes converted into an excellence. For instance, the blemish of ekārtha will indeed heighten the poetic effect in special circumstances instead of marring it when the word in question is repeated under the pressure of fear, sorrow and jealousy as also of delight and wonder.

Sanniveśaviśeṣāttu duruktamapiśobhate /

nīlaṃ palāśamābadhamantarāle srajāmiva // I. 54

It is interesting to note here that Bhāmaha's successors found herein a broad hint regarding the instability in the character of doṣa, and they carried the scheme further, each in his own way, as we shall have occasion to see later on.

Appendix III

DANḌIN'S EXAMINATION OF DOṢAS

Danḍin who is admitted by many as a successor of Bhāmaha in the field of Sanskrit Poetics in the celebrated author of *Kāvya-darśa*, a distinguished work written in fluent and mellifluous style. Though the work does not claim itself to be a standard text book or Poetics dealing with most of the familiar topics of Sanskrit *ālankāra*, yet it is decided by a handbook to the aspirants after literary fame, dealing with figures of speech and other aspects of Poetics in a lucid and precise manner. Bhāmaha recognises co-equal status of word and meaning in poetry, Danḍin admits words such with delectable meaning as the body of poetry (*Śarīra*) and no loss an *Ālankārika* than Paṇḍitarāja Jagannātha in the late period of Sanskrit Poetics more or less accepts Danḍin's position in defining poetry. Danḍin is the first *ālankārika* to differentiate between two things which are different from each other, one of which is the body (*Śarīra*) and the other is embellishment (*ālankāra*). Poetry, according to him, consists of words replete with detectable meaning (*iṣṭārtha*) and all other elements *guṇas*, *mārgas* and *doṣas* are dealt with so far as they contribute to the *iṣṭārtha* or hinder it. Danḍin is even more determined and emphatic than Bhāmaha in holding that even a slight defect is sure to mar the effect of poetry just as a single leprous spot is sufficient to render a handsome body ugly, and hence it should not be endured (*tadālpamapi nopekṣyaṃ kāvyē duṣṭaṃ kathaṅcana/syādvapuḥ sundaramapi śvitreṇaikenā durbhagam // Kāv. 1.7*). He says "A word well used is declared by the wise to be the wish-fulfilling cow, the same ill-used, however declares the user's bovine nature (*Gaurgauḥ Kāmadughā samyakprayuktā smaryate budhaiḥ / duṣprayuktā punargotvaṃ prayoktuḥ saiva saṃśati // ibid 1.6*)

In the third chapter of the *Kāvya-darśa*, Danḍin enumerates ten *doṣas* which are in name, substance and order of enumeration, identical with Bhāmaha's second list of *doṣas* with the only exception of the eleventh, namely, of defective logic which is recognised by Bhāmaha and rejected by Danḍin as a fault difficult to judge and unprofitable to discuss. The question, whether errors in syllogistic conclusion, probans and illustration are to be regarded as

blemishes in poetry, or not is, according to him, out of place in a book on poetics. The problem is a purely technical one and belongs mainly to the domain of logic and a dry discussion of it in poetics is both inappropriate and baseless (pratijñāhetudraṣṭāntahānirdoṣa na vetyasau / vicāraḥ Karkaśaprāyastenālīdḥena kiṃ phalam // ibid 111, 127).

Like Bharata Daṇḍin enumerates ten types of doṣas in Chapter-III of his work and after defining and illustrating each doṣa he states with example when this particular doṣa turns into a guṇa. The ten doṣas of Daṇḍin are as following :

- | | | |
|-------------------------------------|---|------------------------------|
| I. Apārtha | - | absence of complete meaning |
| II. Vyārtha | - | self contradictory |
| III. Ekārtha | - | tautology |
| IV. Saśamsaya | - | doubtful utterance |
| V. Apakrama | - | non-sequent |
| VI. Śabdahīna | - | grammatical mistake |
| VII. Yatibhraṣṭa | - | defective in caesura |
| VIII. Bhinnavṛtta | - | defective in metre |
| IX. Visandhi | - | non-euphonic |
| X. Deśakālakalālokanyāyāgamavirodhi | - | inconsistent with place etc. |

Doṣas like apārtha, Vyārtha, Ekārtha, Sasamśaya, apakrama and Deśakālakalāloka nyāyāgamavirodhi are shown by Daṇḍin with suitable examples under along with the circumstances under which these doṣas are turned into guṇas and herein the concept of aucitya or propriety, which is elaborated in the works of Abinava and Kṣemendra in later days, serves as the basis for determining a doṣa or a guṇa.

Doṣas like Śabdahīna, Yatibhraṣṭa, Bhinnavṛtta and Visandhi are never shown by him as guṇas under any circumstances and here Daṇḍin appears to have - characteristised these poetic defects as nitya doṣas or faults under all circumstances. It is noteworthy that unlike Vāmana Daṇḍin has not devoted a chapter for the consideration of certain grammatical principles and for justifying or dismissing Śabdahīna or asādhū doṣa that seems to be associated with some well-known usages of prominent poets like Kālidāsa, Bhāsa and others. But the note of warning struck by him at the beginning of Chapter I of the Kāvya-darśa relates definitely to the above four poetic defects as well as to the defects like

grāmyatā and neyatva, which are shunned by poets belonging to either of the two mārḡas Vaidarbha and gauḍa.

In Chapter I while dealing with the topic of distinction of two standard dictions of his time Vaidarbha and gauḍa-Danḍin has noted certain defects that are contrary to certain guṇas but characterise gauḍa mārḡa. One may raise a pertinent question here how a number of poetic defects can constitute the essential features of a well-established mode of poetic expression of the poets of the eastern region (gauḍa).

Neither Danḍin nor any of his commentators has answered this question. We are to find the answer in the observation of Gopendratippabhūpāla at the end of Vāmana's chapter on doṣas (Adhikaraṇa II, 2). Doṣas are mainly of two kinds, Sthūla and Sūkṣama. Doṣas relating to pada, padārtha, vākya and vākyaārtha are Sthūla, since they are to be spotted out directly. But defects which are actually reverses of certain guṇas are to be known from the guṇas themselves by implication and these are called Sūkṣama doṣas or poetic defects subtle in character. But they completely disfigure poetic beauty (Sūkṣamāḥ kāvyā-saundaryākṣepānatikṣamāḥ). Indeed this is an explanation of what Vāmana himself has said in his vṛtti.

Śaithilya or defect of looseness arises when letters used are mostly of small breath-value, and this śaithilya is the reverse of the guṇa Śliṣṭa (Śliṣṭamasprṣṭaśaithilyam I, 43). But the poets who are adherents of gauḍamārḡa prefer this defect of Śaithilya as in the sentence mālatimālā lolālikalilā yathā — the garland of jasmine is clustered with fickle bees — since it is a case of alliteration and adds to the dignity of composition.

Anatirūḍha or use of words which are not well-known and which are found in the lexicons only is a case of poetic defect that is the reverse of the guṇa prasāda. As for example anatyarjunā-bjanmasadrkṣāñko valakṣaguḥ — the moon with spot resembling lotuses which are not so white — the meaning of the word valakṣaguḥ as a synonym of the word moon can be determined only by analysing its component parts and the word 'arjuna' in the sense of white is found only in the lexicon. But the poets belonging to the gauḍa mārḡa do not attach much value to prasāda guṇa. They often commit this fault in order to parade their pendants which is irritating for refined taste.

Grāmyata —

Avoidance of the defect of grāmyatā (vulgarity) forms the core of the excellence mādhyurya. There is absolute agreement as regards

the avoidance of this defect of grāmyatā among the poets of both the mārṅas (vaidarbha and gauḍa. Grāmyatā or the poetic fault of vulgarity may belong to sense, word and sentence.

The sentence — Kānye, Kāmayamānaṃ mām na tvam kāmāyase Katham — Girl, why don't you desire me who desire you ? — is an instance of the fault of vulgarity in sense and this is deemed quite undelectable. In order to purge the defect of vulgarity of idea the above sentence should be put thus — Kāmaṃ kandarpacāṇḍālo mayi vāmākṣi nirdayaḥ / tvayi nirmatsaro diṣṭyetyagrāmyo'rtho rasāvahaḥ // — let the base born cupid be unkind to me, faireyed lady, happily, he bears no malice towards you.

The first sentence is a specimen of crudity of expression and the last one is a case of striking mode of poetic expression. Deviation from common mode of expression constitutes the essence of poetic expression. The idea of soliciting love from the lady-love is put in an uncharming and common-place way in the first sentence, so it is too open and open to the poetic fault of grāmyatā or the fault of unpoetic utterance, while in the latter sentence the same idea is put forward in a striking manner to avoid the fault of bountness or grāmyatā.

The grāmyatā consists in words as in the examples —

Yābhavataḥ priyā 1.66

Daṇḍin notes here an exception to this fault of grāmyatā of words. Words like bhaginī, bhagavati etc are approved by all as words of decent meaning, since any indecent idea that may be associated with them is entirely shrouded and not known in common.

cf. the śloka quoted in Vāmana's Kāvyaśāstrakārikāsūtravṛtti
(page 47)

Samvitasya hi lokena na doṣā'nveṣaṇaṃ kṣamaṃ /

Śivaliṅgasya samsthāne kasya'sabhyatvabhāvanā //

Niṣṭhuratā, Dīptatva or Kṛcchredyatva

Abundance of non-harsh letters constitutes the poetic excellence Sumukāratā, but total use of non-harsh letters gives rise to the fault of bandhaśaithilya, looseness in composition. The reverse of this guṇa is the use of harsh letters in abundance; the harsh letters are difficult to pronounce as in the example —

Nyakṣeṇa Kṣapitaḥ pakṣaḥ ksatriyānām kṣaṇāditi —

Paraśurāma annihilated the race of Kṣatriya within a short span of time.

But the adherents of gaudamārga do not accept this as a poetic defect since it contributes to the grandeur of composition (dīptam).

Neyatva —

The poetic fault of neyatva is a case where supply of a word or words is essential to complete the sense of a sentence.

As for example —

Mahī mahāvarāhaṇa lohītāduddhṛtodādheḥ

— the great boar rescued the earth from the red ocean. The above sentence is elliptical in character, since the words used herein are not competent to account for the redness of the ocean, and hence words like uragāsṛjaḥ (due to the blood of the serpents) are to be supplied to make the sense complete. Poets of both the mārgas abhor this poetic defect of neyatva.

To successfully convey definite meaning the structure of a sentence must be guided by the law of syntax. This law requires fulfilment of three conditions —

Competence (yogyatā), proximity (āsattī) and expectancy (akāṅkṣā). When the words of a sentence are not sufficient to complete the sense and the total sense is to be inferred by supplying some more words or words the sentence suffers from the fault of 'neyatva' which literally means inferability. In such a case the law of expectancy is violated. This law demands that the intended sense should be completed by suitable words which are expected to complete it. When such words are missing the expectation is unfulfilled and so the law of expectancy is not observed.

Ākulatā — Poetic fault of confusion. Use of profuse compound words gives rise to this defect. As for example —

astamastakaparyastasamastārkaṁśusaṁstarā /

pinastanasthitatāmrvastrevābhativāruṇi //

the Western horizon with the rays of the (setting) sun strewn on the setting mountain shines forth like a lady with heavy breasts clad in brownish garment (1. 82).

Here too many recondite compound words create confusion of sense and hence the poets belonging to Vaidarbha mārga put above verse in the following manner with less compound words.

payodharataṭo'tsaṁgalagnaśandhyātapāṁśuksā /

Kasya Kāmāturaṁ ceto vāruṇi na kariṣyati // 1. 84

Bhāravi. the poet, has lauded 'anākulatva' as one of the essential features of good speech (prasādaramyanojasvi)

Atyukti —

That which strays away from ordinary sphere and is described in an exaggerated manner is called the poetic fault of exaggeration. As for example —

alpaṃ nirmitamakāśamnālocyaiva vedhasā /

idamevaṃvidham bhāvi bhavatyāḥ stanajrmbhaṇam //

"By Brahman, ākāśa (space) has been created small without taking into his consideration that the expansion of your breaths could be like this."

This poetic fault of exaggerated meaning which is the reverse of the poetic guṇa kānti in cultivated by the adherents of gauḍa mārga.

It should be noted that hyperbole exaggeration is extolled by Daṇḍin himself in the second chapter of his work (Vivakṣā ya viśeṣasya lokasīmātivartini / asavatiśayoktiḥ syādalmakārotamā yathā //..... alamkārantarasm nāmapyekamāhuḥ parāyaṇam / vigiśamahitāmuktimimāmatiśayahvāyām // ll. 214 and 220.)

Anything poetic is essentially tinged with hyperbole and Narendraprabhāsūri in his Alamkāramahodadhi places hyperbole at the top of all arthālamkāras as it constitutes the very life-breath of all poetic figures (Sarvālamkāracaitanyabhūtatvāt prathamamatiśayoktiṃ viśeṣato lakṣyati VIII. 2).

The fault of atyukti should not be confused with the figure of atiśayokti or hyperbole which according to Daṇḍin, constitutes the basis of all other figures of speech. Even the poetic hyperbole should have a limit, the transgression of which becomes revolting to the poetic taste. The fault of atyukti consists in this transgression of limit upto which a hyperbole may be profitably allowed. This limit cannot be precisely defined with logical accuracy. It is more or less relative to individual taste. Yet we know that exaggerations sometimes prove as irritants to cultured taste. This irritating exaggeration is the fault of atyukti. Viśamatā —

The poetic fault viśamatā or unevenness in composition is the reverse of the guṇa samatā, which constitutes in the proper arrangement of betters of one and the same type at the beginning and at the end. But the followers of gauḍa mārga resort to the fault

of unevenness in composition as they prize more the presence of a figure than the loss of a poetic guṇa called Samatā.

ityanālocya vaiṣanyamarthālaṁkāradaṁbarau/
avekṣamānā vardhate paurastyā kāvyapaddhatiḥ //

Daṇḍin was well conversant with rasa and bhāva (aanikṛtansamksiptaṁ rasbhavahirantaran 1.18) but to him eight rasas were alaṁkāras, since as an ālaṁkarika he was yet to recognise the pivotal importance of rasa in poetry which, according to him as we noted earlier, consists of words replete with delectable sense. This delectability in sense is heightened with the help of alliteration, and particularly with śrutyānuprāsa (consonants originating from the same śruti or place of articulation). Repetition of letters in the words and feet of the verse, provided the proximity is close is called anuprāsa, i.e. setting of letters in accordance with delectability of series (tadrūpā hi padāsattiḥ sānuprāsārasāvahā 1.52). In anuprāsa recurrence of letters of the same class of sounds should be in close proximity so that the impression of the letter or sound used before should be green in memory (pūrvānubhavasamkskārabodhinī yadyadūratā 1.55); but if the distance between the letters or sounds is great there can be no anuprāsa contributing to the delectability of meaning. As for example rāmāmukhāmbhojasadṛśaścandramā iti — the moon is like the lotus-face of the lady.

In Chapter I, Daṇḍin refers to yamaka incidentally, but he puts off its treatment since yamaka does not lead to the achievement of delectability in sense and here Daṇḍin hints at the rasadoṣa of Dhvani and post-dhvani school.

(Avṛttiṁ varṣasaṁghātāgocarāṁ yamakaṁ viduḥ /
tattu naikāntamadhuramataḥ paścādvidhāsyate // 1.61)

According to Daṇḍin sometimes absence of a defect gives rise to a figure, the figure Yathāsaṁkhyā is nothing but the result of avoidance of the defect apakrama.

(Uddiṣṭānāṁ padārthānāmanūddeśo yathākramam

Yathāsaṁkhyamiti proktaṁ saṁkhyāhaṁ krama ityapi //
II. 272)

As regards upamādoṣas Daṇḍin has some improvements to suggest over Bhāmaha's treatment of them. Bhāmaha blindly accepted Medhāvin's catalogue of Upamādoṣas without adding anything of his own. Daṇḍin has omitted three of the seven upamādoṣas, i. e., Viparyaya, asādrśya and asambhava, since pre-

sence of any of these three inconsistencies entails the total absence of upamā (yathā kathañcit Sādrśyaṃ yatrodabhutaṃ pratīyate / Upamā nāma sā tasyāḥ prapañco'yaṃ pradarśyate // ll. 14). And, even as regards the other four doṣas treated by Bhāmaha, namely, hīnatā, adhiḥkatva, liṅgabhedā and vacobhedā. Daṇḍin declares that they are not always doṣas or detractors of beauty in a simile and supports his claim with apt instance. He concludes that the criterion which decides whether there are doṣas or not in a particular context is none other than the taste of the refined. If they offend the taste of the cultured, then alone can they be termed as doṣas, not otherwise. He also gives instances when they act as deterrents of poetic effect and remarks that under such circumstances they must be eschewed. The reason, he says, goes without saying

(na liṅgavacane bhinne na hīnādhikatāpi vā /
upamadūṣaṇāyālaṃ yatro' dvegō na dhīmatām ll. 51)
(īdrśaṃ varjyate sadbhīḥ kāraṇaṃ tatra cintyatām /
guṇadoṣavicārāya svayameva mañṣibhiḥ // ll. 56)

The question whether the disparity between upamāna and upameya in respect of number and gender vitiates the simile raises the fundamental problem regarding the very concept of similarity. It is agreed that there cannot be a total similarity between two similars, since in that case similarity is bound to be reduced to identity. Hence similarity entails difference. Similarity is thus a relation of identity-cum-difference. Two objects existing separately in their own right may have some identity of aspects. This identity of some properties together with independent existence of the propertied objects as two differentiated existents, constitutes the concept of similarity. Hence this concept is defined by the Naiyāyikas as 'Tadbhinnatve sati tadgatabhūyodharma-vattvam.' It follows from this definition that similarity is not such a fundamental concept as to constitute a separate category (padārtha) in the basic scheme of reals (padārthavibhāga - padārthagaṇanā), because identity of aspects going together with difference in essentially individual existence, is not a category of reals by itself. It cannot be a basic category like substance, quality, action, universal and so on.

But this interpretation of the concept raises a formidable problem that almost defies solution. It is a poetic convention to compare a beautiful female face with the moon. The similarity is here said to be based on having an identity of beauty between the two. We at once face the question whether the beauty of the face is

the same as the beauty of the moon. Obviously it is not. This very pertinent question has been raised by Jayaratha in his discussion on upamā in bimbapratibimbabhāva (Alaṅkāra sarvasva, page 35). As an example of this type of simile Ruyyaka has quoted a famous verse of Kālidāsa —

Pāṇḍo'yamaṃsārpitalambahāraḥ kṣiptāngarāgo
haricanda-nona /

ābhāti bālātāparaktasānuḥ sanirjharodgāra ivādrirājaḥ //

Raghu VI. 60.

Here we seem to get a hierarchy of similars. The case is apparently different from the expression Candravat sundaram mukham. In the latter case beauty appears as an identical property between the moon and the face, thus providing the basis of comparison. But in the former case the properties of the upamāna have got clean differentiation from the properties of the upameya. And this differentiation has been heavily underlined by the separate mention of the two sets of properties. Yet the comparison between the upamāna and the upameya is instituted on the basis of an implied comparison between the two separate sets of properties themselves. How is it permissible in a simile which is supposed to stand on the commonness of properties between the upamāna and the upameya ? It is a case of two-tier simile in which the comparison between the upamāna and the upameya at the upper level is grounded on the comparison between the sets of properties at the lower level. The comparison at the primary level of properties, for its very possibility, requires a further common property between the two sets of properties until and unless we can find out this property of properties and comparison between the sets of properties falls through, for the very requirements of the definition of similarity are not fulfilled.

To obviate this difficulty Jayaratha has brought to bear a very significant interpretation upon the notion of bimbapratibimbabhāva — which, literally speaking, is the relation between an object and its reflection. Somebody standing before a mirror assumes the reflectional face as his own and seems to directly perceive his own thinness or flabbiness in the reflection itself. A lady also examines the appropriateness of cosmetic application on her body by looking at its reflection in the mirror.

Here an identity is assumed despite the knowledge of difference. In a similar way in the case of a simile in bimbapratibimbabhāva, the two sets of properties attached separately to upamāna and upameya should be assumed as identical. This is the

way of poetic expression. There is no escape from this imposed assumption of identity even in the case of a common simile such as 'candravat mukham'. It is agreed that the beauty of the moon is different from the beauty of the face. The common word Sundaram, applied both to the upamāna and the upameya, only serves to conceal this difference which is very much there. Thus the notion of a really common and identical property between the upamāna and the upameya breaks down on this score.

If we try to pursue a further similarity between the beauty of the moon and the beauty of the face we shall be involved in a wild goose chase of infinite regress. So the fact remains that in an ordinary simile the difference in properties themselves is concealed by the application of a common adjective, while in bimbapratibimbabhāva the difference between the two sets of properties is laid bare by express mention of the separate sets. In both the cases an identity of properties between the upamāna and the upameya is to be assumed for the sake of poetic justice to the possibility of simile as a figure of speech at all.

When it is thus impossible to find even a really common property it is difficult to see any justice behind the insistent demand that the upamāna and the upameya must have the same gender and number. It is to be especially noted in this context that number and gender in Sanskrit grammar are more a matter of conventional usage than that of a real property dictated by the nature of things. Thus in Sanskrit the word dāra meaning wife is masculine and is to be used in plural while the word kalatra also meaning wife is neuter. Number and gender being external to the essence of things and being a matter of pure conventionality any insistence on their sameness between the upamāna and the upameya sounds rather hollow and irrelevant to the dictates of poetic diction. When we say Vidyā-dhanam (Knowledge-wealth) the disparity of gender does not irritate our taste. These considerations lend cogency to Daṇḍin's view that the sameness of number and gender should not be insisted upon in a simile. Disparity of the both number is clearly evident in such a simile as Sā me prāṇā ivapriyā (she is as dear to me as life itself). Here the word Prāṇa meaning life has been used in masculine plural as is demanded by grammatical convention. Yet it does not constitute a fault, since the meaning intended by the poet stands unimpaired. It is surprising that Jayaratha who has delved deeper into the difficult problem regarding the concept of simile and similarity than any other ālaṃkārika, should find fault with the famous verse of Bāṇa (Kādambarī's Introduction), simply because there is disparity of gender. In Bāṇa's verse

"Kaṭu kvaṇanto maladāyakāḥ khalāstudantyaḥ
 vandhanaśṛṅkhalā iva/
 Manastu sādhuḍhvanibhiḥ pade pade haranti santo
 maṇinupurā iva/

Kād-introduction Sl. 6

The word Śṛṅkhataḥ, the upamāna, being used in feminine plural demands 'Kvaṇantyaḥ' (the feminine form) as its adjective, while the word Khalāḥ, the upameya, used in masculine plural has the adjective Kvaṇantaḥ in masculine plural too. This disparity of gender between the upamāna and the upameya necessitating the consequent disparity in the common adjectival property is a fault even according to Jayaratha. But what we are interested in is the common property of irritating jingles belonging both to the chain and the cheat, a property standing there in commonness under the force of poetic imposition and assumption. There is no disparity in this meaning-content despite the disparity in grammatical gender. The fundamental disparity in the assumed common property itself belongs to the domain of ontological problem from which Jayaratha has rightly dissociated the poetic problem by affirming that the fundamental difference between the properties of the upamāna and the upameya should be ignored and an identity is to be assumed in order to make any simile possible at all. If that is so it is all the more reasonable that disparity of gender which is completely external to the essence of meaning should be rightly ignored. The irritating jingles standing common between the cheat and the chain and constituting the ground of comparison do not irritate our refined taste simply because of the disparity of the grammatical gender. This external and irrelevant disparity does not verge on poetic inconsistency. Moreover, it is admitted that similarity entails a fundamental difference between two objects together with identity of some aspects or properties. Our demand for this identity cannot be a total demand, but only a limited demand. A total demand could thoroughly obliterate the very difference between the two objects by reducing them to an identity of existent itself. Thus identity in all aspects does away with the very relation of similarity. In that case it is doubly meaningless to insist that the identity of properties should proceed as far as include even the identity of number and gender, which are external and irrelevant to the meaning as such. Hence Daṇḍin is correct in his assessment that disparity in number and gender is to be tolerated as long as it does not prove repellant to the cultured taste.

Jayaratha's dissertation on the concept of simile in the context of bimbapratibimbabhāva goes against the Nyāya concept of similarity as identity in difference. The Naiyāyikas, however, are themselves conscious of the difficulty with their own definition. In the expression moon-like face the comparison is grounded on delightfulness which is supposed to be common between the moon and the face. Yet delightfulness in the sense of causing delight is not the same in the both. The moon and the face do not cause the same delight, so the causality differs from cause to cause according to the difference in the determinant property of causality (Kāraṇatābchedakadharmā). In the case of the moon causality, that is, causing delight is determined by moonness, while in the case of the face it is determined by the faceness. In this way the difference in the determining property of causality determines the difference in causality itself (Kāraṇatābchedakabhedaṇa kāraṇatābhedaḥ). Hence delightfulness as the same and common property cannot belong both to the moon and the face. To escape from this difficulty the Naiyāyikas have taken recourse to a further assumption. Though the delight caused by the moon differs from the delight caused by the face, yet both belong to the same class 'delight' (Ekajūtiyameva sukham). Corresponding to this class-identity of the effect, delight, we should assume some sort of class identity in causing delight or delightfulness itself. In other words, though delightfulness or causing delight differs from cause to cause, that is from the face to the moon. Yet the two delightfulnesses are assumed to be falling under the same class. This identity of class - subsumption between the different causalities of delight corresponding to the identical class - subsumption of the effects, that is, different delights issuing from the moon and the face, constitutes the ground of similarity. But all this intricate and cumbersome elongation of the concept of similarity finally settles down to this that the moon and the face are similar, because the delightfulness of the one is similar to the delightfulness of the other.

The similarity between the upamāna and the upameya is thus sought to be defined by the similarity between their properties, and so the notion of an identical common property belonging to the two is practically thrown away. Needless to say that the Naiyāyikas cannot afford to accept the class of delightfulness as a universal, since there is no such real property as delightfulnessness. This super-class is an unanalysable concept — 'Akhaṇḍa upādhi, which is necessary as a logical apparatus of interpretation and not as a real object-content of comprehension.

This very fact that, even according to the Naiyāyikas the notion of similarity is finally grounded on some sort of unanalysable concept or Akhaṇḍa upādhi at the base, makes it all the more reasonable that similarity should better be accepted as a fundamental category (Padārthāntara) in the scheme of reals. Thus Prabhākara's position in favour of positing similarity as a separate category seems practically unassailable. Śālikanātha, the most staunch follower of Prabhākara, in his Prakaraṇa-pañcikā observes as follows —

**Sarvavastūni saṃvidekaśaraṇāni. Asti ceyam sadṛśa
iti saṃvit. Sā ca sarvaiva viśayāvyabhicāriṇī.**

Our acceptance of a fundamental category depends on a fundamental understanding (Saṃvit) which is otherwise inexplicable. Just as we say one thing is similar to another so we also observe one property similar to another, one action similar to another and even one universal similar to another. So similarity cannot be subsumed under substance, quality, action or universal. According to the Nyāyavaiśeṣika view a quality cannot belong to another quality, an action cannot belong to another action, and the universal cannot belong to another universal. Again, a substance cannot belong to a quality, an action or a universal. Hence similarity which may belong to a substance, a quality, an action or a universal cannot be subsumed under anyone of these fundamental categories. So it should be better accepted as a basic category by itself. This, in short, sums up the position of Prabhākara regarding the status of similarity (see Prakaraṇapañcikā, page 268, Edn. BHU). This similarity differs from object to object. When we say moon-like face, two similarities belonging to the moon and the face are different, though these two similarities in their apprehension are mutually dependent. Thus similarity is different from such a relational reality as Saṃyoga which as a physical contact is one and the same obtaining between two contacted objects.

Sādṛśyam hi pratyāśrayam bhinnam

Na saṃyogādivadekam, sadṛśamiti pratyekam

dhīḥ pratyekam bhinnaviśayā. Yāpi sadṛśau dvau iti

dhīḥ sā sādṛśyadvayapūrvikā.

**Ekadhīsthayorapi hi pratiyogisvarūpapratibandhānapekṣā
pratiyogyantare sādṛśyadhīḥ.**

Saṃyoginorekadhīsthayostu saṃyogālimgitayoreva

**dhirtyekasaṃyogaḥ, sādṛśyamanekamanyo'nyaniyañtaca
dhīsiddhaṃ padārthāntaram.**

Bhavanātha Miśra's Nyāyaviveka —

Madras Univ. Edn. pp. 148-149.

It is highly relevant to note in this context that Dinakarī on Muktāvalī (Viśvanātha's after explaining Viśvanātha's position clearly observes the following :

Navyāstu sādṛśyamatiriktameva

Dinakarī on Muktāvalī under Kārikāvalī, Kārikā II

The neologicians have, thus seen the force of Prabhākara's arguments and veered round to this position. Rāmarudrī, while commenting on this portion of Dinakarī explains the position of these neologicians in the following way :

**Anyathā sadṛśa ityākārapratīteḥ sarvatra samānākāra-
tānubhavāpalāpāpatter — iti śeṣaḥ**

We say the face is similar to the moon on the basis of delightfulness. Again we say that the pitcher is similar to the piece of cloth on the basis of the universals, substantially (Dravyatva) and earthiness (pṛthivītvā). Thus the standards of comparison may differ according to different pairs of objects brought under purview, yet the notion of similarity is retained in common in every piece of comparison. This common understanding cannot be explained without accepting similarity as a fundamental category. Rāmarudrī's observation is in line with the observation of Śālikanātha and Bhavanātha. Śālikanātha refers to an inviolable common understanding (sā ca sarvaieva viśayāvya-bhicāriṇī). Bhavanātha means the same thing by Dhīsiddha (established by universal understanding).

When similarity thus turns out to be a fundamental concept corresponding to a fundamental category Daṇḍin's position regarding the figure of simile appears all the more appropriate, for the sameness of number and gender does not enter as a necessary element into the concept of similarity.

VĀMANA'S CRITIQUE ON DOṢA

Vāmana, the author of Kāvyaśāstrakāśya, holds an important position in the history of concept of Doṣa in Sanskrit Poetics as he is the first śāstrakārika to classify doṣas into certain definite categories which were standardised in the works of almost all later poeticists. Besides pointing out for the first time in Sanskrit Poetic to something as soul of Poetry, which according to him is Rīti, he states at the very outset of his work that poetic beauty, which is designated by him as śāstrakāra, is gained by avoidance of poetic defects and application of poetic figures. Rītis vary according to countries and three predominant Rītis vaidarbhī, Gauḍī and Pāñcālī current in three prominent lands are referred to by Vāmana.

Doṣas, according to him, are opposites of guṇas or negation of guṇas. Guṇaviparyayātmāno doṣāḥ, II, I, I. This is in contradiction with the observation of Bharata, who describes doṣas as some definite entities. Guṇā viparyayādeśām mādhyaudāryalakṣaṇāḥ — N. S. II XVI, 95a. Thus Vāman is the first śāstrakārika to challenge the authority of Bharata. Poetic defects being opposites of poetic excellences, study of guṇas or poetic excellences should get priority over the treatment of doṣas. Vāmana's commentator gopendratippabhūpāla in his Kāmadhenu anticipates such an objection and himself answers it with the help of a popular maxim that avoidance of evils should be ensured first before the attainment of desired objects and hence treatment of doṣas is proposed first in the second chapter of Vāmana's work called doṣadarśana (a notice of poetic blemishes).

īṣṭānuvartanātkuryātpṛāgaṇiṣṭānīvartanamiti
nītyā guṇāśāstrakārādānāt pūrvam doṣaḥ ānameva
kavinā kartavyamiti sūcayitum doṣaḥ ānasya
prathamato nirdeśaḥ kṛtaḥ.

Kāmadhenu, under I, i.3

Vāmana classifies doṣas under four main heads — padadoṣa (defects of words), padārthadoṣa (defects based on the meaning of the words), Vākyadoṣa (defects of sentences) and Vākyārthadoṣa (defects relating to the meaning of sentences).

Padadoṣa is again classified into the following six subvarieties —

1. Asādhū - grammatically incorrect
2. Kaṣṭha - unmelodious
3. Grāmya - vulgar
4. Apratita - unknown
5. Anarthaka - meaningless

Of these five faults asādhū corresponds to Bharata, Bhāmaha and Daṇḍin's śabdahīna, Kaṣṭha tallies with Bhamaha's śrutikaṣṭha and anarthaka corresponds to Bharata's arthahīna and Bhāmaha and Daṇḍin's ekārtha.

Grāmya—A word which is rustic in nature and not used by the learned but only by common men who are not refined in speech is the defect grāmya. For example,

Kaṣṭam katham roditi phūtkṛteyam

Oh, how she cries with puffing sound.

Here the word phūtkṛta is the speech of the rustic. This is slang (grāmya). Bhāmaha does not mention it but illustrates it in words like gaṇḍam apypare nechanti, and here the word gaṇḍa is slang. Vāmana further adds some more words to illustrate this point as talla galla and bhalla which are endorsed by Mammaṭa who illustrates—tāmbūlabhṛtagallo'yaṁ tallam jalpati mānuṣaḥ.

The logic of this defect consists in the fact that use of words which are slang makes the speech of a poet crude and robs everything poetic in it.

For the defect apratita please open at page 185.

The Padārthadoṣa are classified under five sub-varieties :

1. Anyārtha - Deviation from the conventional meaning
2. Neyārtha - for fetched meaning
3. Gūḍhārtha - used in an uncommon sense
4. Aślīla - vulgar meaning
5. Kliṣṭa - distant meaning

Vāmana's Kliṣṭa corresponds to Bhāmaha's avācaka.

1. Anyārtha — When a word is used in a sense entirely different from its accepted conventional meaning (rūḍhīcyutam) and the intended sense is deducible only from the etymology, it is the case of anyārtha. Vāmana observes in the vṛtti that ordinary misuse of word is not meant by the sūtra. The use of 'paṭa' instead of 'ghaṭa' is too manifestly wrong to be mentioned. Persons who do

not understand even such manifestly wrong uses are not fit for instruction in the niceties.

As for example —

te duḥkham uccāvaṇam āvahanti

ye prasmaranti priyaśaṅgamānām

'Those people experience great pain who recall the association of dear ones'.

Here the word 'āvahanti' is used in its derivative sense 'bearing' and not in its accepted denotative sense 'doing'. Similarly the word 'prasmaranti' is used in its etymological sense 'remembering excellently' and not in its conventional sense 'forgetting' !

Vāmana here raises a fundamental question about the nature of meaning. There are certain words the meanings of which are determined by the sum-total meaning of their component parts. As for example the meaning of the word 'pācaka' is ascertained by the total meaning of the root pac (to cook) and the agent suffix ṇvul. But in case of proper names and many other words the derivative sense of the words does not tally with their conventional sense sanctioned by popular usage. The linguists' speculations regarding the genesis of word from a radical have little influence upon its current meaning. Thus abhorrence for the current usage of the two words 'āvahanti' and 'prasmaranti' and fancy for their etymological sense give rise to the poetic fault anyārtha.

This is summed up in the dictum anyad hi śabdānām vyutpattinimittam, anyacca pravṛttinimittam (Sāhityadarpaṇa Chapter II).

2. Neyārtha — If a word is used in a sense which does not come under the purview of its primary as well as secondary sense it is a case of the poetic fault called neyārtha.

As for example —

Sapadi paṅktivihanṅama - nāma - bhṛttanayasamvalitaṁ

balaśalinā

Vipulaparvatavarṣi śitaiḥ śaraiḥ

plavagasainyam ulūkajitājitaṁ

'The army of monkeys led by the sons of Daśaratha was defeated by the conqueror of Indra by means of sharp arrows showering thousands of mountains'.

Here the word 'pañkti vihaṅgama - nāma bhṛt' is made to signify Daśaratha Pañkti, a metre, consists of foot of ten syllables. Hence pañkti is equal to ten vihaṅgama is the name of the bird in general but here it will give the meaning of a particular bird Cakravāka = ratha (chariot). Thus the whole word means Daśaratha. Again the word ulūkajitā is made to signify 'Maghanādena'. The word kauśika denotes ulūka (owl) as well as Indra. Thus Indra and ulūka are regarded forcibly to be synonymous and Indrajitā is spoken of as ulūkajitā.

Vāmana makes it clear in the vṛtti that use of words like rathāṅganāma for the bird Cakravāka is not prohibited. Such usage in secondary sense is quite familiar and well recognised (nirūḍha). There are two sorts of lakṣaṇā, nirūḍhā (well-established by long usage) and the one that is resorted for producing an effect. Thus the word Kuśala means skilful though its primary meaning might have been 'one skilled in collecting kuśa'. Though it is a secondary meaning it is regarded as good as primary meaning because of long usage. When the relation between primary and secondary meanings are far-fetched and much too strained the secondary meaning does not meet with approval. It is called neyārtha where meaning can be gussed out with extreme difficulty. The defect neyārtha as shown by Bhāmaha and Daṇḍin differs from that pointed out by Vāmana.

3. Gūḍhārtha —

A word when applied in an unformaliar signification constitutes a case of the poetic fault called gūḍhārtha.

As for illustration :

'Your army is invincible by your enemies as the army of Indra' (Sahasragorivānikam duḥsaham bhavataḥ paraiḥ).

Here the word 'Sahasragu' is used in a rare signification to indicate Indra. Though one of the meanings of the word 'go' is 'eye' according to lexicon yet this meaning is very rarely met with. Therefore, the word sahasragu to denote Indra 'one having thousand eyes' involved the poetic fault of gūḍhārtha. This defect corresponds to Bharata's gūḍhaśabdābhidhāna.

4. Aślilārtha —

A word with an indecorous synonym or a part of which smacks of indecent meaning constitutes a case for the poetic fault called aślilārtha.

This poetic defect can occur in two-fold manner — A word has many synonyms and one of them is indecent as for example the word

'varcas' means glory, Splendour, and also human excreta. A word though conveying a decent meaning can spell out indecorous sense when taken by parts — as the word Kṛkātikā, the part of which is Kāṭikā remains an indecent meaning of the bier (pretayāna).

Bhamāha includes this defect in his śrutiduṣṭa and arthoduṣṭa.

The following poetic defect apratīta should kindly be read in connection with padadoṣas (See page 180).

Apratīta —

The use of word which is well-known in a technical treatise constitutes the poetic fault of apratīta. Vāmana is the first ālaṅkārika to introduce apratīta as a poetic defect.

His example is —

**Kim bhāṣitena bahunā rūpaskandhasya santi me na guṇāḥ /
guṇanāntariyakam ca premeti na te'styupālabhaḥ / II, I, 8.**

'What is the use of my saying much ? I know I am wanting in the excellence of physical organism, and as love also is the invariable concomitant of that excellence I do not complain'.

Here the two words rūpaskandha and nāntariyaka are the two technical terms of the Buddhist philosophy and Nyāyāśāstra respectively. Therefore, these are the instances of the defect apratīta. The use of such expressions in poetry only gives the impression of obtrusive pedantry.

Defects of the sentence (Vākyadoṣa) are the following :

1. Bhiṇnavṛtta - deficiency in metre,
2. Yatibhraṣṭa - misplaced caesura
3. Visandhi - unharmonious euphony.

All these defects are elaborately dealt with by Vāmana's predecessors Bharata, Bhāmaha and Daṇḍin. Vāmana only puts them under the head of Vākyadoṣa.

The set of doṣas called Vākyārthadoṣa by Vāmana of consists of the following poetic defects :

1. Vyārtha
2. Ekārtha
3. Sandigdha
4. Ayukta
5. Apakrama
6. Loka-vidyā-viruddha

All these poetic flaws are elaborately treated by Vāmana's three renowned predecessors.

Vāmana enumerates six upamā doṣas in the second adhyāya of the fourth adhikaraṇa of his work. They are as follows :

- a. Hīnatva
- b. Adhikatva
- c. Lingabheda
- d. Vacanabheda
- e. Asādrśya
- f. Asambhava.

All these defects of simile are discussed in detail by Bhāmaha and Daṇḍin and Vāmana has nothing new to add.

Appendix V

RUDRAṬA'S EXAMINATION OF DOṢAS

Rudraṭa represents the transitional period in Sanskrit Poetics between the Alaṃkāra and Kiti School on the one hand and the Dhvani school on the other. In the work Kāvyaālaṃkāra he has not only accommodated the thoughts of his predecessors in the field of Sanskrit Poetics, but also has made remarkable advance and introduced new chapters. It must be admitted that he was very much influenced by Bharata's Nāṭyaśāstra ; and his chapter rasa and the different varieties of heroes and heroines are definitely reminiscent of Bharata's Nāṭya-śāstra.

Thus Rudraṭa is the first ālaṃkārika after Bharata in the pre-dhvani school to introduce rasa as a prominent element of poetry (Jvalad ujjvala-vākprasaraḥ sarasaṃ kurvan mahākaviḥ kāvyam 1.4), but it is not, however clear whether he makes rasa a coordinate factor of poetry with guṇas and ālaṃkāras. Though Rudraṭa assigns a very important place to rasa in poetry, and like Bhāmaha he makes rasa as a means to the realisation of caturvarga, the four-fold end of life. Rudraṭa prepares the way for the supremacy of rasa in poetry which has been advocated by subsequent writers. He agrees with Bhāmaha in according equal status to Śabda and artha in poetry and his conception of Śakti, also called pratibhā, is in agreement with Daṇḍin's. He makes Vyutpatti (knowledge in different branches of study) as a power conducive to success of composition. Mammaṭa takes up Rudraṭa's definition of Vyutpatti in the Kārikā Śaktirṇipuṇatā loka-śāstrakāvyaḍyāvekṣaṇāt (1.3), and Jagannātha seems to agree with Rudraṭa regarding the efficiency of knowledge for the development of poetic power. Rudraṭa's treatment of ālaṃkāras, both formal and material, is a record of the advance and improvement he made upon his predecessors. His definitions and illustrations are his own production, they show clearness of conception and mastery of diction. He devotes a whole chapter (Chapter IV) on Śleṣa and he is referred to by Ruyyaka and Viśvanātha on several occasions. It is very difficult to assign to Rudraṭa one particular school in Sanskrit Poetics, but it is definite that he paved the way for the advent of the modern school headed by Ānandavardhana.

In the enumeration of doṣas Rudraṭa follows a principle, slightly different from that of Vāmana. Taking Śabda and artha as the two elements of poetry he mentions doṣas in two series :

1. Śabda-doṣas or defects of words,
2. Artha-doṣas or defects of sense.

In the beginning of the second chapter of the Kāvya-lamkāra he enumerates six doṣas in general and maintains that the absence of these faults constitutes the excellence of poetry. These faults are as follows :

1. Nyūnapada — deficiency of word
2. Adhikapada — excess of word
3. Avācaka — inexpressive
4. Duṣṭakrama — wrong position of a word in sequence
5. Apuṣṭārtha — inadequate meaning
6. Acārupada — unpleasant to hear

All these faults have been explained not by Rudraṭa himself, but by his excellent Jain Commentator Namisādhu with proper illustrations.

The Śabda-doṣas of Rudraṭa are six pada-doṣas : asamartha, apratīta, visandhi, viparītakalpanā, grāmya and deśya - and three Vākya doṣas : Saṁkīrṇa, garbhita and gatārtha. The artha-doṣas of Rudraṭa comprise nine faults (besides four upamā-doṣas) : apahetu, apratīta, nirāgama, bādhayat, asambaddha, grāmya, vīrasa tadūna, atimātra and tadvān.

We shall restrict ourselves to a consideration of those poetic faults which are discussed by Rudraṭa himself for the first time in Sanskrit Poetics and leave out these which are reproduction from the works of his predecessors.

Tadvān : The fault of tadvān is the statement of a needless quality or an action that is invariably concomitant with a substance. It is done only to complete the metre (yo yasyāvya-bhicārī saḡuṇādistadviśesanam kriyate/paripūryitum chando yatra sa tadvāniti jneyah // XI, 15). Rudraṭa illustrates bhasmī-kṛtaṁ vanam taddavadahanenātītiṣṛṇa — the forest is burnt to ashes by violent forest conflagration. Here violence is inherent in forest fire and the statement of atītiṣṛṇa is needless. Such statements are in flagrant violation of the dictum : Sambhavavya-bhicārābhyāṁ Syād viśeṣaṇasambhavaḥ Tantravārttika, Benares edition page 208.

Atimātra :

When a description surpasses limit of common experience it constitutes the fault of atimātra unbalanced exaggeration. For example —

Tava virahe hariṇākṣyāḥ plāvayti jaganti nayanāmbu - tears shed by the fawn-eyed lady in your separation are inundating the worlds. This sort of statement transgresses the limit. Tear-drops can at most wet the clothing; they have no power to flood the worlds.

In our previous chapter on Daṇḍin we have noted that the fault of atyukti constitutes the essence of the poetic excellence Kānta according to the poets belonging to Gauḍamārga (idamatyuktirityuktametadgauḍopalālitam ... Kāv 1, 92) ; but negation of this fault of atyukti constitutes the poetic excellence 'Kānta' according to the poets who follow the standard diction of Vaidarbhī.

Rudraṭa has stated that an exaggerated statement is no fault in case it is made by a mad man an idiot or a person beset with anxiety for his beloved.

Virasa :

This flaw arises from the description of a sentiment which is not all appropriate to the context or situation (anyasya yaḥ prasṭage rasasya nipatedrasaḥ kramāpetāḥ XI, 12a). Rudraṭa himself comments that this arthadoṣa can be better understood from the total Prabandha Kāvya. However the following example as given by Rudraṭa may serve as an indication :

Tava vanavāso'nucitaḥ piṭṭmarāṇaśucaṃ vimunca kim tapasā /
Sapthalaya yauvanam etat samam anuraktena sutanu mayā //

This is shockingly inappropriate. The son of Hyagrīva went to the city of Narakāśura in order to give him safe conduct to his own. He came to know that Narakāśura was killed by Lord Kṛṣṇa and his daughter was intent upon repairing to forest for penance. He addresses these words of undisguised lustfulness to her. This absolutely ill-accords with the tragic situation of the girl, who was not in a mood to appreciate amorous advances on the part of an unknown man, and also with the benevolent purpose of consolation for which he went to her.

It is noteworthy that this sort of fault of virasa accords well with the fault of akāṇḍe prakāśanam — (Dhv. III. 19a.) as shown by Dhvanikāra i.e., intrusion of some other Rasa which is not at all appropriate for the relevant Rasa.

Rudraṭa further points out that over-elaboration of a Rasa though relevant and not out of tune, constitutes this defect of virasa. This foreshadows Dhvani-Kāra's rasa-doṣa of over-elaboration (Paripoṣaṃ gatasyāpi paunaḥpunyena dīpanam Dhv. III. 19). This is a fault causing diffusion of the sentiment leading to a melodramatic effect. Nami Sādhū points out that the Sixth Act of the Veṅīśarhāra is an instance of this doṣa.

Among these Vākya-doṣas given by Rudraṭa the faults of gatārtha and garbhita are interesting. In long description some poets sometimes cannot resist the temptation of describing a scene or a situation in a long series of different sentences though one or two sentences are sufficient to describe. This is obviously a case of poetic fault of repetition. Namisādhū points out that verses in the discription of the Himalayas in the Kīrātārjunīya is a case of this defect of gatārtha. Rudraṭa defines - (Yasyār thaḥ sāmārthyā-danyārthaireva gamyate vākyaīḥ / taditi prabandhaviṣayaṃ gatārthametattato vidyāt // VI, 45. Here too the effect loses its pointedness, and the reader gets bored by fruitless efforts of elaborating what does not need elaboration.

The fault of garbhita (parenthetical, arises when a sentence being inserted in the midst of another sentence conveys its meaning with difficulty. (Yasya praviśedantarvākyaṃ vākyaśya saṃ-gatārthayā / tadgarbhitamiti gamayeh nijamarthaṃ kaṣṭa-kalpanyā // VI. 43.

For example :

**Yogyo yaste putraḥ so'yaṃ daśavadana lakṣamaṇena mayā /
raksainaṃ mṛtyumukhaṃ prasahya laghu nīyate vivaśaḥ //**

Here the sentence 'rakṣa enam' is inserted in the main sentence by way of parenthesis. As long as it is not taken out it creates difficulty to understand the meaning of the main sentence. Hence it is a defect.

Among four upamādoṣas —

Vaiṣamyā, Sāmānya Sabda-bheda, asambhava and aprasiddhi — the last one 'appasiddhi' is worth noting and the rest are more or less derived from the works of Rudraṭa's forerunners in the field of Sanskrit Poetics.

Strangeness of the standard of comparison (Upamāna) is a case of defect. A poet should not choose for upamāna an object which is not sanctioned by tradition (Upamānatayā loke vacyasya na tā-drṣaṃ prasiddham yat / Kriyate yatra tadut-Kaṭasāmānyatayā' prasiddhih sā / XI. 34).

For instance :

**Padmāsanaśaṃmihito bhāti brahmeva cakravāko'yam /
Svapacāśyāmaṃ vande harimindusito bako'yam // XI, 35.**

Heri is compared with Śvapaca ; Cakravāka bird is compared with Brahmā, and bird 'baka' is compared with the moon. The effect of such comparison is ridiculous.

In our opinion Rudraṭa's formulation of this fault is to be understood in its proper spirit. The example given by Rudraṭa shows that the fault of the simile does not lie so much in its unconventionality as in its ridiculousness. Even then it will not be a fault if the ridicule is verily meant by the poet. So the term 'bakatapasvī' does not contain any fault, since he who uses it means to ridicule the hypocrisy suggested by the term. It should be remembered that unalloyed loyalty to convention may often lead to an irritating note of monotony by repeating the conventional sets of upamānas like moon and lotus along with another conventional set of upameyas like face and feet. In this way similes are in danger of being hackneyed and common-place. Unconventional similes imagined with proper poetic skill often lends a rich grandeur to imagery as it is evident in many cases of Bānabhaṭṭa's similes. When Bāṇa says :

**Samhṛtapādḥ pārāvata-padapāṭalarāgo ravirambaratalād-
alambata - Sandhyāvarṇanā -kād, page 164.**

We do not feel outraged by the comparison between the sacred sun and the pigeon's foot, rather we are struck by the surprising imagery which bears the stamp of exceptional power of colour-vision. The very unconventionality here strikes a note of pleasant surprise.

Among Śabda-doṣas given by Rudraṭa aśamartha is anyārtha or rūḍicyuta of Vāmana; visandhi tallies with Daṇḍin's Visandhika with the additional import that bad coalescence often results in sound-combinations which mean obscene things.

Among artha-doṣas formulated Rudraṭa 'Apahetu' is included in Bhāmaha's pratijnahāni doṣa, nirāgama is Daṇḍin's and Bhāmaha's Deśa-kalādi-viruddha; Bādhayan is the vyārtha of Daṇḍin ; Asambandha is of Vamana's ekārtha of the second type and Grāmya is the Loka-viruddha of Daṇḍin and other writers.

Our treatment of Rudraṭa thus goes to show that in the development of Indian Aesthetics Rudraṭa stands as a visible link between the illustrious elders like Bhāmaha, Daṇḍin, Vāmana and Udbhaṭa and the relatively great modern critics like Anandavardhana and Abhinavagupta. This link is established especially when we take into consideration Rudraṭa's anticipatory powers in respect of rasadoṣa like 'virasa' which Anandavardhana later on interpreted in more or less the same way as Rudraṭa.

Appendix VI

ĀNANDAVARDHANA ON POETIC FLAWS

Ānandavardhana's approach to the problem of poetic fault is inseparably linked with the notions of propriety and impropriety in relation to an effective suggestion of *Rasa*, the soul of poetry. So the faults noted by him are all related to the success of *Rasadhvani* which is handicapped by the faults. Mahimabhaṭṭa appropriately calls it the problem of *antarangaaucitya* or intrinsic propriety to the consideration of which provides the context for Ānandavardhana's discussion on poetic faults. Mahima avowedly restricts himself to the consideration of extrinsic faults related to the problem of *bahiraṅgaaucitya* or extrinsic propriety in poetic compositions. This shows that as to the faults of intrinsic impropriety (*antarāṅgarasānaucitya doṣāḥ*) he does not feel the need of adding anything new to what has been said by Ānandavardhana. He thinks that Ānandavardhana has the last say on the matter. Quite expectedly, and consistently with the central theme of his treatise, Ānandavardhana has very wisely restricted himself to the consideration of *Rasadoṣas*. This has saved him from the tedium of dull and boring schematic tabulation of trivial extrinsic faults under different heads like *pada*, *vākya padārtha*, *vākyaṛtha doṣas*. An elaborately monotonous exercise in these trivialities began spectacularly with Mahima in his *Vyaktiviveka* and was carried to an extraordinarily absurd length by Mammāṭa in his *Kāvyaaprakāśa*. As a soothing contrast to this schematic and extrasophisticated approach, the selective judgment and restrictive wisdom displayed by Ānandavardhana in his refusal to digress into trivialities establish him as the greatest authority on the Art of poetry having deeper insight than others in the field. This explains why Ānandavardhana has never concerned himself with laboriously detecting debatable trivial faults in great poets. He correctly thinks that the Art of poetry is better understood by understanding where the strength lies in great poets and where the weakness lies in lesser poets. This correct approach has saved him from the show of pedantry. This approach may be fittingly contrasted with the approach of Kuntaka and Mahima who openly declare that it is the great poets

who should be singled out for showing the faults. Behind this attitude there is a lurking audacity that it is the critics who should formulate the rules to which the poets are bound to conform. Anandavardhana thinks that what is an excellence and what is a fault are to be understood by the difference in impact felt by the critical readers on a comparative perusal of greater and lesser poets. A critic is not permitted to build up an inventory of faults and judge a poet by the application of his scheme. Some poets appeal to us and some does not. Why is it so ? The Art of poetry can best be understood by concentrating on this question. But the attitude of Kuntaka and Mahima is not at all helpful in this regard. They have avowedly enjoined upon themselves the duty of detecting faults in great poets. This is especially marked in Mahima whose exercise in trifles will be elaborately examined by us. When Mahima claims to detect trifling faults which he himself calls extrinsic or bahiraṅga the question at once rises — who has commanded us to call them faults — the critic or the poet ? If it is admitted that the overwhelming excellence of a great poet sheds his minor faults into insignificance what is the rationale of calling them faults at all and what is the utility of elaborately exercising one's mind on detecting those faults the very faultiness of which cannot be established except by the over-fastidiousness of a pedantic critic ? On the contrary, Anandavardhana declares that faults of poetry cannot be profitably shown by the fruitless labour of locating trifling faults in great poets, but by showing major weaknesses in small poets brought in contrast to the major excellence of great poets. Hence Anandavardhana declares :

tattu sūktisahasradyotitātmanām mahātmanām

doṣodghoṣaṇamātmana eva dūṣaṇam bhavati

na vibhajya darśitam

Dhv. II, page 249.

The deterrents (Virodhins) of Rasa invariably land a poet in anaucitya, which is the gravest flaw that a poet might commit. Anandavardhana in the Dhvanyāloka, Uddyota II., brings these deterrents of Rasa under the following heads :

1. Adoption of vibhāvas etc associated with an incompatible Rasa (Virodhirasasambandhi-vibhāvadiparigrahaḥ - Dhv. III, 18a)

If the poet, after portraying a person as spiritually minded (as an ālamvaravibhāva) makes him appear abruptly in the role of a romantic lover we have anaucitya. Similarly, when a lady who is as if enraged due to a love-quarrel with her hero and if the hero is described as wooing her by growing eloquent over the emptiness

of worldly pleasures, anaucitya is the result. And again if the rage of the lady as a result of a love-quarrel is not softened down and the hero is discribed as getting wild with rage and the annbhāvas of Raudra-rasa are brought out, we have anaucitya.

2. Indulging in disproportionately lengthy descriptions of things though they might be very remotely connected with the Rasa.

(Vistareṇānvitasyāpi vastuno'nyasya varṇaham — Dhv. III, 18b)

When the poet seeking to describe the hero goes off the track and describes at an inordinate length mountains etc. he will be committing the flaw of anaucitya.

Abrupt break in the delineation of Rasa as also abrupt intrusion of some other Rasa (Akāṇḍe eva vicchittirakāṇḍe ca prakāśanam) Dhv. III. 19a.

After depicting the rise of mutual love in the hero and the heroine, if, instead of describing their endeavours at union, the poet proceeds to dwell upon their other activities, anaucitya will result. In the same way, the whole second Act of the play Veṇīsaṃhāra is a specimen of anaucitya as the king Duryodhana is described as indulging in dalliance with the queen Bhānumati when heroes are dying in the battle-field.

4. Frequent over-elaboration of a Rasa even when it has been adequately manifested (Paripoṣaṃ gatasyāpi Paunaḥpunyena dīpanam — 19a). Too much of anything is bad and by over-elaboration the delicate flower of Rasa gets faded (Upabhukto hi rasaḥ Svasāmagriparipoṣaḥ punaḥ punaḥ parāmṛśyamānaḥ parimlānakusumakalpaḥ kalpate page 400).

As in the Kirātārjūṇīya the elaborate description of amorous sports of the heavenly nymphs.

5. Lastly, impropriety in the portrayal of Vṛtti :

By Vṛtti is meant the behaviour of the characters, the Vṛttis (Kaiśikī etc.) of Bharata and the Vṛttis (Upanāgarikā etc. of the rhetoricians (Udbhaṭa's Kāvyaśāstra-kārasārasaṃgraha 1.1)

(Yadi va vṛttinām bharataprasiddhānām kaiśikyādinām
Kāvyaśāstra-kārāntaraprasiddhānāmupanāgarikādyānām vā
yadanaucityamavisaye nibandhanam tadapi rasabhaṅga-
hetuḥ Dhv, III, page 401.)

Heroes are (of three types) — Divine, non-divine (Human) and partaking of the elements of both divine and non-divine. Each of them is again divided into dhīrodātta, dhīroddhata, dhīralalita

and dhīra-prasānta. In dhīrodātta the predominant sentiment is heroism, in dhīrodātta the predominant sentiment is anger, in dhīralalita it is the sentiment of love and in dhīraprasānta it is the sentiment of quietude. Each of these types is again high, medium and low. The delineation of a character should be in accordance with the type to which it belongs and if it be to the contrary it gives rise to a fault of improper delineation. Thus in the play, Anargharāghava, the incident of hurling of divine weapons at the crow by Rāma as related in the Rāmāyaṇa is rejected and the hurling of the arrow by Lakṣmaṇa on the crow is depicted by the expression Kāṇīcakāra caramah etc. Otherwise such an act on the part of Rāma, in whom the sentiment of heroism is predominant, would have constituted the blemish of improper delineation of the hero's character.

The beauty and harmony of Rasa are thus marred by anaucitya or impropriety, and it is the gravest flaw in the poet. Emptied of Rasa, a composition is worse than useless. Nīrasatva may be regarded as the most unpardonable error in the poet. It will take away from him even the justification of styling himself a poet. According to Ānandavardhana, nothing but oblivion is in store for such a poet.

nīrasastu prabandho yaḥ so'paśabdomahā kaveḥ /
sa tenākavireva syādanyenāsmṛtalakṣaṇaḥ //

Dhv. III. 19b

It is true that eminent poets were able to achieve poetic fame though unbound by any tie of rules. But the moderns should not belittle the truth of the above considerations following their example.

Pūrve viśṇukhalagiraḥ kavayaḥ prāptakīrtayaḥ /
tan samāśritya na tyājyā nūtireṣā maṇiṣiṇā //

Dhv. III. 19c.

As a matter of fact, the above dicta are in complete conformity with the practice of master poets like Vālmiki and Vyāsa

Vālmikivyāsamukhyāśca ye prakhyātāḥ kavīśvarāḥ /
Tadabhiprāyabāhyo'yaṁ nāsmābhirdarsītonayaḥ //

Dhv. III. 19d.

In this connection, Ānandavardhana points out how the flaw of anaucitya can be avoided in different ways. There can be no dogmatic rule about aucitya or anaucitya which will have universal application. Each individual instance of poetry will

have to be judged on its own merits. Some Raṣas are mutually opposed, Śṛṅgāra and Bībhatsa, vīra and Bhayānaka, Śānta and Raudra, Vīra and Karuṇa and Śānta and Śṛṅgāra.

But they can be delineated simultaneously by the poet if the primary Rasa has been well brought out and established on a secure footing. The principal Rasa should be capable enough to outshine the opposite Rasa, that is all, or the opposite Rasa may be made an ancillary of the principal one.

**Vivakṣite rase labdhapratisthe tu virodhinām /
Vādhyānāmangabhāvam vā prāptānāmuktiracchalā //**

Dhv. III. 20

Hence it follows that in every work of literature, there must be only one dominant Rasa, though the other Rasas also can enter into relation with it as ancillaries.

**Prasiddhe'pi prabandhānām nānārasanibandhane /
eko raso'ngīkartavyaṣṭeṣāmutkarsamicchatā //**

Dhv. III. 21.

The occurrence of the other Rasas can in no way detract from the importance of the principal one, since the latter is seen steadily and constantly running through the entire work, and is never totally lost sight of

**Rasāntarasamāveśaḥ prastutasya rasasya yaḥ /
nopahantyaṅgitām so'sya sthāyitvenāvabhāsināḥ //**

Dhv. III. 22.

Rasa is analogous to the unity of action in a drama, where, in spite of the variety and complexity of the incidents, the organic wholeness of the theme is preserved. The diversity of Rasas only serves to enhance the beauty of the principal one.

**Kāryamekaṁ yathā vyāpi prabandhasya vidhiyate /
tathā rasasyāpi vidhau virodho naiva vidyate //**

Dhv. III. 23.

As a corollary, it follows that no other Rasa (opposed or unopposed) should receive greater treatment in a work than the principal one. Attention should be primarily devoted towards the principal Rasa, and the other should come in only incidentally or as helping adjuncts of the principal. By so doing, the opposition between Rasas will soon disappear.

**Avirodhī virodhī vā raso'ngini rasāntare /
paripoṣaṁ na netavyastathā syādavirodhitā //**

Dhv. III. 24

Further, an opposite Rasa may be pressed into service of the principal one by presenting it in a character other than the hero. For instance if vira is being described in the hero, its opposite i.e. Bhayānaka may be delineated with reference to the antehero, and by so doing, the effect of the principal Rasa is reinforced by striking contrast. Even elaboration of it at great length will cease to be a flaw then

Viruddhaikāśrayo yastu virodhī sthāyino bhavet /

Sa vibhinnāśrayaḥ kāryastasya poṣe'pyadoṣatā //

Dhv. III. 25

It is also possible that sometimes two Rasas, naturally opposed, may be shown in one and the same character. In such instances, the two Rasas should not be portrayed simultaneously; otherwise there would be anaucitya-doṣa. Some other Rasa should be made to intervene the two Rasas and the fault is thus avoided

Ekāśrayatve nirdoṣo nairantarye virodhavān /

rasāntaravyavadhinā roso vyaṅgyaḥ sumedhasā //

Dhv. III. 26

cf. the intrusion of Adbhuta between Śṛṅgāra and Śānta in the Nāgānanda. Nor is there anything surprising about this. For even in small self-contained stanzas (which are so very small in compass when compared with long poems) consisting of not more than a single sentence, this phenomenon is observed. The natural enmity of two Rasas is seen to disappear when a third Rasa intervenes between them.

Rasāntarāntaritamorekavākyaasthayorapi /

Nivartate hi rasyoh samāveśa virodhitā //

Dhv. III. 27

Opposition and agreement between Rasas must be clearly noted as indicated above particularly, when dealing with Śṛṅgāra Rasa, as it is the most delicate of all Rasas. The slightest inappropriateness will spoil it completely. And what is more, the flaw of the poet becomes most patent there. The poet should, therefore, take especial care while portraying Śṛṅgāra.

Virodhamavirodham ca sarvatrettham nirūpayet.

Dhv. III. 28.

Since Śṛṅgāra thus occupies the greatest place amongst the Rasas, more often than not, the poet will have to incorporate it into his work. He may have to infuse a thing of Śṛṅgāra even into

themes not strictly amenable to such treatment. But it will not be a fault, provided the poet deliberately resorts to such 'Śṛṅgāra touch' with a definite purpose in view. The purpose may be either to win over the audience before giving moral instruction or to invest his composition with greater beauty.

**Viheyānunmukhikartuṃ kāvyaśobhatharameva vā /
tadviruddharasasparśas tadaṅgānām na dusyati //**

Dhv.-III. 30.

Such is the nature of 'avirodha' and 'virodha' amongst Rasas. And by grasping the above distinctions carefully, the poet will be in a position to steer clear of all blemishes. He will never stray away into the mire of doṣas.

**Vijñāyetthaṃ rasādīnāmavirodhavirodhayoḥ /
Visayaṃ sukaviḥ kāvyaṃ kurvanmuhyati na kvacit //**

Dhv. III. 31.

We have noted earlier that animent ālaṃkārikas like Bhāmaha, Daṇḍin and others have shown that certain poetic defects are turned into guṇas under special circumstances. Ānandavardhana has accommodated this impermanence of doṣas in his scheme of poetry. He has shown how doṣas like śrutiduṣṭa (offending the ear) may be looked upon blemishes only when they creep into compositions treating of Śṛṅgārārāsa as the most primarily suggested emotion :

**Śrutiduṣṭādāyo doṣā anityā ye ca darśitāḥ /
dhvanyātmanyeva śṛṅgāre te heyā ityudāhṛtāḥ //**

Dhv. II. 11

In his critique of poetic art Ānandavardhana displays a high degree of liberalism when he remarks that in a great poet sometimes an impropriety is shedded into insignificance by his exceptionally powerful creative genius. In this context he classifies faults into two types : Avyutpattikṛtadoṣa and aśaktikṛtadoṣa. Avyutpattikṛtadoṣa arises from wilful indifference to time - honoured social conventions and aśaktikṛtadoṣa arises from lack of genius and talent.

In a great poet the former fault is well covered up by extraordinary creative powers of the genius.

**avyutpattikṛto doṣaḥ śaktya saṃvṛyate kaveḥ /
yastvaśaktikṛtastasya sa jhaṭityavabhāṣate //**

Dhv. page 346.

In the Kumārasambhava Kālidāsa has displayed an aggressive audacity while depicting the amorous sports of the supreme divine couple. Such description is tabooed by social convention, yet the poet has bravely ignored this confidently depending on his creative genius.

The amorous sports have been portrayed in such an artistic way that the reader does not feel repelled and does not find time to pause and think it to be an outrage on conventional taste.

**Sam̐bhogo'pi hyasau varṇitastathā pratibhānavatā-
kavinā yathā tatraiva viśrāntaṃ hṛdayaṃ paurvāparya-
paramarśaṃ kartuṃ na dadāti**

Dhv. page ibid.

The vulgarity is completely screened by the great creative genius. Ānandavardhana warns that this is an achievement possible only for Kālidāsa and a lesser poet wishing to trace his footsteps is bound to come to grief by earning immediate censure of the Society.

Kṣemendra in his Aucityavicāracarcā has not hesitated to condemn Kālidāsa for his alleged show of perversity in Kumārasambhava.

**Atrāmbikāsambhogavarṇane pāmaranārīsamucita nirlajjasa-
jjananakharājivirājitorumūlahṛtavilocanatvaṃ trilocanasya
bhagavatastrijagadguroryaduktaṃ tenānucityameva paraṃ
prabandhārthaḥ puṣṇāti.**

Aucitya vicāracarcā, page 18

But a far greater critic Ānandavardhana has not only hesitated to condemn Kālidāsa, but also indirectly expressed his admiration for the exceptional power of the poet in successfully scranning a deliberate indifference to conventional sanctity by the touch of a true genius. Such bold liberation can only come out of a deep critical insight into the art of poetry and Ānandavardhana stands unique in the field.

In good poetry alaṃkāras should serve only as helping hands for the revelation of Rasa. Hence alaṃkāras must be subordinated to Rasa. If the order is reversed, if the alaṃkāras gain predominance over Rasa, the spirit of poetry suffers, because the appreciation of charm gets handicapped by attention being diverted to the skilful play of words. This proper relation between alaṃkāras and Rasa is enunciated by Ānandavardhana in the following words :

**Sa sarvo'pi yadi samīkṣyā viniveśyate tadalakṣyakramavya-
ngyasya dhvaneraṅginaḥ sarvasyaiva cārutvaheturṇiṣpadyate**

Dhv. page 236.

In the most successful revelation of Rasa the primary meaning and the suggested meaning, though factually emerging in stages, do not appear as crowding into consciousness in noticeable sequence Rasa as the suggested meaning follows the primary meaning so easily and closely that the sequence remains as good as unnoticed. Hence it is called *asaṃlakṣyakramo vyaṅgyaḥ*. Notice of sequence implies delay in the emergence of Rasa as the suggested meaning. That shows a certain inefficiency on the part of the poet. Perhaps he is then too much concerned with skill of weaving a pattern of spectacular *alaṃkāra* and so does not care to note that the proper poetic sentiment (Rasa) is thereby subordinated to skilful manipulation of words. Great poets like Kālidāsa and Bhavabhūti have hardly permitted this subordination which is, however, disgustingly evident in lesser poets like Bhāravi and Māgha, not to speak of Śrīharṣa. In good poetry figures of speech must not be allowed to disturb Rasa as intruders appearing as being skilfully contrived by the poet. Yamaka and Śleṣa, especially Yamaka, require tremendous skill of the poet in manipulating letters and words. The reader is bound to proceed haltingly through them in order to reach even the primary meaning and the suggested meaning stands further in distance. Only a bad critic of uncultured taste can applaud such a poet for his skill in versification. A cultured critic will not call him a poet but a skilful versifier at best. The success of an *alaṃkāra* does not rest in itself, but in its capacity to gracefully help the emergence of Rasa. Hence *alaṃkāras* to be successful must appear as being interwoven into the structure of Rasa-consciousness with an effortless ease. This is the meaning is *Ānandavardhanā's* famous expression *apṛthagyatnanirvarttya* in relation to *alaṃkāra*. Whenever an *alaṃkāra* appears as the result of a special effort it is bound to create a sense of distance between the primary meaning and the suggested meaning. The charm of the suggested meaning is the nearly lost being over-subordinated to the primary meaning which is too much prominently thrown up into consciousness by the astonishing intellectual skill of the poet. In other words, intellection gets precedence over poetic intuition.

When we came across a yamaka or a laborious śleṣa we at once feel the enormous pains the writer has taken in searching out and selecting proper words and then arranging them letter by letter in a particular fashion. Such an effort cannot but assume the air of intellectual gymnastics which are miles apart from good poetry. So *Ānandavardhana* rightly condemns Yamaka as contradicting the spirit of good poetry in the following words :

**Yamake ca prabandhena buddhipūrvakaṃ kriyamāṇe
niyamenaiva**

yatnāntaraparigraha āpatati śabdaviśeṣānveṣaṇarūpaḥ.

Dhv. page 233.

In the case of a great poet concentrating on Rasa and endowed with poetic intuition the figures-of-speech rush forth with utmost ease and grace, as if, caught in a spirit of competition. On analysis it may be found that they do not come as easily as they appear, yet they must have an appearance of effortless ease. In a great poet thus the most difficult seems the most easy and the power of creating the seemingness makes a poet really great. In him the intellectual effort and the intuitive flash combine into an indivisible whole. Ānandavardhana in this connection draws the reader's attention to some portions of Kādambarī and Setubandha. So he remarks —

alamkārantarāṇi hi nirūpyamānadurghaṭanānyapi
rasahamāhitacetasaḥ pratibhānavataḥ
kaverahampūrbikayā parāpatanti

Dhv. page 234.

Laborious figures like Yamaka may be, however, appropriate to Rasābhāsa (pseudo-rasa) but not to Rasa proper. Not to speak of Yamaka alone, even when other alamkāras frequently employed by tend to gain predominance over Rasa the fault of impropriety is definitely there. As an example Ānanda quotes the following from Hayagrīvavadh Cakrābhighata etc. etc. This verse is supposedly intended to reveal unbounded heroism of Vāsudeva. It is a specimen of Paryāyokta alamkāra, since the suggested meaning, that is, the heroism of Vāsudeva has been brought to the plane of primary meaning by narrating some heroic deeds of the lord which cut short the amorous sports of the demon's wives. The charm of the verse, however, does not rest so much on the suggested meaning itself as on the clever device of the particular alamkāra. So the intended vira Rasa has become subordinate to the alamkāra. Abhinava comments

Vāsudevapratāpo hyatra vivakṣitaḥ sa cātra cārutva-
hetutayā na cakāsti, api tu paryāyoktam

— Dhv. page 239.

Abhinava, however, seems to have a bias for the writer of Hayagrīvavadha. He is at pains to show that this verse has not been cited by Ānanda as a specimen of fault. What Ānanda means is this — In such subordination of Rasa to alamkāra there is danger of slipping into fault, though this particular verse may not be faulty.

Yadyapi catra kāvyē na kāciddoṣāśamkā, tathāpi dṛṣṭanta-
vadetat - yat prakṛtasya poṣaṇīyasya svarupatiraskāralo-
ngabhuto'pyalaṅkāraḥ sampadyate tataśca
kvacitdanaucityamāgacchatīyaṃ granthakṛta āśayaḥ.

Dhv. page 239.

We are unable to accept this interpretation of Abhinava, because subordination of Rasa to alaṅkāra has never been looked upon with favour by Anandavardhana.

Depending on the conformity to context and on the appropriateness of a particular poetic sentiment the poet indeed exercises his selective judgment in choice of alaṅkāras. He may accept a certain alaṅkāra which he may reject at some other time considering how far it would fit into the context and into the effective revelation of a particular Rasa. Hence for the principal purpose of nursing and developing an appropriate Rasa the poet resorts to varied forms of striking expressions in the shape of different figures. A great poetry proceeds this way —

Yamalaṅkāraṃ tadaṅgatayā vivakṣati nāṅgitvena,
Yamavasare gṛhṇāti, yamavasare tyajati, yaṃ nātyantaṃ
nirvṛtumicchati, yaṃ yatnāt aṅgatvena pratyavekṣate, sa
evamupanibadhyamāno rasābhivyaktiheturbhavaṭīti vitataṃ
mahākāvyam

Dhv. Page 236.

After the short resume of Anandavardhana's deliberation on Rasadoṣa we feel it necessary to offer some critical comments on the fault of Rasa called svapadavācyatā by later ālaṅkārikas. This term and its meaning have been derived from the following observation of Ānanda in the context of Rasadhvani

Tṛtīyastu rasādilaṅkāraḥ prabhedo vācyasāmarthyākṣiptaḥ
prakāśate, na tu śākṣacchabdavyāparaviṣaya iti vācyādvibhinn
eva. tathā hi vācyatvaṃ tasya svaśabdaniveditatvena vā syāt.
Vibhādipratipādanamukhena vā. pūrbasmin pakṣe svaśab-
daniveditatvābhāve rasādīnāmapratītiprasaṅgaḥ na ca sarvatra
eṣaṃ svaśabdaniveditatvam. Yatrāpi asti tat, tatrāpi viśiṣṭavi-
bhāvādipratipādanamukhenaivaīṣāṃ pratītiḥ.

Dhv. I, pages 81 - 82.

The Rasa-davani School of Poetics has established the tradition that in the highest form of literature its aesthetic meaning should settle down to Rasa or the transcendental experience of moods and emotions. But the depth and beauty of a poetic composition can be realised with the note of accentuation only when the meaning of literature is conveyed by a subtle sense of

suggestion, but not with the crudity of directness which involves the danger of poetry degenerating into melo-dramatic effect. The fault of Svaśabdavācyaṭā proceeds from this concept literary sense. When a Rasa is directly mentioned by its name it becomes too open to retain its depth. Too much openness detracts from the intensity of relish, thus openness is transformed into opacity.

But over-enthusiasm for retaining the tradition or following it to its very letter faces the danger of running into absurdity. It is extremely doubtful if mere mention of Rāsa by its name can constitute an independent fault in literature. To press home our point let us consider the following famous verses from Bhavabhūti's Uttarramcarita.

paripāṇḍuraḍurbalakapolasundarsaṃ dadhātī

Vilolakabarikamānanam /

Karuṇasya murtirathavā śarīriṇī virahavyutheva

Vanameti jānakī //

U. C. Act. III. 4

Anirbhinno gabhīratvā dantargūḍhaghanavyathaḥ /

puṣpākapratiśaśo rāmasya karuṇo rasaḥ //

U. C. Act. III. 1

Here pathos or karuṇa is expressly mentioned by its name. Only schematic and ritualistic pursuit of tradition can detect a fault of svapadavācyaṭā, in these verses. But even the founder of the tradition does not dare to declare a fault in such universally accepted specimens of literary excellence charged with concentrated intensity of feeling. Thus Ānandavardhana tries to wriggle out of the difficulty by attempting a distinction between svapadavācyaṭā and svapadānūdyatā, and he has been faithfully followed by Śrīdhara in his commentary on Kāvyaaprakāśa, where he actually quotes the verse anirbhinno gabhīratvāt etc. from Uttarramcarita. Purport of Ānanda's observation on this point is as follows : when the determining conditions for the realisation of Rasa, like vibhāva, and others, are virtually absent and the only means to discern the Rasa is its expressly mentioned name, the fault of svapadavācyaṭā is definitely there, since the name alone is intended to directly convey the Rasa. But where the determining conditions are present enough to suggest the Rasa the fault does not arise even with the mention of its name. In such a case as we meet in Bhavabhūti the word Karuṇa itself does not convey the aesthetic meaning. The word here stands only as a dittoing mark or a referential notation for the meaning which has already been suggested. Thus what we get here is svapadānūdyatā and not svapadavācyaṭā. Yet if we abide by this clever distinction

between vācyatā and anūdyatā we should have declared it to be a fault of repetition (punaruktadoṣa). If the aesthetic feeling is already recognised through suggestion what is the need of stamping a name upon it ? An analysis of the verses will show that Ānanda's remarks are not so convincing as to inspire our confidence. In the first verse the word Karuṇasya has been explained by Vīrarāghava (one of the commentators on Uttararāmcarita) as iṣṭaviyogajanyaduḥkhātiśayasya this is significant, since according to the technical niceties involved in the theory of Rasa, as it has been developed by Abhinavagupta and his followers, the sorrows of Sitā by themselves cannot constitute karuṇarasa. Her grief is a basic emotion which strikes a responsive chord in the corresponding emotion of the reader. This communication is possible only because of universalisation and the reader relishes this universalised emotion in the form of aesthetic transcendence. So Vīrarāghava, faithful to the tradition, is cautious enough not to identify the sorrows of Sitā with karuṇarasa itself. Her own grief is not a matter to be relished by herself, not does a reader relish the real sorrows of others in the world of facts. Even then the matter does not improve a whit because svapadavācyatā of a sthāyī-bhāva is also recognised as a fault. With her beauty enhanced by sufferings impressed on her pale and emaciated cheeks, and her unbraided looks of hair hanging loose over her face, karuṇa jānakī staggers into the forest like a tangible image of tragic spirit itself or like pangs of separation concretised in a physical body. It is not difficult to discuss that the expressions karuṇasya mūrtiḥ. And Śarirīṇī virahavyathā attain special significance by lending concentration and concreteness to the image of suffering. They have effectively summed up the emotive experiences of a faultless abandoned wife and her spiritual depth. The pure physical expressions of sorrows given in the first two lines of the verse are only external pointers which by themselves do not go far enough in their suggestiveness without an internal vision into the richness of emotive content. When the spirit is visualised as assuming a full-fledged physical image we get a rare insight into the internal wealth of experience which attains vividness and concreteness through these two expressions. It is idle to imagine that these expressions are mere anuvāda or duplicating statement of what is already expressed; indeed they serve as expressions of the inexpressive.

The second verse quoted above brings out the depth of Rāma's sorrows in a manner which is consistent with the dignity and austerity of his character. The expression puṭapākapratikāśaḥ contains a very significant simile which suggests an extraordinary

striving for self-control that does not allow the grief to well up on the surface. The smouldering embers of grief keep burning within and to an inexperienced and crude observer Rāma's response to a tragic event remains undetected. When an internally suppressed feeling is debarred from external expressions by conscious efforts the experience gains in depth without being watered down by diffusion. This becomes evident when Rāma fails to contain himself and bursts into a fit of crying anguish. Tamasā approves the sudden slackness of self-control with the following famous observation the poetic beauty of which cannot be challenged even by the most fastidious connoisseur *purotpiḍe tadāgasya parivāhaḥ pratikriyā / Śokakṣobhe ca hṛdayaṃ pralāpaireva dhāryate //*

U. C. Act. III. 29.

The charge of grief is relieved being let out through tears. This suggests that suppression of feeling lends to the depth and intensity of experience which has been most effectively brought out in the expressive simile *puṭapākapatikāśaḥ*. If we blindly accept the tradition initiated by Ānandavardhana the words *vyathā* (*antar-gūḍhaghānavyathā*) and *karuṇarasa* should suffer from the fault of redundancy and fault of *svapadavācya*tā. According to the logical consequence of theory even the general word 'feeling' should not have been mentioned. *Bhavabhūti* should have simply said Rāma has something smouldering within without mentioning what it is. If somebody persists in the view that 'something unnameable seething within' is poetically a more effective expression than 'sorrows seething within' he is at liberty to entertain his opinion without convincing others. Here Rāma's feeling is essentially different from the indefinable experience of *Duṣyanta* in whom a previously felt emotion unavailingly tries to force into the open through the barrier of forgetfulness, from the stirred up stratum of the unconscious. *Duṣyanta* gropes for a definition of the indefinable.

*ramyāṇi vīkṣya madhurāṁśca nīsamya śabdān
paryutsukībhavati yat sukhito'pi jantuḥ /
taccetasā smarati nūnamabodhapūrvam
bhāvasthirāṇi janānāntarasauhṛdāni //*

Abhi. Sak. Act. V, 2.

But Rama knows what he feels and so his emotion has a definite name. Thus without the name itself the simple phrase 'something smouldering within Rāma' would have been too laconic to retain its definability - too suggestive to throw up any suggestion. Hence the expression *puṭapākapatikāśa* gets the definiteness of its meaning by the term *karuṇarasa* adjoined to it. Evidently seething grief is

more definite than 'seething something'. Indefiniteness is not the virtue of suggestion. What the poet here really means to suggest is not the pathos itself, but its extraordinary density gained through suppression which is a pointer to the dignity and austerity of Rāma's character. Thus the term *karuṇarasa* is not stained by *svapadavācya* and one need not bring in the relieving feature of *svapadānūdyatā* in order to wash out the imagined fault of *svapadavācya*. In the verse *purotpīde tadāgasya* — again the word *śoka* has been expressly mentioned. Does it constitute a case of *svapadavācya* of *sthāyibhāva*? *Svapadanūdyāta* is also here out of the question because the poet definitely means to say that tears are a relief for grief itself. How can the traditionalists reconcile themselves with the striking charm of this verse? Hence in our view the schematic definitions of poetic faults given in the treatises on poetics should sometimes be accepted with a grain of salt.

The whole problem boils down to this : If there is a bare statement such as Rāma is grief-stricken without the conditions and adjuncts which would elevate an emotion to the state of aesthetic relish, it is definitely a fault. But the fault is not of *svapadavācya* since it does not proceed from the mentioning of *Rasa*, or *Bhāva* by name. It arises from the absence of determining conditions which help the revelation of an emotion as *Rasa*. If the determinants are present mentioning the name is not a fault, rather it often becomes a necessity for conferring concreteness and definiteness on a feeling which otherwise might have become too intangible to be fixed and located by a definitive concept.

The theory of *Rasa* as it has been developed in tradition especially with the introduction of the elements of Advaita philosophy into it, raises a pertinent problem regarding the status personality in the so-called transcendental feeling. The personality of the connoisseur is not constituted merely by a bundle of emotive responses, nor by abundance of supreme delight from which the screen of *Avidyā* is lifted. A connoisseur is a critic, while reading a piece of literature or seeing a drama unfolded on the stage he is not a simple enjoyer who is carried away into a transcendental flash of intuitive relish. His critical faculty must be ever alert so that his power of judgment may not be benumbed by emotional exuberance.

Had it been so there could not have been much difference between a connoisseur and an ordinary reader or spectator leaning too much on melodramatic appraisal of literature. The alertness of the critical faculty and the consequent power of judgment points to a personality which cannot be bereft of a conceptual understanding of

the emotive. In other words analysis and synthesis should go hand in hand with contemplative enjoyment in a real *Sahṛdaya*. The conceptual understanding requires a name which fixes the concept. Now suppose in the verses quoted above — the words *Karuṇa*, *śoka* and *Vyathā* are completely absent. In such a case one could have been presented with a bare feeling without its distinguishing outlines, and as a result the feeling itself could have sunk into a non-descript indefinite content. The power of suggestion alone cannot resurrect it without tracing its continuity with the context. Again if the contextual continuity is enough the *vibhāva*, and *anubhāva*, need not figure in the verses at all. But the traditionalists are not ready to make suggestiveness a complete appendage of the context of the drama as a whole. So they insist on the presence of the determining conditions in the particular verse itself. There is a palpable contradiction in this traditional attitude. If the drama as a whole supplies the context let the power of suggestion be derived from it ; why do we insist on the presence of *vibhāva*, *anubhāva*, in the verse itself. Paleness of cheeks may be caused by fear also ; *puṭapākapratikāśaḥ* may be consistent with anger also. Then how do you distinguish between grief, fear and anger ? Hence to lend definiteness to the emotive contents the poet is justified to concretise it in a name in which it is conceptually fixed. If you say, *vibhāva* and *anubhāva* are sufficient for indication, we may say, the total context is sufficient even without *vibhāva* and *anubhāva* being present in the verse. So why there should be any special objection against the words *karuṇa* and *śoke* ? An *anuvāda* is not necessary for conceptual fixity. The expression *dvau brāhmaṇau* is definitely a case of *anuvāda*, the term *brāhmaṇau* is enough for conveying the sense of twoness by the case-ending in dual number. Hence *dvau* is redundant, it is a double duplication since there is a *prātipadika dvi* which means 'two' and the *dvivacana vibhakti*. But such *anuvāda*, are conventionally accepted. But the terms *karuṇa* etc. used by *Bhavabhūti* are not instances of *anuvāda* in the same way.

The terms are definitely necessary for concretisation of the indefinite, for conceptualisation of the inexpressive. So there is *svapadavācyatā* and not *svapadānūdyatā* and yet there is no fault.

If we look at the thing in this way unfettered by the strait-jacket of tradition *Udbhaṭa*'s view seems to have much substance in it. In his expression *pañcarūpā rasāḥ* (quoted by *Pratīhārendurāja* in his commentary on *Udbhaṭa*'s *Kāvya-lamkāra-Sāra samgraha*, page 53, Bombay edition) *Udbhaṭa* clearly states that a *Rasa* can be *svapadavācyā*. He does not mention that this *vādeatā* constitutes a fault of literature.

One thing remains to be said about Virarāghava's interpretation of *karuṇa* as *iṣṭaviyogajanyaduḥkhātīśayaḥ*. It saves the tradition since the real grief experienced by Rāma or Jānakī cannot be the *Rasa*. But Bhavabhūti uses the terms *vyathā* or *virahavyathā* along with *karuṇa* in the same verses. So how is it safe from the fault of repetition? We think that there is nothing wrong with the poet if he has taken *karuṇa* here as *Rasa* itself. Jānakī is the spirit of tragedy incarnate. That will not mean that Jānakī herself relishes her own grief. The spirit of tragedy figuring in the contemplative enjoyment of the *sahṛdaya* finds its objective correspondence in the grief of Jānakī. There is superimposition of identity between *viṣaya* and *viṣayin*. The disembodied tragic spirit of poetry, as if, has discovered itself by finding a body in the person of Jānakī; this transference of *viṣayin* to *viṣaya* has lent an additional charm to Bhavabhūti's poetry by an adequate objectification of connoisseur's contemplation. The same interpretation may be applied to the term *karuṇa* used in the context of Rāma; this seems to be the deeper significance of Bhavabhūti's expressions.

Appendix VII

KUNTAKA ON POETIC FLAWS

Kuntaka, the author or Vakroktiṣvita, has not embarked upon any elaborate treatment of literary faults. He has broadly noticed three styles of composition — Sukumāra, Vicitra and the middle, that is, a mixture of the first two, of these there the Sukumāra style appeals most to his poetic taste. This is the style of soft beauty which is marked by avoidance of prolixity of figures. The few figures which embellish the style are judiciously chosen and applied in a way which suggests an easy flow without any trace of laborious attempt.

amtānapratibhodbhinnanava śabdārthabandhuraḥ /
ayatnavihitasvalpamanohārivibhūṣaṇaḥ //
avibhāvitasamsthanarāmaṇiyakarañjakah /
vidhivaidagdhyaṇiṣpannanirmānātīśayopamaḥ //

V. J. pages 47-48.

The meaning intended by the poet gets prominence in the style and so elaborate artificial devices parading pedantry and tricky cleverness are not allowed to cloud the easy grace and underlined significance. Rasa is revealed best and unhindered only through such a style which, Kuntaka thinks, lies behind the success of Kālidāsa as a great poet.

In the context of describing three styles Kuntaka notes and illustrates four qualities, mādhyūya, prasāda, lāvaṇya, and ābhijātya, which are common to all the three. Then he proceeds to advance two highest and most pervasive excellences of a composition, namely aucitya and saubhāgya. From the definition of aucitya given by Kuntaka in two verses —

ānjasena svabhāvasya mahatvaṃ yena poṣyate /
prakāreṇa tadancityamucitākhyānājīvitam //
yatra vaktuḥ pramāturvā vācyaṃ śobhatiśayinā /
ācchadyate svabhāvena tadopyancityamucyate //

ibid. pages 72-73.

it seems that what he means by aucitya is sublimity and dignity.

In other words a great poetry must be permeated by a sense of the sublime. By saubhāgya Kuntaka means the perfect and balanced blending of all the elements that go to make real poetry.

ityupādeyavarge'smin yadartham pratibhā kaveḥ /
 Samyak saṁrabhate tasya guṇaḥ saubhagyamucyate //
 Sarvasampatarispandasampadyam sarasatmanam. /
 alankikacamatkārakāri kāvyaikajīvitam //

ibid. page 74.

These two highest qualities are called most pervasive, because they pervade every word, every sentence and the whole length of a work.

etattriṣvapi mārgeṣugūṇadvitayamujjvalam /
 padavākyaprabandhanam vyapakatvena vartate //

ibid. page 75.

In this connection Kuntaka traces faults in three verses of Kālidāsa, two from Raghuvamśa and one from Kumarasambhava. In these verses he notices the faults of anaucitya or impropriety which vitiates against the tone of sublimity that we expect from a great character. Kuntaka first quotes a verse from Raghuvamśa (XIII, 59).

Puraṁ niṣādādhipateridaṁ tadyasmin mayāmaulimaṇiṁ
 vihāya /
 jaṭāsu baddhāsvarudatsumantraḥ kaikeyi kāmāḥ
 phalitāstaveti //

Raghu, XIII, 59. .

Here Rāma in his conversation with Sītā recollects his journey to the forest under the orders of banishment from Daśaratha. Rāma here merely recounts the harsh words of Sumantra, the charioteer, against the disgraceful conduct of Kaikeyī in this context. Kuntaka thinks that in the days of his apply and glorious return to the throne of Ayodhyā he should not have retained any trace of bitterness against Kaikeyī. Yet without such a lingering trace he could not have repeated through remembrance the exact words of Sumantra which naturally expressed his justified anger against Kaikeyī. When a great man's mind is filled with a happy sense of fulfilment he is expected to forgive and forget any piece of injustice done to him before by anybody. So the very remembrance and repetition of Sumantra's words against Kaikeyī at the time of

his successful return to Ayodhyā along with his wife do not conform to the dignity and sublimity of a great personality like Rāma's.

Next Kuntaka takes two verses from Raghu II and points out the violation of aucitya in the second verse read in relation to the first.

The lion attacks the divine cow Nandini placed under the protection of King Dilipa. When the King protests against this attack the lion advises him thus—

athaikadhenorāparadhacaṇḍād guroḥ

kṛśanupratimādvibheṣi /

sakyo'sya manyurbhavatapi jetuṃ gāḥ

kotiśaḥ sparśayata ghaṭodhniḥ //

— But if thou fearest to meet the great displeasure of thy preceptor, who is the very image of fire, and who will be naturally offended for the loss of his single cow, it is in thy power to allay his anger by presenting crores of cows, whose udders are ample and full like jugs of water.

ibid. II, 49.

The king replies—

Kathaṃ ca śakyānunayo maharṣirviśrāṇanādanya-

payasvininām /

imāṃ tanujāṃ surabheravehi rudraujasā tu prahṛtaṃ

tvayāsyām //

—And again how is it possible to avert the wrath of the great sage by offering other cows? Know that this cow is in no way inferior to Surabhi, and it is only through the influence of the god Rudra that you have been able to attack her.

ibid. II, 54.

Kuntaka feels that this reply of the king detracts from the dignity of his character. Greatness demands that the king must protect his protege no matter whether she is a divine cow or not. But the king argues that he might have allowed Nandini to be killed if she were an ordinary cow, and not the daughter of the divine cow-mother Surabhi. This shows the king's readiness to betray the trust if his charge were not as valuable as Nandini.

This is least expected from such high character as Dilipa's. Kuntaka feels that his single blemish going against the concept of aucitya vitiates the entire beautiful second canto of Raghuvaṃśa

just as a piece of beautiful costly cloth is made ugly by a single spot of burn—

prabandhasyapi kvacitprakaranaikadeśe'pyancitya
virahadekadeśadahadusitadagdhapataprayata prusajyate

V. J. page 76.

Kuntaka then takes the following stanza from the third canto of Kumārasambhava :

Kāmekapatnīm vrataduḥśīlām lolam
manaścārutayā praviṣṭam /
Nītabhinimicchasi muktalajjām kaṇṭhe
svayaṃ grāhaniṣaktabāhum //

—What lady is 'it,—has by her charms caught at present your fickle fancy — is yet averse to gratify your wishes. And is troublesome by her absolute devotion to her own wedded lord Shall I set her free from her shame ? Shall she of her own accord twist her arms round your neck ?

Kumāra, III, 7.

Kuntaka feels that very loose and frivolous spirit of the verse verging almost on vulgarity does not at all fit in with his gravity of the atmosphere charged with the ravages of the demon Tāḍaka and with the most serious thoughts about the means of protecting the heavenly kingdom.

Without going into the discussion whether Kuntaka is exactly correct in finding these faults we must admit that he impresses us highly with his exceptional power of critical insight. Whether we agree with him or not his criticism cannot be easily dismissed and gives us enough food for thought.

Appendix VIII

RĀGHAVABHAṬṬA

Of numerous commentaries on Kālidāsa's Abhijñāna Śākuntalam the commentary called arthadyotanikā by Rāghavabhaṭṭa, son of Pṛthīdhara an authority on Nyāya and Mīmāṃsā, is the most well-known. Rāghavabhaṭṭa has chosen the South Indian recension of the play to comment and that is why some of the verses appearing only in the East Indian recension are not commented by Rāghava. His commentary has not only interpreted successfully aesthetic niceties in the play but has spotted out points of interest concerning dramaturgy which he has explained by citing even authors whose works have not come down to us. From the name of the commentary arthadyotanikā and numerous citations from the Dhvanyāloka it appears that Rāghava was an advocate of Dhvani-school and as such he has quoted profusely from the authors who are decidedly adherents of Dhvani-school. But in proper assessment Kālidāsa's poetic beauty he has to find out some poetic flaws also in the verses of the play. It is very much interesting that Rāghava, though being a devout follower of Dhvani-school, has chosen Mahimabhaṭṭa for the purpose of examining poetic defects in the play. He has not only followed Mahima in this respect but has carried Mahima's principles of poetic flaws to their extreme. Like Mahima he has recommended reconstruction of Kālidāsa's stanzas which are not at all improvement but deterioration of the worst sort. Of the five flaws shown by Mahima. Rāghava has shown the two flaws Prakramabheda and Kramabheda is most of the verses of the play with a sense of over-fastidiousness which makes poetry itself impossible. That is why Pūrṇasvarasvatī in his commentary on the first verse of the second part of the Meghadūta has rightly observed that such trivialities as the Prakramabheda do not detract from the eminence of the poet.

In defence of the great poets Mahima myself quotes the famous like of the Kumārasambhava eko hi doṣo etc. But from this Mahima logically concludes that the fault is very much there, though it is clean from immediate detection on account of overwhelming excellences attached to the poetic composition. Sometimes in a composition consisting of many sentences the breach of order and symmetry does not at once come to light due to the dis-

tance between words belonging to separate sentences. That we do not easily detect the breach does not prove its non-existence. If there is breach there is fault and it does not matter whether we see it or not, since the causal relation between the breach and the fault exists there as reality. Hence the breach of order and sequence constitutes the most comprehensive fault which lies visible or invisible in almost all poetic compositions high or low —

tadedaduktam bhavati sarva eva bhaṇitiprakāraḥ
prakramabhedasya viṣaya iti — V. V. page 316.

In the verse —

gāhautām mahiṣā nipānasalilam śṛṅgairmuhustāditam .

Chāyābaddhakadambakam mṛgakulam romanthamabhya-
syatu /

Viśrabhdam kriyatām varāhatatibhirmustākṣatiḥ palvale

Viśrāmaḥ labhatāmidam ca śīthilajyābandhama-
smaddanuḥ //

Abhi. Śāk. II. 6

Mahima has spotted out the poetic fault of asymmetry in relation to Kāraka and Rāghava has repeated with approval the observation of Mahima on the verse. The reconstruction of the śloka as suggested by Mahima has been accepted with additional points in justification of the emendation.

It is interesting to remember in this context that Vāmana and many other ālaṃkārikas have cited this very verse as a specimen of all the ten standard poetic excellences (guṇa) combined in one and as such it has been recognised by them as a striking example of vaidarbhīṛīti. But while suggesting the reconstruction - Kurvantvastabhiyo varāhatatayo mustākṣatim.

Neither Mahima nor Rāghava has cared to notice that the alternate reading preferred by them sacrifices the grace of Vaidarbha diction which made Kālidāsa singularly famous. Apart from the harsh sounds in Kurvantvastabhiyo etc, it lacks the suggestion of confidence that is onconveyed by the word visrabdha. Rāghava has also approvingly quoted the verse Pṛthvi Sthirā bhava - etc. as cited by Mahima and records his agreement with him as regards the fault involved in it.

In the verse of Śākuntalam —

tava kusumaśaratvaṃ śītarasmitvamindor

dvayamidamayathārtham dṛśyate madvidheṣu /

viṣṛjati himagarbhairgnimindurmayūkhaistvamapi

kusumaḥṛān vajrasārikaroṣi //

Abhi. Śāk. III. 3.

Mahima discovers the fault of Kramaprakramabheda (asymmetry of order).

The verse begins with reference to the god of love which is consistent with the context and this is followed by reference to the moon. In the second half the referential order is reversed the moon comes first followed by cupid. Thus there is the fault of asymmetry of order. Rāghava at first tries to dismiss the fault as the verse uttered by a love-born king in whom the absence of the sense of order is permissible —

uttarārdhe kramaprukramabhaṅgo virahiṇo rājño vacanamiti
pārihartavyaḥ

Abhi. Śāk. page 88.

But at the very next moment Raghava shows lack of confidence in his proposed defence in the face of Mahima's criticism. With this criticism in mind he suggests reconstruction of the second half in the following way —

tvamiha kusumabānān vajrasārān vidhatse visṛjati sa ca
vahnim sītagarbhair mayūkaiḥ

Abhi. Śāk. page 88.

He thinks that in this way not only defect is rectified but also a new improvement is achieved by repeating the same word Śīta in pratiniṛdeśa in the fourth foot as is there in uddeśa in the first foot. Such audacious suggestion of improvement upon Kālidāsa is too absurdly childish to merit serious consideration. Such readymade formulas of order and sequence may be advised to novices whose business is to produce some verses without producing poetry.

Kālidāsa is furtive that in writing poetry he had no adviser like Mahima and his disciple Rāghava. Rūyyaka, however, has come forward with a clever defence of Kālidāsa. Since the love-born condition of the king provides the context of the verse it is quite consistent that the verse should begin with reference to the weapon of cupid and end with the same. Such defence too is uncalled for, since it also points to a formula which cannot give a guideline to a great poet. We do not think that while writing this verse Kālidāsa had in his mind the clever point of defence raised by Rūyyaka. He was too free to be bound by such trivial sophistication. Anyway, Rūyyaka displays his capacity to realise that this verse of Kālidāsa does not suffer from the fault so laboriously discussed by Mahima and more laboriously sought to be rectified by Rāghava.

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